Book Review | America’s Taiwan Dilemma: Allies’ Reactions and the Stakes for US Reputation

America’s Taiwan Dilemma: Allies’ Reactions and the Stakes for US Reputation. Michael A. Hunzeker and Mark A. Christopher. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press. 2025. ISBN 978-1638573531. Pp. xv, 232. $39.99.

In the mid-20th century, British marques such as Jaguar and Morris Garages were the zenith of automotive excellence, style, and sophistication. While their reputation suggested they were the finest machines on the road, mechanical reality was starkly different; they were notoriously unreliable. Conversely, when Honda entered the American market in the 1970s, it lacked any established reputation; it was perceived as a purveyor of cheap, practical novelties. However, the reality was that these vehicles started every morning, remained leak-free, and reached 200,000 miles with basic maintenance. The enduring lesson is that, over time, reliability becomes reputation. Reputation is a lagging indicator—a snapshot of past performance or a fading echo of who an actor used to be. Reliability, by contrast, is a leading indicator—a prediction of future performance and a clear voice of intent. What does this anecdote offer the national security community? While reputation remains a fixture of U.S. foreign policy discourse, reliability is the more salient variable when examining the cross-Strait alliance issues, challenging national security orthodoxy.

This critical national security challenge, reputation vs. reliability, is the focus of an extensive, multi-year study culminating in the 2025 release of “America’s Taiwan Dilemma,” by Taiwan scholars Michael Hunzeker and Mark Christopher. The authors contend that reliability is the primary variable through which allies assess U.S. commitments regarding Taiwan, not the more frequently cited reputation. While reputation continues to dominate much of the discourse within the national security community, Hunzeker and Christopher argue that it is the tangible expectation of reliable performance that ultimately dictates allied behavior. The most important finding of this study is that America’s reputation for resolve in the Asia-Pacific region does not rest solely on whether Washington defends Taiwan. Instead, the credibility of Washington’s extended deterrence commitments depends on tangible U.S. military capabilities. When it comes to critical decisions, Australia, Japan, and South Korea prioritize Washington’s ability to protect their own interests over its demonstrated willingness to defend others. Interviewing over 100 elite experts on Australia, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States, Hunzeker and Christopher explore four scenarios and subsequent alliance behavior: the U.S. intervenes and Taiwan remains independent, the U.S. intervenes and China gains control of Taiwan, the U.S. not does intervene and Taiwan remains independent, and the U.S. does not intervene and China gains control of Taiwan.

Before proceeding, it is useful to establish baseline definitions for terms like ‘reputation’ and ‘reliability’ which often suffer from variance within the national security lexicon. Reputation –  specifically reputation for resolve – is defined as “the belief others hold about an actor’s willingness to stand firm and face costs, based on that actor’s past behavior.” In contrast, reliability is defined “as the degree to which a given ally considers Washington to be both willing and able to protect that ally’s core national interests.” The primary barrier for this work is its heavy reliance on international relations theory. Although the authors clearly define terms, the argument relies on a baseline fluency in the rhetoric of deterrence and alliances. Consequently, readers without a background in international relations may find it necessary to familiarize themselves with the broader literature to fully appreciate the strategic implications of this work. In the same vein, one of this work’s positive attributes outside its contributions to better understanding cross-Strait relations is how it distills and summarizes expansive international relations theories for the layperson, increasing its accessibility and usefulness outside of a purely academic or expert setting. This work is as much a stand-alone scholarly work as it is a useful primer to those seeking to better understand the principles of deterrence and alliances within international relations.

Starting with the most geographically proximate ally, Japan, the authors conclude that the most optimal outcome is successful deterrence. This strategy relies on a capable military that ensures state survival—an enduring maxim of Machiavelli—and serves as the fulcrum for regional alliance cohesion. However, this reliance on military capacity presents a significant challenge: the Japan Self-Defense Forces are already numerically overmatched by the People’s Liberation Army, a disparity that will likely worsen given Japan’s demographic decline.

Regarding South Korea, the authors present a complex picture beginning from Seoul’s historic ties to China. Unlike Japan or Australia, Seoul remains notably hesitant to commit or comment on cross-strait relations, likely due to its proximity and economic integration with China. Hunzeker and Christopher posit that South Korea experiences the pressures of reliability and reputation more ‘acutely’ than other relevant actors. Yet South Korea proves empirically elusive. While interviews with human subjects reveal an attitude of ambiguity, the authors admit that a distinct unwillingness among South Korean elites to discuss the subject hinders their assessment, complicating their efforts to reach a firm conclusion. Regardless of the limitations, they find that domestic politics will play a factor in any Taiwan scenario for Seoul, more so than for other allies.

The last case study, Australia, benefits from geographic standoff but still faces the challenge of having strong economic ties to China while remaining militarily aligned with the West. Many of Australia’s elites expressed concern that the United States fails to appreciate the unique challenges faced by Canberra. It appears defending Taipei is less of a concern for Australia than the U.S. retaining the military capability to defend Canberra should the need arise.

The authors reveal a remarkably pragmatic consensus among interviewed elites: the primary objective of any state in the international system is survival. Mirroring the reliability of the Honda Accord described in the opening anecdote, elites consistently prioritized reliability over reputation regarding cross-Strait scenarios. Furthermore, the data suggest that Chinese aggression in the Taiwan straits would likely trigger balancing behavior, driving allies closer to the U.S. rather than away. However, this dynamic is contingent upon U.S. material capacity. This necessitates a sustained commitment to military readiness, best demonstrated through purposeful allocation of fiscal resources. Ultimately, the United States can weather damage to its reputation (e.g., by abandoning Taipei) but cannot afford to erode its reliability (its capability to deter through military force generation).

The authors’ focus on material capabilities perhaps undervalues the importance of political capital to generate combat power within democratic societies. While the authors briefly discuss the fiscal costs of such efforts (which they conclude are substantial), a deeper examination of the structural hurdles involved in sustaining military reliability would strengthen the argument. As someone entrenched in military personnel studies, my primary quibble is that military capacity is significantly constrained by demographics—a variable to which the authors pay relatively little attention. This omission is significant given the unmistakable numeric disparity between the Chinese military (quantitatively superior) and the allied forces under examination. Nevertheless, national security policymakers and practitioners—specifically those focused on the Indo-Pacific—can benefit greatly from this work. It effectively challenges Taiwan scenario shibboleths, allied decision-making, and the author’s own conclusions that contradict their initial assumptions.

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