The current conditions in Syria and Lebanon are far from stable—yet both nations, and the region, would benefit from their induction into a geopolitical framework alongside Israel.

The Middle East today stands at one of its most fragile and strategically crucial moments in years. Nowhere is this more visible than on the Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese border, where relations sway in a volatile pendulum between military escalation and unparalleled diplomatic opportunities. As our research at the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum (MENAF) illustrates, this fluctuation, sometimes shifting within minutes, exhibits not only the fragility of the current landscape but also the extraordinary potential for an expanded Abraham Accords framework if the moment is managed sensibly.

Why Have the Abraham Accords Endured Despite All Odds?

In both Syria and Lebanon, the dynamics that are unfolding are neither linear nor anticipated. They depict a variable interplay between political transition, deterrence, and the US-led attempts to restructure the region’s security and economic architecture. Our report demonstrates that the Abraham Accords have evolved from a diplomatic initiative into a regional structure that has endured despite a two-year regional war, intense ideological backlash, and broadly unsympathetic public opinion. The Accords’ longevity is rooted not in sentiment, but in a unified stance grounded in national interests hinged on security.

If there is one component that serves as the threshold precondition for the survival and expansion of the Accords, it is the security component. The aftermath of the war illustrates more than ever the centrality of the CENTCOM defense architecture. As IDF spokesman Brigadier General Effie Defrin, who served as the former head of the Foreign Relations Division, told us:

“The coordination [with our Abraham Accords counterparts, including Egypt and Jordan] during the Iranian attacks on Israel was fascinating. It was a combination of air, land, intelligence, radars, sensors, etc. It happened in April 2024, in October 2024, and then, we launched our attack on Iran in June 2025… I think that after two years of war, there is no way back.”

Yet the question now arising in Washington, Jerusalem, Ankara, Damascus, and Beirut is whether this structure can expand. The simple answer is that recent events indicate it could shift rapidly in either direction.

Syria Is Closer to a Deal with Israel Than Many Think

Syria’s landscape predicates significant fluctuations within the pendulum. In one respect, military armed encounters—such as the Israeli attack on a terrorist group in southern Syria on 28 November 2025 as part of its proactive buffer-zone doctrine—illustrate this tension. In addition, tensions within the mosaic of armed actors in Syria, including HTS factions, Druze groups, Kurdish forces, and Alawite loyalists, generate a highly charged environment.

The ascent of the interim government under Ahmed al-Shara, in the context of declining Russian and Iranian influence, the expanding influence of Turkey, and Israel’s dubious approach, has not consolidated the state but has fragmented it further. Against this background, tensions between regional powers Turkey and Israel, now embroiled in a foreign policy crisis, have dovetailed with entrenched internal fragmentations and intensified the overall fragility, leaving it up to the United States’ goodwill and competence to stabilize this environment.

Yet the Middle Eastern newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reports that US mediation facilitated a September meeting between Netanyahu and al-Shara at the UN, with talks advancing to coming close to signing a US-mediated de-confliction agreement—demonstrating that both sides are engaged in intense diplomatic mediation despite rising tensions. Such an agreement would have been inconceivable a year ago; today, it is nearly plausible. As our research shows, the logic driving this change is strategic exhaustion, the demise of the Iranian axis, and the emergence of economic reconstruction as a central incentive for all sides. Yet much remains uncertain—and within this emerging landscape, Syria could become either an arena of pragmatic de-confliction or the next spark of a regional escalation.

Israel’s Dual Lebanon Policy: Fight Hezbollah, Work with Beirut

The Lebanese landscape is equally divergent, epitomizing the pendulum dynamic in its most acute form. On 23 November 2025, Israel assassinated Hezbollah’s chief of staff, one of the most decisive assassinations since the November 2024 ceasefire. This strike was not a distinct incident, but part of a continuous Israeli effort that has removed more than 360 Hezbollah operatives and dismantled over 500 positions in the south of the Litani since the 2024 ceasefire. In essence, Israel is implementing the “hammer” side of the pendulum: a zero tolerance approach, aggressively degrading Hezbollah’s military capabilities and impeding its opportunities for reconstitution in peacetime.

Since its disastrous war with Israel in the fall of 2024, Hezbollah’s operational capacity, financial networks, and political standing are still significantly compromised. Even so, Iran’s main proxy remains openly defiant—rebuilding what it can and repositioning operatives throughout Lebanon. As Hezbollah Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem defiantly echoed, “We will not give up our weapons,” in spite of enormous pressure to do so from other segments of Lebanese society. This posture keeps the crisis on a knife edge, with a heightened probability of military escalation.

And yet, in clear contradiction, a few weeks ago, Israeli and Lebanese officials met in Naqoura for the first formal contact of its kind. That meeting, facilitated through American channels, signaled that while Hezbollah remains an active spoiler, Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam are cautiously probing a path towards de-confliction and rapprochement.

The dichotomy between an Israeli assassination in one day and diplomatic meetings on another is not an anomaly. It implies a structural truth our report demonstrates: rapprochement and escalation are not concurrently exclusive. They correspond in a condensed space shaped by the Iranian axis, rising Abraham Accords conditionality, and Lebanese state reassertion.

The Abraham Accords Framework Could Rapidly Expand—or Collapse

The conjunction of escalation and rapprochement reveals three insights. First, the Israeli, Syrian, Lebanese triangle is no longer restricted by simple binaries. For decades, Israel’s interactions with Syria and Lebanon alternated between war and stalemate. Today, they move fluidly between war and negotiation, even within the same operational cycle.

Second, as our paper argues, the Abraham Accords framework relies fundamentally on the United States as a facilitator. Without US diplomats functioning as patrons, mediators, and guarantors, the pendulum tilts toward instability.

Third are the causative agents for expansion. We argue that if Syria and Lebanon join the Abraham Accords framework—even partially—they could conclude the arc and position the Accords axis as the major framework in the region.

This sensitive moment we are witnessing is historically rare: the conditions for expanding the Accords now coexist alongside the triggers that could push the region back into war within minutes. The region has encountered similar crosswinds in the past. Yet it has never done so with the existing political backdrop: a weakened Iran, whose regime longevity has become an open question; a fragmented Syria open to investments through incentives; a convalescing Lebanon slowly reclaiming its sovereignty from Hezbollah; and a resilient Accords framework that has already endured a regional war. Whether this pendulum swings toward peace or toward war will hinge on how wisely Washington, Jerusalem, Ankara, Damascus and Beirut can render tactical opportunities into strategic agreements. The window is open, but narrow.

About the Author: Gad Yishayahu

Dr. Gad Yishayahu is a visiting lecturer in the Department of International Relations at City, St George’s University of London, and a senior fellow, lead researcher on Security and Crisis at the Cambridge Middle East and North Africa Forum.

Image: Shutterstock / noamgalai.

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