The Donroe Doctrine and US China Competition in Latin America

 

President Trump is famously pursuing an America First policy. In the 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS), he emphasized securing the Northern Hemisphere and defending it from narco-traffickers, terrorists, and external powers such as China, treating Beijing’s expanding influence in Latin America as a direct U.S. national security issue.

The strategy asserts a U.S. security blanket over the entire continent of the Americas, a posture that has been dubbed the Donroe Doctrine, an explicit echo of the Monroe Doctrine. Officially, the 2026 National Defense Strategy refers to this approach as the “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine,” formalizing the principle that the United States will intervene unilaterally to prevent extra-hemispheric powers such as China, Russia, and Iran from gaining a strategic foothold in the region.

To understand the current state of U.S.–China competition in Latin America, it must be viewed through the lens of the Monroe Doctrine, a nearly 200-year-old policy now reasserted with a sharper, modern edge. Established in 1823, the doctrine warned external powers to stay out of the Western Hemisphere and treated the Americas as a distinct U.S. sphere of security.

In the early twentieth century, the Roosevelt Corollary expanded this principle, asserting the U.S. right to intervene as a regional police power. That evolution laid the foundation for the assertive hemispheric posture President Trump is now reviving in response to China’s expanding economic, political, and strategic presence in Latin America.

The NDS makes this shift explicit by redefining the U.S. military’s foremost priority away from global power projection and toward Homeland and Hemispheric Defense. The strategy expands the concept of the homeland itself, treating the entire Western Hemisphere, from the Arctic, including Greenland, to the southern tip of South America, as a secondary defensive perimeter for the U.S. mainland.

Within this framework, the NDS places heavy emphasis on non-traditional threats, formally reclassifying drug cartels as narco-terrorists, a designation that permits the use of military assets previously reserved for conventional warfare. This shift has already translated into action, including drone strikes in the Caribbean and expanded operations targeting cartel networks and affiliated actors in Venezuela.

At the same time, the strategy frames Chinese economic and infrastructure investments in Latin America, including port ownership and control of logistics hubs near the Panama Canal, as direct military and strategic threats rather than neutral commercial activity. The Trump Corollary seeks to neutralize this influence through what the administration describes as transactional diplomacy and denial defense, with the objective of preventing any adversarial competitor from establishing military access, basing arrangements, or decisive economic leverage in what the strategy openly describes as America’s backyard.

In this sense, the Donroe Doctrine is not a rhetorical revival of the Monroe Doctrine but a modernized security framework designed to counter China’s advance into the Western Hemisphere and reassert U.S. dominance over hemispheric defense.

China’s third policy paper on Latin America and the Caribbean confirms President Trump’s suspicion that China intends to assert itself further in the region and signals a more explicit, comprehensive, and security-oriented push into the Western Hemisphere. Framed around building a “China–LAC community with a shared future,” the document makes clear that Beijing’s primary objective is political rather than merely economic.

The concept reflects China’s intent to reshape the regional order in ways that marginalize U.S. influence, legitimize Beijing’s authoritarian system, and secure deference to Chinese core interests, particularly on Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party expects Latin American countries not only to avoid relations with Taiwan but to actively support Beijing’s sovereignty claims and reunification goals. China has already demonstrated a willingness to punish governments that deviate from this line, using economic pressure and diplomatic retaliation to enforce compliance, and is accelerating efforts to flip Taiwan’s remaining diplomatic allies in the region.

Economically, China outlines an expansive Development Program that goes well beyond trade. The document emphasizes Belt and Road infrastructure, energy, ports, telecommunications, space cooperation, and high-tech sectors including AI, semiconductors, aerospace, and digital networks.

Much of this infrastructure is dual-use, blurring civilian and military lines, and includes Chinese space facilities, satellite navigation through the Beidou system, and logistical hubs. China already operates more space-related infrastructure in Latin America than anywhere outside mainland China and has stated its intent to build regional logistics bases tied to Antarctic operations.

The paper also marks a significant escalation in security cooperation. Under its so-called Peace Program, China expands military, law enforcement, cybersecurity, judicial, and intelligence collaboration with Latin American governments. This reflects growing confidence in exporting China’s internal security model and embedding Chinese influence within regional police forces, courts, and digital governance systems. Beijing presents this as benign cooperation while positioning itself as an alternative security partner to the United States.

Although the policy paper does not name the United States directly, its timing and content strongly suggest a response to President Trump’s renewed emphasis on hemispheric security and the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine.

Chinese officials and state-linked commentators have openly framed China’s expansion in Latin America as a way to counter U.S. pressure on China’s core interests, particularly Taiwan, by pushing into what Washington considers its immediate strategic neighborhood.

Under President Trump, the United States is already taking concrete steps to counter China in Latin America. These include blocking Beijing from owning or controlling strategic assets such as ports near the Panama Canal and 5G telecommunications networks, applying tariffs and sanctions to discourage regional alignment with extra-hemispheric powers, and pursuing the removal of Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro to prevent the country from becoming a Chinese proxy. The administration has also increased U.S. naval and troop activity to signal that the region remains firmly within the U.S. security sphere.

China, by contrast, does not operate through a formal doctrine, but its Belt and Road Initiative has made it a dominant economic force across the region. Beijing has become the top trading partner for much of South America, overtaking the United States in several key markets.

It has invested heavily in critical resources, particularly lithium in the Argentina–Bolivia–Chile Lithium Triangle and copper mining in Peru, while presenting itself as an alternative partner that does not lecture governments on democracy or governance, an approach that appeals to leaders frustrated by U.S. conditions.

As Washington seeks to reassert dominance, many Latin American countries are pursuing what they describe as active non-alignment, attempting to extract economic benefits from China while maintaining traditional security ties with the United States. This dynamic has sharpened the geopolitical clash between the two powers.

While the United States remains the largest foreign investor in Latin America, U.S. private firms are often reluctant to compete with Chinese state-backed enterprises on large-scale infrastructure projects. The Trump administration has moved to expand U.S. development financing, but questions remain over whether it can match China’s scale or speed.

In response to mounting U.S. pressure, China has worked to reassure regional partners by portraying itself as a cooperative, development-focused actor, signaling flexibility in its engagement while making clear that it does not intend to withdraw from the region.

At the same time, Latin America is undergoing an ideological shift, with right-leaning, Trump-aligned leaders winning elections across the region, including Laura Fernández in Costa Rica, José Antonio Kast in Chile, Nasry Asfura in Honduras, Rodrigo Paz Pereira in Bolivia, Javier Milei in Argentina, and Daniel Noboa in Ecuador.

Nayib Bukele remains the ideological reference point for this emerging bloc. This regional shift raises the possibility that more Latin American governments may support U.S. efforts to limit Chinese access and influence in the Americas.

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