From Conflict to Troubled “Peace”: Lessons From Colombia’s Counterinsurgency

This article argues that Colombia’s long-running counterinsurgency success was not the result of military pressure alone, but due to the integration of security operations with public diplomacy and institutional reform aimed at addressing the underlying drivers of violence. It further contends that one of the most challenging aspects of a counterinsurgency campaign emerges after major combat operations, as insurgent organizations fragment and adapt into transnational criminal and narcotics networks. Drawing on this experience, the article demonstrates how U.S. policymakers can apply these insights to contemporary counternarcotics and security assistance efforts in the Caribbean by pairing military operations with governance support, regional partnership-building, and targeted investment in local security and justice institutions.

Introduction

The decades-long counterinsurgency campaign conducted by the Colombian military is often cited as a model for what should be done to combat irregular armed groups. Colombian forces faced the complex challenge of fighting several insurgent groups while initially receiving limited and inconsistent support from Bogotá. Although the conflict was initially rooted in deep historical grievances, its trajectory has shifted over time. This evolution reflects the growing influence of internal and external actors seeking to steer the campaign in ways that align with their personal objectives. Throughout Colombia’s campaign, the United States provided extensive financial and material assistance while pressing Colombia to prioritize counternarcotics operations. Despite these competing pressures, Colombian authorities successfully targeted the most capable insurgent organizations and ultimately brought key actors to the negotiating table. The final stage of the conflict has nevertheless revealed significant difficulties in ending a counterinsurgency campaign. One of the largest challenges has been when insurgent groups fragment, some elements remain unwilling to surrender profitable illicit enterprises and instead persist in committing acts of violence.

This article will advance three interrelated claims. First, Colombia’s counterinsurgency campaign succeeded not solely because of improved military capacity, but because security operations were consistently paired with institutional reform and efforts to extend state presence into contested areas. Second, the Colombian case demonstrates that the most difficult phase of a counterinsurgency emerges after battlefield success, when fragmented insurgent groups transform into hybrid criminal organizations sustained by narcotics revenues. Finally, the case demonstrates that US security assistance is most effective when it prioritizes partner capacity in security and justice institutions alongside regional coordination, rather than narrowly focusing on kinetic operations or drug interdiction.

Origins of the Colombian Conflict

The origins of Colombia’s internal conflict can be traced to la Violencia, a decade of political violence lasting from 1948 to 1958. Discontent with the power-sharing agreements designed to end the violence led to the formation of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN). These groups would take up arms against the government in Bogotá and would frame their campaigns in ideological and socioeconomic terms. The insurgency would be a long and complicated affair with the growth of other non-traditional actors, including drug cartels and right-wing paramilitary organizations such as the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). The conflict was characterized by a combination of military and police operations into insurgent strongholds and widespread violence against civilian populations. FARC and ELN would frequently conduct high-profile kidnappings and assassinations, including the abduction of a presidential candidate and a sitting senator. At the same time, the US expanded its support for the Colombian government, investing billions of dollars to modernize the Colombian military and National Police and reduce the flow of illicit narcotics. This emphasis on drug interdiction blurred the distinction between political insurgency and organized crime, as groups like FARC and AUC relied heavily on the narcotics trade. By the turn of the twenty-first century, increased pressure from the Colombian military and the continued support for the Colombian government from the US would see the beginning of peace negotiations.

Operational and Political Approaches to Counterinsurgency

The Colombian counterinsurgency strategy evolved into a multifaceted effort that combined direct military action with political and social initiatives aimed at restoring state legitimacy. The Colombian Army primarily focused on a mix of targeted raids against insurgent strongholds and leadership, alongside a public diplomacy campaign aimed at the rural population sympathetic to the insurgent groups. The Colombian Army’s primary tactic of direct action was launching targeted raids into territory controlled by FARC and the ELN. This aggressive strategy began in 1964 with Operation Marquetalia, which was designed to occupy the principal zone of resistance and capture key leadership. While these initial campaigns would be unsuccessful, the Colombian military and National Police would maintain a steady tempo in these raids and would steadily deplete FARC leadership. This success was aided by FARC’s key vulnerabilities, especially its reliance on a conventional apparatus to support its operations. Dr. Thomas Marks of the National Defense University argues that “base areas and mobility corridors resulted in a dual center of gravity vulnerable to Colombian military attack: the insurgent units themselves and their sources of sustenance.” This increased pressure on key FARC leaders would be a critical factor in bringing the group to the negotiating table in the 2010s.

The Colombian government has prioritized engagement with rural communities as a deliberate strategy to erode popular support for FARC and the ELN. A lack of personal security and the absence of state presence in rural areas have necessitated a strategy of public engagement. This has included stationing military and police units in towns to provide greater security and investing billions in infrastructure and agricultural projects. These agriculture projects have subsidized farmers and eased their transition to alternative agricultural products, and away from the cultivation of coca plants. Although these initiatives were introduced during the conflict, they have endured into the present to address these drivers of armed violence.

In parallel to rural initiatives, the Colombian government has conducted an information campaign against FARC and the ELN that has contributed to growing public opposition to these groups’ political objectives. This campaign has been reinforced by the brutal actions committed by the insurgent organizations, which have further undermined their legitimacy. A  2001 report by the Council on Foreign Relations observed that “various nationwide movements have brought together millions of Colombians to protests against rampant violence and kidnapping.”

Institutional Reform and Military Adaptation

Another critical factor of Colombia’s counterinsurgency success was the military’s willingness to acknowledge institutional shortcomings and implement comprehensive reforms. During the 1990s, Colombian military leaders recognized that existing structures were insufficient to confront increasingly capable insurgent forces. These reforms targeted several key weaknesses, including recruitment, training, and unit performance. This recognition of key failings, especially during a period when both the FARC and the ELN were growing stronger thanks to the expanding illicit drug market, was important for regaining institutional stability. These reforms have continued into the present, with the need now to scale down from a higher-intensity conflict to the lower-intensity operational tempo of general security operations. The current concern regarding institutional reforms is making sure that the Colombian military and National Police properly align with the overall peace process and the re-establishment of the Colombian justice system as the primary driver against the cartels. These efforts by the Colombian military to reform their military in response to the needs of the conflict, along with the speed and scale of these reforms, are unique. Comparing these reforms with those attempted by the US military during the Global War on Terror illustrates how bureaucratic resistance, an entrenched officer corps, and interservice competition can hinder institutional reform. This comparison thereby underscores the significance of Colombia’s adaptive capacity and the importance of being able to quickly understand key institutional failings.

The Role of the United States

US involvement in Colombia dates to the 1960s, and has included economic assistance, military aid, and advisory support. US involvement initially began during the Cold War and reflected concerns that Latin American allies might fall to communist revolutions, particularly in the aftermath of the Cuban Revolution. The initial partnership centered on the Alliance for Progress aid program, launched in 1961 to promote democracy, economic development, and suppress emerging communist organizations. However, the most consequential phase of US support was Plan Colombia. This program was instituted in 2000 to “combat guerrilla violence, strengthen Colombia’s institutions, and stem drug production and trafficking”. Beyond the financial support, the US would provide direct support through security force assistance missions led by the Department of Defense. Additional efforts included the establishment of the Lancero School in Colombia, in part modeled on US Army Ranger training, and educational exchanges that would allow Colombian officers to study in the United States. Finally, the US Army Special Operations Forces would be deployed to Colombia with the mission to train and support the Colombian military and National Police forces. US Army SOF would also assist in creating an integrated structure between the army and police forces to create a unified force to target the insurgent groups.

While the US wished for Colombia to defeat the insurgents, it primarily wished for the flow of illicit narcotics out of Colombia to cease. This focus on counternarcotics drove much of the funding and the provision of support from the US government, including bleeding over into agencies that are not usually responsible for counternarcotic operations. This is most clearly illustrated by United States Southern Command. USSOUTHCOM conducts all US military operations in Latin America, and in the FY2026 budget, the Department of Defense requested $350.1 million for “counterdrug programs”. This emphasis on counternarcotics for the US and the increased presence of the US military in operations targeting drug traffickers in the Caribbean has led to increased tensions between Colombia and the US.

Strategic Missteps and the Paramilitary Problem

Despite operational successes, Colombian counterinsurgency efforts were undermined by several strategic missteps. The most damaging was the state’s tacit and, at times, direct cooperation with the AUC. Originating from local self-defense groups formed by wealthy landowners, the AUC consolidated in 1997 and developed close relationships with elements of the Colombian military. The Colombian military and AUC would have such a close operating relationship with the Colombian military that “one report from Human Rights Watch titled Paramilitaries: the Sixth Division – the Colombian army having only five divisions”. These paramilitary groups conducted their campaign against the guerrillas with extreme brutality, and assassinations and intimidation of civilian and guerrilla leaders were common. The AUC would also engage in several criminal activities to raise funds, including kidnappings and drug smuggling. The AUC’s actions rose to such prominence in the international community that the US designated the AUC as a foreign terrorist organization from 2001 until 2014. Although the Colombian government eventually severed ties with the AUC and oversaw its partial demobilization, earlier cooperation proved counterproductive. The inability to exercise effective oversight over AUC would damage state legitimacy, complicated post-conflict reconciliation, and reinforced cycles of violence that outlasted formal demobilization. This cycle of violence has been driven by various successor organizations that have begun appearing in the post-conflict void.

Peace and Persistent Challenges

Initial negotiations between FARC and the Colombian government began in 2012, with a final peace agreement to be finalized in 2016. This agreement has focused on illegal crop eradication, transnational justice, and rebel disarmament, along with the implementation of the peace deal. It also focuses on bringing FARC members and clearing the land mines that had been planted by both the Colombian government and the guerrillas. The ELN has remained active, although it’s greatly diminished. It continues to clash with the Colombian military and National Police, and its longstanding drug operations have drawn renewed international attention amid recent US interdiction operations in the Caribbean.

Relevance for Contemporary Irregular Conflict

Colombia’s counterinsurgency campaign remains relevant for many policymakers and military professionals confronting irregular threats today. The current American operations in the Caribbean targeting drug trafficking networks are closely linked to Colombia’s historical role as one of the largest production and trafficking hubs of coca. While Colombia has been overshadowed by the Venezuelan regime in these actions, there is still a great deal of tension between the two administrations. Many of the contemporary criminal and insurgent networks can trace their origins to Colombia’s armed groups, displaying the persistence of hybrid political-criminal actors. If the US is serious in its desire to combat these irregular actors effectively, it must understand the history of Colombia’s campaign to combat insurgencies and drug traffickers. Examining current US counternarcotics operations in the Caribbean, the Colombian experience highlights three priorities for effective policy. Fostering cooperation between military and judicial forces, maintaining state presence beyond military deployments, and recognizing the limits of purely kinetic or counternarcotics-focused strategies.

Conclusion

The Colombian conflict is a demonstration of how effective a patient and multi-pronged counterinsurgency operation can be. The success of this operation was contingent on improving relations with the rural population and the willingness of the Colombian military to institute reform when it wasn’t institutionally strong enough to defeat a guerrilla force. US support demonstrates the effectiveness of high-quality training provided through security force assistance operations. It also demonstrates how adequate resources can improve the operational capabilities of military and police units engaged in counterinsurgency. While there were missteps and diverging interests between internal and external actors, the campaign was effective enough to bring the major leaders to the table to negotiate an end to the conflict. While the road to peace is still a long one, the Colombian government displayed that it was able to tackle multiple insurgent groups within a single conflict.

The post From Conflict to Troubled “Peace”: Lessons From Colombia’s Counterinsurgency appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.