Muscat’s facilitation of talks has helped the region more than once. Now Oman must act quickly to convince Iran to make meaningful concessions and prevent conflict.

For years, Oman’s quiet diplomacy was viewed with suspicion across the Gulf. Muscat’s insistence on maintaining open channels to Tehran, especially during periods of acute regional tension, often made it appear the odd man out within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Some partners saw Oman as naïve, others as unhelpfully independent, and a few quietly worried that its neutrality diluted collective pressure on Iran. With the Gulf monarchies now lobbying the White House to stick with talks with Iran in Muscat, that view has changed. 

By January 2026, most Gulf capitals had come to accept not only the value of Omani mediation but also its necessity. What has not changed is the scale of the danger ahead, and the reality that Oman now needs to do more than pass messages. It needs to press Iran harder than ever before to rethink policies that could drag the region toward war.

The shift in Gulf thinking became visible in mid-January, when fears of a US strike on Iran spiked amid Tehran’s violent crackdown on nationwide protests. On January 15, 2026, a senior Saudi official confirmed that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman had led a “frantic, last-minute” diplomatic effort to persuade President Donald Trump to hold off on military action and “give Iran a chance” to de-escalate. That intervention was not symbolic. US personnel were temporarily drawn down from Qatar’s Al-Udeid Air Base, regional embassies issued security warnings, and Gulf leaders scrambled to prevent what they feared could spiral into an uncontrollable regional conflict.

This was not the behavior of states freeloading on Oman’s diplomacy. It was the behavior of governments that now recognize how devastating a US-Iran war would be, not just for Iran, but for the Gulf itself. Oil markets would shudder, investor confidence would evaporate, and Iranian retaliation would almost certainly land on Gulf soil. The 2019 strike on Saudi oil facilities and Iran’s June 2025 attack on Al-Udeid, following US strikes during the 12-day Israel-Iran war, remain vivid reminders of how quickly escalation can cross borders.

By January 2026, even Saudi Arabia, long Iran’s fiercest regional rival, was acting less like a spoiler and more like a cautious stakeholder in de-escalation. Riyadh, Doha, and Muscat were no longer arguing over whether to engage Iran, but how to prevent Washington and Tehran from stumbling into open conflict. That alone marks a profound evolution in GCC attitudes toward Oman’s role. What was once seen as unhelpful neutrality is now widely viewed as a stabilizing asset.

Oman’s centrality to this effort was not accidental. On January 10, 2026, Omani foreign minister Badr bin Hamad Al Busaidi traveled to Tehran, meeting President Masoud Pezeshkian, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and Ali Larijani, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. The visit came at a moment when traditional US-Iran channels appeared to be breaking down, and Trump was openly threatening military action. Within days of Al Busaidi’s meetings, Trump publicly suggested that Iran wanted to negotiate, an indication that messages were indeed moving quietly through Muscat.

This is familiar territory for Oman. It was Muscat that hosted secret US-Iran talks in 2013, laying the groundwork for the 2015 nuclear deal. It was Oman that mediated prisoner releases, carried messages during moments of crisis, and kept talking when others disengaged. Arab analysts often describe this approach as “positive neutrality”: not ideological sympathy for Iran, but a state-centric doctrine rooted in non-intervention, balance, and dialogue. Oman’s internal political culture and religious pluralism reinforce this instinct, as does its history of survival alongside larger, more volatile neighbors.

Yet Oman’s success has also exposed its limits. Mediation works when both sides believe restraint serves their interests. Today, Iran increasingly behaves as if escalation is tolerable, or even useful. Tehran insists on continuing high-level enrichment, restricts international inspections, and frames its regional strategy around pushing the United States and Israel out of the Middle East. That posture might play well ideologically, but it is strategically brittle. It assumes a level of risk tolerance in Washington and Jerusalem that no longer exists and underestimates how exposed the Gulf would be in any broader conflict.

This is where Oman’s role must evolve. Passing messages is no longer enough. Muscat is one of the very few capitals whose warnings Tehran actually hears, and that gives Oman both influence and responsibility. The same trust that allows Oman to carry US messages should now be used to deliver a harder one to Iran: that its current trajectory is unsustainable, and that the region will not absorb another major war without lasting damage to everyone, including Iran itself.

Importantly, this message would not be coming from Washington or Israel, but from a Gulf neighbor whose primary interest is regional survival. Iran’s own diplomats have implicitly acknowledged this. In mid-January, Iran’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia confirmed intensified contacts with Saudi, Qatari, and Omani officials, warning that any conflict, even one targeting a single country, would have catastrophic regional consequences. Tehran welcomes dialogue when it serves as a brake on escalation. It must now be pressed to accept that dialogue also requires adjustment.

The space for compromise still exists. Iran does not need to surrender its nuclear program to reduce risk. It could step back from the highest enrichment levels or suspend enrichment indefinitely to build trust, restore meaningful IAEA access, and signal restraint in its regional posture, without framing these moves as an ideological retreat. The United States, for its part, can offer meaningful sanctions relief and avoid maximalist demands. These are precisely the kinds of narrow, transactional steps Oman has helped broker before.

But none of this will occur if Muscat confines itself to quiet facilitation. The region’s mood has shifted. The GCC states that, once questioned, Oman’s engagement with Iran is now relied upon as a firewall against catastrophe. That acceptance gives Oman greater political cover than ever before to speak bluntly in Tehran, not publicly, but firmly and privately.

Oman has long preferred the shadows, operating as a discreet messenger rather than a visible shaper of outcomes. That instinct served it well for decades. Today, however, discretion without direction risks irrelevance. The danger is no longer diplomatic embarrassment, but war by miscalculation. If Muscat wants its mediation to remain credible and its region intact, it must use its good offices in Tehran not just to relay messages but also to influence Iranian choices in ways it has rarely attempted before. Oman’s quiet role has always been valuable. Now it must also be consequential.

About the Author: Alex Vatanka

Alex Vatanka is the director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute. He was formerly a Senior Analyst at Jane’s Information Group in London. He was formerly a senior analyst at Jane’s Information Group in London. His most recent book is The Battle of the Ayatollahs in Iran: The United States, Foreign Policy, and Political Rivalry Since 1979. Follow him on X: @AlexVatanka. The author would like to thank Hamad Alshamlan, a research assistant at the Middle East Institute, for his contribution.

Image: Oscar Gonzalez Fuentes / Shutterstock.com.

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