Egypt 2013 And Bangladesh 2026: Parallels And Warnings – Analysis

Nearly 128 million eligible voters in 300 constituencies will cast their ballots on February 12 in Bangladesh. Voters will not only choose new legislators but also participate in a referendum on a proposed reform package known as the July Charter. 

While Egypt’s precoup climate in 2013 was not identical to Bangladesh’s current situation, the similarities are significant enough that Bangladesh should take the lessons of Egypt’s experience seriously. At the same time, important differences between Bangladesh and Egypt should caution against drawing overly direct comparisons. Bangladesh’s military, despite its influence, has not exercised overt political power since 2008 and lacks Egypt’s long history of direct rule. Unlike Egypt in 2013, Bangladesh also has a more competitive media environment, a larger and more politically mobilized civil society, and a population that has repeatedly demonstrated strong commitment to electoral politics. Additionally, Bangladesh does not face the same level of regional ideological competition that shaped Egypt’s crisis. These distinctions do not erase the risks, but they underscore that Bangladesh’s political trajectory is not predetermined and remains open to negotiated, democratic solutions.

The fall of Morsi teaches us what happens when:

• state institutions reject democratic outcomes,
• polarization overwhelms consensus,
• external and domestic power centers align to predetermine the result, and
• elections occur without trust, transparency, or inclusion.

Bangladesh now finds itself at a comparable historical crossroads, with risks that are neither abstract nor remote, especially in the event of an electoral victory by the Jamaat alliance.

1. Fragile Democracies Collapse When Powerful Institutions Don’t Accept Electoral Outcomes

Egypt’s democracy did not fail because voters chose poorly; it failed because the military, bureaucracy, judiciary, and security services, which can be termed “Deep State”, never truly accepted civilian rule. In Bangladesh, the military remains a decisive “power behind the scenes”, even if not overtly seeking power. Bangladesh Army provided safe passage and temporary protection to hundreds of individuals—including senior Awami League figures—inside cantonments during and after the 2024 uprising. The military’s involvement in key state functions has resembled a shadow or shared governance structure. Soldiers have been deployed nationwide for more than a year with expanded legal authority, shaping political order during the run-up to the vote. 

Like Egypt, Bangladesh is experiencing:

• a weakened police force,
• a highly politicized bureaucracy,
• intelligence agencies active in political spheres.

This institutional imbalance means that who wins at the ballot box may not be the actor who ultimately governs, unless civilian institutions are genuinely empowered and independent.

2. Excluding Major Political Forces Always De-legitimizes Elections

One of the immediate catalysts of Egypt’s democratic collapse was the systematic exclusion of major political blocs—whether through repression, legal restrictions, or widespread arrest campaigns. Although the Ikhwan alMuslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood) has existed since the late 1920s, it was permitted to operate openly only during the brief period between the fall of Hosni Mubarak and the removal of President Mohamed Morsi. Once the Brotherhood was barred from meaningful participation in politics, the system lost its equilibrium—both in the turbulent period leading up to Morsi’s ouster and in the aftermath that followed.

Bangladesh faces a similar danger. The Awami League (AL) has been banned from participating in the 2026 election, leaving millions of its supporters with no political representation. Analysts describe this as one of the most serious threats to the legitimacy of the upcoming election. Hasina’s son and key adviser, Sajeeb Wazed, previously stated that AL supporters would take to the streets and block the elections. Many analysts, however, believe that AL supporters may instead vote for the BNP, which some observers characterize as the Awami League’s “Bteam”.

When a major political force is removed from the ballot:

• polarization deepens,
• a large segment of society withdraws its consent,
• and the election becomes a technical exercise rather than a democratic choice.

This is precisely what happened in Egypt—and it is the clearest lesson for Bangladesh. 

If Bangladesh fails to build an inclusive settlement, the 2026 election risks becoming a winner-takes-all contest, which is precisely the dynamic that destroyed Egypt’s transition.

3. Deep Polarization Creates a Vacuum the Military Can Fill

Egypt in 2012–2013 was deeply polarized between Muslim democrats (who believed that Islam and democracy can coexist), secularists, old-regime loyalists, and a frustrated public. This polarization made compromise impossible. Into that vacuum, the military stepped, claiming to “protect stability.”

Bangladesh today shows signs of severe polarization, in ways that echo—though do not replicate—the tensions Egypt faced in 2012–2013: 

• A divided opposition (BNP, Jamaat, NCP, fragmented civic groups). The younger generation is calling for a new constitution, an end to dynastic politics, genuine judicial independence, resistance to perceived Indian hegemony, and the creation of a meritbased, nondiscriminatory society that guarantees fundamental human rights. Their vision of a “Second Republic” resonates widely among those who participated in the 2024 uprising. Yet the National Citizen Party (NCP)—formed out of the student movement that helped topple Hasina—faces two major challenges: its polling numbers remain significantly lower than those of the BNP and Jamaat, and its leadership lacks the political experience needed to present itself as a fully viable governing alternative. 

• The 2024 uprising—marked by mass demonstrations, violent clashes, and widespread demands for systemic change—left behind a deep reservoir of public anger. Many Bangladeshis, particularly those who felt marginalized or mistreated during previous political cycles, now view the postuprising transition as incomplete or unfulfilled. A significant portion of the public believes that individuals responsible for past political, administrative, or securitysector abuses have yet to be held accountable.

Compounding this frustration is the perception that the BNP, rather than pursuing a clean break from old practices, has provided refuge to numerous former Awami League leaders and assumed control of several syndicates once dominated by the previous ruling party. These developments deepen mistrust toward state institutions and reinforce skepticism about any emerging political arrangement. As a result, even wellintentioned reforms are often greeted with suspicion rather than confidence.

This kind of lingering resentment mirrors what occurred in Egypt after the 2011 uprising, where unmet expectations and unresolved grievances steadily hardened divisions between groups that initially fought for change together.

• Youth activism colliding with institutional caution. Young activists in Bangladesh have become increasingly assertive, demanding transparency, accountability, and structural reform. Yet key institutions—civil service, judiciary, military, police, and longentrenched political networks—tend to prefer incremental change or stability over rapid transformation.

This produces a clash of expectations: the youth expect bold moves, while institutions prioritize caution. That mismatch widens distrust between generations and between street-level mobilization and formal governance.

• A banned ruling party whose supporters now operate underground or abroad. The political exclusion of the former ruling party has pushed many of its organizers to disperse—some going quiet, some leaving the country, others remobilizing informally. This mirrors the dynamic in Egypt where, once the Muslim Brotherhood was banned, its supporters reorganized outside the formal political space.

Such exclusion rarely neutralizes a political force; it merely relocates it, often making reconciliation harder.

Egypt’s lesson: When polarization reaches the point where no side trusts the other, the system defaults to authoritarianism.

Bangladesh must avoid letting polarization become a pretext for “managed democracy.” What this means is that when political groups become so divided that they view opponents not as rivals but as existential threats, cooperation becomes impossible. Compromise—essential for democracy—breaks down completely. Elections, negotiations, and institutions lose credibility because every side believes the others are acting in bad faith or trying to eliminate them.

In such an environment, a “neutral arbitrator” often steps in claiming to restore order—usually the military, a powerful bureaucracy, or an unelected caretaker authority. But when that happens, democracy does not return easily. Egypt’s 2013 experience shows how quickly a power vacuum created by distrust can be filled by an authoritarian force promising stability.

4. Elections Without Trust Are Worthless

Egypt’s 2012 election was legitimate—but by 2013, the public had lost trust in the political process, which made the coup easier to justify.

Bangladesh’s upcoming election is already described by analysts as being haunted by:

• decades of vote-rigging and boycotts,
• questions over the fairness of the upcoming polls,
• fears of political manipulation,
• widespread mistrust of the electoral system. 

Public confidence is so low that the question is not whether Bangladesh will hold an election—but whether the election will deliver legitimacy.

Egypt shows what happens when the public loses faith: protests become more potent than ballots, and the military becomes the final arbiter.

5. External Actors Can Undermine or Strengthen a Transition

In Egypt, regional powers—particularly the UAE and Saudi Arabia—actively funded opposition movements to Dr Morsi and immediately backed the military takeover. Bangladesh’s upcoming election is surrounded by intense regional and international interest, with India, China, and the U.S. watching closely. Tensions have been further heightened by the killing of the popular young leader Osman Hadi. Although full circumstances remain contested, many in Bangladesh believe that the assailant’s flight to India—and the political alignments involved—point to at least some level of Indian complicity. This perception has deepened public distrust and added a volatile geopolitical dimension to an already fragile political moment.

External actors can:

• support stability,
• or, as seen in Egypt, empower forces that subvert democracy.

The lesson for Bangladesh is that regional geopolitics can shape domestic outcomes, especially in moments of institutional weakness.

6. Violence Is Most Likely When Elections Occur Under Stress

Egypt’s coup was followed by the Rabaa massacre, mass imprisonment, and the collapse of political discourse.

Bangladesh is currently “fraught with the potential for violence,” according to expert assessments. The road to February 2026 includes:

• an overstretched security apparatus,
• heightened rural and urban political tensions,
• fears of street confrontations,
• and unresolved grievances from the 2024 uprising. 

Egypt teaches that violence escalates when elections occur in a climate of uncertainty, exclusion, and mistrust.

7. The Biggest Lesson: Democracy Fails When It Is Designed to Fail

Morsi did not fall because he governed poorly. He fell because:

• the state was not prepared to accept him,
• the rules were bent against him,
• and powerful actors—internal and external—set the stage for collapse.

Bangladeshis must now ask themselves whether the “deep state” and other powerful actors are prepared to accept the outcome of the election, whatever it may be. Egypt’s experience offers a cautionary lesson: when the political playing field is tilted too far in advance, the real outcome may be determined long before any votes are cast.

In Conclusion: Bangladesh Has Immense Lessons to Draw From Egypt

Bangladesh today is navigating:

• a weakened democratic infrastructure,
• high institutional distrust,
• heavy military involvement in public order,
• exclusion of dominant political actors,
• geopolitical competition,
• and the lingering trauma of a national uprising.

Egypt teaches a simple but sobering truth: Democracy is not defeated by voters—it is defeated by the forces that refuse to let voting matter.

Unless Bangladesh ensures inclusiveness, institutional neutrality, transparency, and credible oversight, the 2026 election could become less an opportunity for renewal—and more a repeat of Egypt’s tragic cycle.

Bangladesh deserves better—and it has every reason to believe that better is possible. After years of sacrifice, protest, and perseverance, the Bangladeshi people have shown remarkable courage and an unshakable commitment to shaping their own future. The moment ahead need not be a repetition of old patterns; it can be the beginning of a new political chapter grounded in dignity, accountability, and shared national purpose.

If February 2026 becomes a true turning point, it could open the door to a more inclusive and resilient democracy—one built not on fear or exclusion, but on the collective aspirations of its citizens. The international community can lend support, but ultimately it is the people of Bangladesh who hold the power to steer their country toward hope, renewal, and a more just political order.