Hegemony and the Chinese Grand Strategy: Continuity in the CCP’s Political Lexicon
On April 10th, 1974, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) addressed the U.N. General Assembly for the first time. After years of war and struggling for power, they were internationally recognized as the legitimate government of China. This speech would be the first delivered by the CCP to the entire globe and would mark a new era in Chinese foreign affairs. Deng Xiaoping, the selected spokesperson and eventual leader of the CCP, delivered a passionate rallying cry for “Third World” countries across the globe. He emphasized the need to unite and fight against great evils, including colonialism, imperialism, and hegemonism.
Now, over 50 years later, an increasing number of people view China as the world’s top economy. On September 1st, 2025, leaders, dignitaries, and heads of state from around the world gathered in Tianjin to join Xi Jinping in his vision for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. He opened his address by emphasizing the need to combat the Cold War mentality, protectionism, and hegemonism.
Nearly everything about China has changed in the last 50 years, but the international call to combat hegemonism has not. Why? What is it about hegemonism that enshrines it in the CCP’s language? To answer that question, one must also analyze how the CCP’s usage of the word has evolved since 1974. Upon closer inspection, it becomes clear that the CCP’s definition and application of hegemonism remain unchanged.
The CCP’s definition of hegemony is based not on how much power a state has, but on which type of power. The accusation is leveraged based on foreign policy and involvement, not ideological misalignment. The driving force behind CCP policy isn’t ideological alignment – it’s nationalism and a desire to restore Chinese “wealth and power.” Maintaining a moral high ground is central to achieving the ultimate goal of a “rejuvenated” China.
Given the ideologies of China’s two recent strategic adversaries – first the USSR and then the United States – one might assume that if the same word is used to define both, its meaning has changed. However, it has not.
To support this conclusion, I defined key terms, analyzed their usage, and tied in historical and current developments to highlight the drivers of Chinese policy. The terms discussed are grand strategy, power, and Western versus Chinese perceptions of hegemony. I then provide proof of what I argue is the CCP’s definition of hegemony. Finally, I analyze the CCP’s grand strategy, explain why the consistent cry against hegemony is important, and present evidence for these assertions.
What is Grand Strategy?
In the world of strategic studies, strategy can be defined as “the art of creating power”. So, what separates strategy from grand strategy?
Drawing the boundary between grand strategy and strategy is a fierce debate I do not plan on settling in this paper, but for this paper, a pointed version is “a state’s plan for maximizing gains during peacetime.” Each state pursues a goal (e.g., restoring national pride) that dictates all other strategies (e.g., foreign relations, propaganda efforts, military buildup, economic development), with that overarching goal called grand strategy.
Figure 1: A visual representation of how grand strategy dictates a state’s actions. The grand strategy is at the center of everything it does, influencing all branches of government.
What is Power?
A state wishing to maximize gains requires power. So, what does power mean? Most of us associate power with force. “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do”. While this is true, analyzing how A gets B to do something is very, very important.
Felicia Pratto, a social psychologist, put forth an interesting argument on relational power. Definitions of power focus almost exclusively on the powerful actor rather than the agency of all actors. Power can never be quantified in a vacuum because it is entirely perceptual. You can put a gun to my head and threaten to shoot me. In this scenario, most would say you are more powerful than I. But what if I am convinced that no matter what threat you make, you will not pull the trigger? Then, really, you possess no power.
Power, therefore, is relational and can only be measured as such. Pratto identifies four types of relational power:
- Dominative: Power over; forcing another actor to do something against its interest
- Affiliative: Power with; “influence through relationships with others who have compatible goals”, e.g., coalitions, alliances
- Positional: Power in; “Influencing others through virtue of position, rank, or role”, e.g., professor and student, CEO vs laborer
- Transformative: Empower others; “a party with greater capacity helps another party to expand the latter’s capacity”.
We can easily find examples of all four types in international relations. A nation that threatens or uses violence to achieve its goal demonstrates dominative power. The formation of coalitions and alliances, such as NATO, ASEAN, and the U.N., represents affiliative power. Positional power could be defined as the roles states play in those alliances (e.g., having a permanent seat on the Security Council). Finally, aid and development agreements build transformative power.
What is Hegemony, and do China and the West Agree?
Every state aims to build power, but how much power puts an actor in a tier above the rest? What differentiates the underdog from the Vegas favorite, the rogue state from the hegemon? The textbook definition of a hegemon is “a leader, country, or group that is very strong and powerful and therefore able to control others”.
Modern Western strategic analysts consider only a country’s power when classifying it as a hegemon. How much can it get other actors to act in its own interests? However, Chinese definitions, unlike Western ones, are not amoral. Badao, the Chinese word for hegemony, “has a decidedly normative overtone”. Chinese scholars claim that hegemons (currently the United States) “worship violence”, are “bloodthirsty”, and have a “warlike disposition”.
Let us tie hegemony to the four types of power. Most Western analysts only care about how much power a state has. The CCP cares greatly about which kind of power a state has. To the CCP, a state becomes a hegemon and an enemy when it exercises predominantly dominative power (power over). Therefore, no matter how much transformative power (empower others) China builds, it will not classify as hegemonic.
Figure 2: A graphic showcasing the difference between the contemporary Western definition of hegemony in strategic studies and the commonly-accepted Chinese word for hegemony, badao.
What is the Historical Proof?
In the CCP’s first address to the world in 1974, Deng Xiaoping assails the United States and USSR, the two superpowers and hegemons of the world:
“Each [the U.S. and the USSR] in its own way attempts to bring developing countries … under its control and, at the same time, to bully the developed countries that are not their match in strength.”
Notice the emphasis on the coercive (aka dominative) nature of the two bullies. They were evil not because they were powerful, but because they used their power to exploit and oppress others.
China was not equal in its criticism of the USSR and the U.S. At that time. the Americans were key allies against the aggressive Soviets. Mao and Deng had made clear that the Soviets were dangerous hypocrites. Violent conflicts such as the invasion of Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan reflected the Soviets’ comfort with force and military domination. As a result, the CCP sided with the U.S., the (relatively) moderate, détente force.
Once the immediate, violent threat was dealt with, the U.S. and China were actually on good terms. However, to the CCP, America was becoming increasingly coercive. Both Bushs’ insistence on the Gulf Wars was a huge red flag. Now, Donald Trump now is using economic and military might to put nations in their place and remind them that they do not “want to f— around” with the U.S. With America not only fitting but embodying the CCP’s definition of hegemony, ties are continually worsening.
What is the CCP’s Grand Strategy, and Why is Combatting Hegemony so Important?
I argue that the CCP was founded on and is still centered around nationalism. Evidence is found in the CCP’s history. A central part of the CCP’s official history is the Century of Humiliation, a period from 1839 to 1949 during which the Chinese people were displaced, denigrated, and subject to foreign oppression.
After World War 1, the Japanese controlled some Chinese territories. Chinese diplomats were sent to the Paris Peace Accords to negotiate the return of Shandong, the Japanese-controlled land, but were unsuccessful. Citizens were furious and protested en masse in the May 4th Movement.
Participants included future leaders like Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. In Deng’s words, he participated in “the Nationalist effort to rid China of the humiliation it had suffered” and “to make it rich and strong”. When Mao announced the establishment of the PRC in 1949, he declared, “Ours will no longer be a nation subject to insult and humiliation. We have stood up”.
The accumulation of “wealth and power” and the “rejuvenation” of China are specific phrases found littered through CCP texts. The phrase “wealth and power” is over 2,000 years old, but its use gained widespread traction during the Century of Humiliation. It replaced Confucian teaching of the “rule of the virtuous” and remains “something of a north star for Chinese intellectual and political leaders”.
Xi Jinping made clear his grand strategy is China’s rejuvenation; it is the center of his “China Dream”. During an address in 2017, he invoked the horrors of the Century of Humiliation and declared rejuvenation as “the original aspiration and mission of the Chinese Communists”.
Both Mao and Xi often made clear that only the CCP can achieve those goals. Their centralization of authority and control of national society is in the name of stability. But to participate in the international arena, they need power. China wants to become a regional power and a hegemon in the Western definition of the word, but seeks the most efficient way to do that. China is a realist state, meaning it realizes the necessity of amassing power to pursue any type of grand strategy. Within realism, there are two approaches: offensive and defensive realism.
Offensive realism states that each nation should actively seek hegemony and achieve hegemonic status through any means possible. According to defensive realism, although each state should wish to be a hegemony, pursuing hegemony is not desirable. Constantly battling actors for control over a region will build harbored hatred and eventually lead to a cycle of uprising and suppression.
Figure 3: A table to display the difference between offensive and defensive realism.
The CCP’s international relations strategy combines both approaches. It amasses regional power by uniting countries disadvantaged in the current status quo and empowering them. Building transformative power instead of dominative power reduces the likelihood of being associated with hegemonic aspirations while achieving the goal of a stronger and wealthier China.
Where is the Evidence for the Grand Strategy Put Forth?
Evidence can be found in CCP texts and foreign policy. To reduce the likelihood of being associated with hegemonic aspirations, party officials often screen publications for words that are deemed sensitive to observers wary of Chinese power. For example, texts for foreign audiences are less likely to explicitly mention China’s efforts of displacing U.S. hegemony. In another example, the usage of “peaceful rise” was dropped in favor of “peaceful development” to “avoid appearing militarily threatening”.
In 1974, Deng specified five principles all countries should uphold, including peaceful coexistence and mutual benefit. When Xi opened his remarks at the SCO, he emphasized the need to “uphold our original commitment to peaceful coexistence” and “strengthen our confidence in win-win cooperation”. These examples highlight the CCP’s commitment to portraying itself not as a dominative regional power but as a leader with the interest of all in mind.
To maintain that image in the international arena and fulfill its nationalistic policies, the CCP is opportunistic. It doesn’t give support based purely on ideological alignment – rather, the proposed grand strategy of nationalism drives policy.
In the 1974 address, Deng uses Mao’s Three Worlds theory, where Third World countries are characterized by low economic development, and revolution entails financial prosperity. As part of supporting revolutionary forces, the CCP backed causes of all kinds, regardless of if they aligned with socialist ideals. Some supported causes were controversial, with one even being partly funded by apartheid South Africa. The following examples highlight the CCP’s opportunism in pursuing the grand strategy of nationalism, not establishing communism.
“Revolution could quickly give way to pragmatic policy needs, as later economic developments illustrate”. As mentioned before, the U.S. used to be a close ally of the CCP. China faced a greater threat from a strong USSR, so the USSR became public enemy number one. Deng even distanced himself from the 1974 speech because of its harsh criticism of American policy. In the 1970s, Chinese relations with Taiwan actually improved – Taiwan was given more freedoms with the pretext that there was an implicit parallel interest in protecting shipping lanes from adversaries. A series of Sino-Japanese trade agreements were also signed in the 70s despite their extremely violent, imperialist past. Now, U.S. relations have deteriorated largely due to the continued use of dominative power, which meets the CCP’s definition of hegemony and threatens its proposed equalitarian world order.
What’s Next?
For the CCP, Chinese power is an end, not a means. Its grand strategy is to reverse the damages of the past two centuries and restore “wealth and power”. Party leaders like Mao, Deng, and Xi believe that building transformative power is the most efficient way to do so. By calling on nations to combat hegemonies (states that rule others through dominative power), they ensure prosperity for their people. Maintaining that image of benevolent leader is crucial and is a very conscious, strategic choice. Even though the U.S. and the USSR are ideological opposites, to the CCP, their exploitive and violent nature classify both as hegemonic and evil.
In Xi’s words, “Time and momentum on our side.” China is experiencing a “period of historical opportunity”. Countries have long been oppressed and are joining China’s rallying cry for change. But with power as an end and not a mean, how much power is too much power, and what is China’s strategy for when there are no more dominative hegemonies?
This is something I could not find an answer to. All evidence analyzed points to the Chinese understanding of relational power – there is a strong hegemony (the USSR, then the U.S.) that must be displaced through cooperation. There’s a boogeyman to combat, but what happens when there is no boogeyman? China has been punching up in the world order, but if it stands alone at the top, will it continue to build transformative power, or will it exert dominative power to maintain the China-centric status quo? Answering these questions is key to understanding the CCP’s policy and future.
Afterword
“Thank you to Dr. Amos C. Fox, Dr. Max Rayneard, and Dr. Lee Jeong-Ho for guiding me and making this possible.”
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