The last time Nuri al-Maliki was in power, corruption, mismanagement, extremism, and Iran ruled the roost in Iraq.

Today, Iraq risks repeating its perilous history; Nuri al-Maliki looms above the office of prime minister. Maliki’s 2006–2014 premiership was defined by rampant corruption, authoritarian power grabs, sectarian repression, and servility to Iran—a toxic legacy that helped set the stage for the rise of ISIS. Now he is again positioning himself for the premiership, threatening to undo Iraq’s fragile recovery.

Iraq’s main Shia parliamentary alliance has now officially nominated Nuri al-Maliki as its candidate for prime minister, bringing him closer to regaining power than at any point since his 2014 ouster. The Coordination Framework—a coalition of Shia blocs that holds a majority in parliament—endorsed Maliki “based on his political and administrative experience.”

This move paves the way for government formation talks and suggests Maliki’s return is more likely than ever. It has also triggered an alarm in Iraq and abroad. A leading Sunni coalition cautioned against “recycling” a leader “whose past experiences have failed” to bring stability or public trust. Indeed, Maliki’s past fuelled sectarian strife and failed to stop ISIS from overrunning large swaths of Iraq.

Western officials, especially Secretary of State Marco Rubio, worry about Baghdad drifting back into Tehran’s orbit. President Donald Trump even took to Truth Social, warning Iraq about bringing back the former premier. With Maliki now on the cusp of power, the urgency to prevent his return cannot be overstated.

As Iraq struggles to recover, Maliki has been maneuvering to reclaim power. Despite being forced from office in 2014, he never truly exited the political stage. His State of Law coalition remains a key player and has joined the ruling Shia alliance. In fact, Maliki’s camp already pulls many strings in Baghdad’s government.

Maliki’s eight-year rule was plagued by endemic corruption and kleptocracy that hollowed out Iraq’s institutions. By one estimate, a staggering $320 billion in public funds were lost to corruption in the 15 years after 2003, and Maliki was in power for eight of those years. His governments doled out patronage and tolerated graft on an industrial scale.

A notorious example was the Iraqi Army’s “ghost soldiers” scandal. Over 50,000 fictitious troops were kept on the payroll so that commanders could pocket their salaries. By 2014, this racket was bleeding an estimated $380 million per year from the defense budget. 

Maliki’s inner circle, meanwhile, enriched themselves extravagantly—funneling wealth into luxury properties, shell companies, and offshore accounts—with zero accountability, as his regime neutered the judiciary’s independence. Years later, Iraqi leaders point directly to Maliki-era corruption as the root of national tragedies.

Former prime minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi lamented that “the fall of Mosul [to ISIS in 2014] was caused by corruption, nepotism and mismanagement,” explicitly blaming the Maliki government for the calamities that befell Iraq. A third Maliki term would almost certainly revive this kleptocratic culture, imperiling any hope of good governance.

Another hallmark of Maliki’s rule was his alignment with Iran’s agenda, effectively placing Baghdad under Tehran’s shadow. For example, after the 2010 election, Iran lobbied Iraqi factions to keep Maliki in power. In return, Maliki opened Iraq’s doors to Iranian influence. He permitted Iran-backed militias to integrate into Iraq’s security forces and even took credit for forming the Popular Mobilization Forces—ostensibly under the prime minister’s command but dominated by Tehran’s proxies like Hadi al-Amiri, Qais al-Khazali, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.

Iranian advisors such as General Qassim Suleimani reportedly had free rein in Iraq, coordinating militia operations as if the country were an Iranian province. Maliki’s tenure thus tethered Iraq tightly to Iran. Baghdad’s sovereignty was eroded by this Iranian “guardianship,” which fueled sectarian polarization and estranged Iraq from much of the Arab world.

Maliki’s sectarian governance ripped apart Iraq’s social fabric and paved the way for the Islamic State’s rise. He marginalized the Sunni Arab population through exclusionary policies and heavy-handed security tactics. When Sunnis organized peaceful protests in 2012–2013 against their treatment, Maliki’s forces responded with brutal force. In one infamous incident, government troops killed over 50 Sunni demonstrators at a sit-in in Hawija in April 2013.

This massacre convinced many Sunnis that peaceful change was impossible, driving some into the arms of insurgents. By mid-2014, after years of Maliki’s divisive rule, ISIS militants met little resistance as they seized Mosul and overran a third of Iraq. The Iraqi army—hollowed out by corruption and sectarian purges—collapsed in the face of the onslaught. 

Even Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Iraq’s main Shia spiritual leader, blamed Maliki’s “corrupt and authoritarian” governance for the military’s meltdown that enabled ISIS’s advance. A bloody war from 2014 to 2017 was then required to drive out ISIS, at the cost of tens of thousands of lives and the devastation of cities like Mosul. None of this would have happened absent Maliki’s oppressive, divisive reign—a legacy that will haunt Iraq for decades.

Given Maliki’s unabashed loyalty to Iran’s regime, a third term raises the dire prospect of Iraq becoming a sanctuary for Tehran’s hardliners. If Iran’s clerical government were toppled by the ongoing protests, Maliki might offer refuge to its fugitive officials, effectively turning Iraq into an exile haven for the Islamic Republic’s remnants. Such a scenario would be disastrous for Iraq’s sovereignty and stability, importing Iran’s turmoil onto Iraqi soil.

Tellingly, hundreds of Maliki-aligned militiamen from Iraq have already gone to Iran to help crush protesters there—a stark reminder of where his loyalties lie. Were Iran’s embattled leaders to flee, Maliki would likely harbor them in Iraq, planting the seeds of a theocracy-in-exile. That would derail any hope of reform in Baghdad, making Iraq an extension of Iran’s authoritarian rule at the very moment Iranians are trying to break free. It is a nightmarish vision that could render Iraq impossible to salvage as a sovereign state.

Iraq today stands at a fragile position, striving to rebuild after years of conflict. The last thing it needs is a return to the misrule that brought it to ruin. Nuri al-Maliki’s comeback would mean a revival of the corruption, sectarianism, and subservience to Iran that nearly destroyed the country once before. Allowing him back now would repeat that tragic cycle—Iraq’s democracy and unity may not survive another Maliki term.

For Iraq’s new generation, who protested in 2019 for reform, such a reversal would shatter their hopes for a better future. The lesson of the past decade is clear: Maliki’s leadership leads to ruin, and preventing his return is essential to keeping Iraq from sliding back into chaos.

About the Author: Abdullah Hayek

Abdullah Hayek is a senior contributor with Young Voices and an independent Middle East analyst and consultant based in Washington, DC. He previously specialized in the political, economic, and military affairs of the Levant, Iraq, and Arabian Gulf regions at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Follow him on X: @ahayek99.

Image: 360b / Shutterstock.com.

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