What Happened to Command of the Sea?
Absent serious challengers, strategists dropped it as a planning factor after World War II. That has changed—and so must planning.
In What Happened to Command of the Sea?, published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings, Captain Robert C. Rubel, U.S. Navy (Retired), argues that the U.S. Navy dropped command of the sea as a serious planning concept after World War II and now risks strategic failure as China rises as a major maritime challenger.
Rubel argues that command of the sea is a strength relationship that creates deterrence and should shape risk decisions in both peace and war. He warns that the Navy could lose global command if it treats a fight over Taiwan as a repeat of past carrier gambits, and he urges planners to adopt concepts and force mixes that preserve the deterrent advantage. He concludes that the Navy must make command of the sea the doctrinal foundation for strategy, planning, and fleet design.
Relative Strength
Strategists need channel markers. Command of the sea, a concept that disappeared from Navy doctrine after World War II, may offer the kind of planning buoy that would prevent the Navy from running aground in future maritime contests…For decades, command of the sea has been a strategic condition so pervasive, unchallenged, and essentially unnoticed that the United States has taken it for granted. But the world is changing, and not in a way good for U.S. strategic interests.
Command of the sea is resurfacing as a critical strategic planning factor. Or, at least, it should—if the Navy wishes to avoid disaster at sea…A correct understanding of command of the sea involves seeing it as a strength relationship between navies or, in today’s world, any forces that can exert power at sea. The strength relationship must be such that one force cannot or will not directly challenge the other for the use of the ocean.
Think Globally, Command Locally
China establishing local command of the sea would not necessarily spell the end of U.S. global command of the sea unless the U.S. Navy commits a strategic blunder—which could occur if the service does not understand command of the sea and fails to include it as a planning factor.
Thanks to its victory over the Axis navies in World War II, the United States achieved virtually absolute command of the sea throughout the World Ocean. Once obtained, the Navy believed, command of the sea no longer needed to be accounted for in planning…But, properly understood as a strength relationship and not a condition of the water, command of the sea should be considered a basis for planning, especially in peacetime.
Risk Management
Combining the two elements—maintenance and exercise—makes it possible to formulate a strategic risk-management principle: Do not hazard maintenance of global command while exercising it…But today, when the Navy has only 11 carriers, losing two in a Taiwan scenario could conceivably result in the loss of global command.
As a strategic risk-management criterion, the United States should not risk its aircraft carriers in any such fight. If it elects to fight at all, it should adopt the nascent distributed maritime operations concept and use an array of smaller vessels, land-based missile detachments, and long-range Air Force bombers…A fight over Taiwan must be regarded as an episode of exercising global command of the sea.
Command by Other Means
Although the current presidential administration is moving to resurrect U.S. shipbuilding capacity, such capacity is not likely ever to match China’s. Other means by which to maintain command of the sea must therefore be considered. But the Navy does not seem to be engaging in such consideration because it does not recognize the doctrinal importance of command of the sea.
It is critically important: The Navy must embrace command of the sea as its central doctrinal concept then nest strategic planning within it. These plans must include not only fleet design, but also the non-naval means by which to maintain command of the sea.
The post What Happened to Command of the Sea? appeared first on Small Wars Journal by Arizona State University.