Even since the end of the Cold War, Western Europe and the United States have had conflicting geopolitical ambitions and values.  

But something profound has now changed. Canada’s Mark Carney calls it a “rupture,” and that doesn’t seem too far from the truth.  

The current American administration says it hopes to save Europe from itself, from the risk that mass immigration will cause “civilizational erasure.” Its initial intention was to support MAGA-inclined parties across Europe, but that idea may not survive the current political weather — President Trump’s nationalism, seen in statements suggesting European NATO troops had “stayed a little back from the front lines” in Afghanistan, clashes with the populist right’s need to appear patriotic, and has caused a significant backlash. 

An alternative perspective, which now seems to be gathering impetus on both sides of the Atlantic, is that Europe must disentangle much of its security apparatus from America’s. The current administration no longer sees Europe as a value-adding contributors to its diplomatic and military power. It will now leave Europe mostly to fend for itself (some key enablers will remain) while maneuvering to take European territories. The continent needs to wake up.  

The Greenland crisis is a historic opportunity to align European foreign policy into a coherent, hard-power-backed new alliance. All major parties in the West, including the right-wing parties in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, find themselves at odds with America’s ambitions.  

A new defensive alliance is needed, anchored by the eight countries that sent troops to Greenland, and grounded in common Western European values that are increasingly at odds with their great geopolitical neighbors. Some might hope that the European Union can provide this defense, but it cannot — its slowness and vulnerability to political sabotage by small nations exploiting its byzantine rulebook have proved time and again that a fresh approach is needed. 

The outlines of a common European defense alliance are fairly clear. The Greenland eight (that is, France, Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, and Finland) would be joined by Poland, Iceland, and the three Baltic states. Canada, Belgium, and Luxembourg might also join for a total of 16 nations out of NATO’s 32. Given the geography (and Canada notwithstanding), the new alliance might reasonably be termed the North-East Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NEATO for short. 

Other alliance members would feel a magnetic pull, though a number might resist. Some Central and Eastern European states still hope the currently Russophilic US will ultimately provide support against Russian invasion or bullying, but would countries with such recent experience of invasion and national erasure really bet their futures on this? The response of populist right-wing governments in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia would be fascinating weather vanes for this push-pull dynamic. 

Likewise, Italy, Spain, and NATO’s other southern members would need to make difficult decisions. In different ways, many are less hostile to Russia and more dubious about the benefits of a new grouping that’s likely to be more hardline on the Kremlin. But they may fear the risks of standing alone, particularly given their exposure and interests in a volatile North Africa and the Middle East.  

It’s likely that in time these countries would seek to align themselves with this new power block, since NEATO will share interests in resisting Russia’s hostility and a secure Mediterranean. Europe will then have a cohesive defensive alliance to protect its interests in the world, a liberal democratic counterweight to China and Russia, and far more powerful than its nearby neighbors.  

It’s doubtful that such a development would assist US interests. Washington would face a more assertive and capable Europe, which is free to make decisions that a US administration would dislike. Donald Trump was infuriated by the deployment of European NATO troops to Greenland, assessing it was a response to his threats of possible military action (although the administration has also demanded greater NATO involvement in the High North). Denmark’s government reportedly issued its troops with live ammunition and ordered them to fight any attempt to seize the island, though this may have been posturing rather than a genuine belief that this was likely or imminent. 

Taken as a whole, the events of the last year, and especially the last month, have fostered a sad realization for European countries. After 80 years of unprecedented peace and prosperity, the greatest period of the West’s so-called Great Enrichment, there is now a credible threat that European territory may again be invaded by a hostile power.  

The new NEATO should focus its forces on the continent and shift all relevant and available military assets to the region to support deterrence. It should regard the United States as a possible, and hopefully a likely friend, but must also understand that this is an era of rivalry and a pursuit of the national interest. That means Washington will make decisions counter to Europe’s interests. Similarly, China’s growing cyber espionage, unbalanced trading behavior, and expanding hard power pose a serious threat requiring continental unity. 

It must understand Russia’s military and shadow warfare threat, and robustly counter them. NEATO’s members must commit to much higher defense spending by 2030, which means in particular that laggards like the UK and France will have to embrace the serious political pain and possible social disorder that will inevitably result from cuts to welfare spending. 

The Greenland crisis is a historic opportunity for Europe to accelerate its journey as its own power bloc, independent from cajoling in an increasingly fractured world. It is the logical continuation of the German Zeitenwende and would indicate that a great continent has learned the lessons of its past.  

Surely 1938 was sufficient to show that appeasement and disarmament do not work. Is it necessary to learn that lesson again?  

Nathan Decety is a macroeconomic and geopolitics strategist and a Captain in the US Army Reserves, with extensive experience in financial management roles and in military deployments. He advises clients on global affairs, macroeconomic conditions, labor markets, and growth strategy. His research focuses on war outcomes and military effectiveness.  

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.

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