Conventional Forces Will Never Embrace Irregular Warfare
Two U.S. Marine Corps M1 Abrams tanks patrol the streets of Baghdad, Iraq on April 14th, 2003
Facts
- The Irregular Warfare (IW) Annex to the 2020 National Defense Strategy states, “The Department [of Defense/War] must institutionalize irregular warfare as a core competency for both conventional and special operations forces…”
- The 2025 Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3000.07 on Irregular Warfare states—among numerous directives to the entire joint force—that the military will:
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- Maintain a baseline of military capabilities and personnel and track the capacity and proficiency of the Military Services to meet CCMD [Combatant Command] IW-related requirements in accordance with strategic guidance.
- Attract, develop, manage, employ, and retain enough military personnel with IW expertise.
- Provide developmental opportunities and career paths commensurate with IW professionals’ peers.
- Manage IW military and civilian professionals to maintain long-term institutional knowledge to attract, incentivize, and retain top IW subject matter experts.
- Incorporate the ability to conduct IW into all Military Service force development and design products, in accordance with strategic guidance, joint concepts, and prioritized CCMD requirements.
The author suggests that there is one additional fact: None of the directives above have been implemented as intended; furthermore, they will not be implemented anytime in the foreseeable future.
The Siren Call of Irregular Warfare
The siren call of irregular warfare (IW) has echoed through the corridors of American defense institutions for decades, growing louder with each asymmetric conflict. Doctrine, publications, and policy papers consistently assert that IW is not the sole domain of special operations forces (SOF), but a responsibility for every element of the Department of War. Yet, despite these pleas and strategic imperatives, conventional military forces, by their very nature, remain resistant. The thesis of this article is that this resistance is not a failure of will, but an incompatibility, rooted in the identity, structure, and reward systems of conventional forces. America’s conventional military headquarters and units will never truly embrace irregular warfare the way its proponents envision, and continuing to believe they will be is an exercise in futility. It must be noted—very explicitly—that the argument put forward here is not that the conventional force shouldn’t embrace IW, but rather that they will not embrace it, for several reasons. Furthermore, it is likely that conventional forces would embrace IW if circumstances permitted, but they do not.
The appeal of integrating IW into the conventional force is undeniable on paper. In an era dominated primarily by hybrid threats, proxy wars, and insurgencies rather than state-on-state conflicts, the ability to operate across the spectrum of conflict, from high-intensity combat to nuanced stability operations, seems like a strategic imperative. The argument can be made that if every soldier, sailor, airman, marine, guardian, and coast guard member possessed a basic proficiency in security force assistance, civil affairs, psychological operations, and other related areas, the military would be more adaptable and effective in the complex environments that define modern conflict. This vision, however, clashes head-on with the ingrained culture and operational paradigms of conventional forces.
America’s conventional military headquarters and units will never truly embrace irregular warfare the way its proponents envision, and continuing to believe they will be is an exercise in futility.
At its core, conventional military culture is defined by the pursuit of overwhelming kinetic advantage. Its identity is forged in preparation for state-on-state conflict: the decisive battle, the synchronized maneuver of tanks and artillery, the precision strike from the air, and the carrier battle group’s power projection. This culture values direct action, quantifiable destruction, and hierarchical command-and-control. Metrics of success are tied to tangible outcomes, such as enemy killed in action, terrain secured, and adversary infrastructure destroyed. None of that should change. Our military’s primary role is to fight and win wars through large-scale combat operations.
Irregular warfare, conversely, thrives in ambiguity. It eschews kinetic solutions as often as it embraces them, prioritizing influence, legitimacy, and the art of population-centric engagement. Its metrics are soft and often unquantifiable: shifts in public opinion, the strength of local governance, the willingness of a population to provide intelligence. Adversaries are often indistinguishable from the civilian population, the lines of conflict are blurred, and victory is a prolonged, often generational, endeavor. For a conventional force steeped in the culture of decisive kinetic action, this landscape is not just a different tactical problem; it is an existential challenge to its self-conception. It comes down to using the right forces for the right mission. There are requirements for the selective use of kinetic options in IW. Conventional forces may employ their capabilities selectively and effectively when part of an Irregular Warfare campaign plan, which the US does not have; however, such employment is not the primary mission of the conventional force.
The “System” is Not Built for Irregular Warfare
One of the most significant barriers to the joint force embracing IW is the “specialization trap.” When a dedicated, elite force—like SOF—is explicitly created and celebrated for its prowess in irregular warfare, it inadvertently grants conventional forces implicit permission to offload that responsibility. The existence of the Green Berets, or the Psychological Operations teams, for example, acts as a cultural pressure valve. “That’s their job” becomes the default for the conventional force commander. Why would a tank crew train in tribal engagement protocols when a SOF team is designed for precisely that mission? Why would an infantry platoon leader master the intricacies of local power brokers when there’s a dedicated Civil Affairs unit in the same camp that is focused solely on that problem? This division of labor, while seemingly efficient, actively undermines the widespread integration of IW skills.
Furthermore, the reward system within conventional forces is fundamentally misaligned with the demands of IW. Promotions, commendations, and career progression are overwhelmingly tied to performance in conventional metrics. A commander who excels at large-scale combined arms maneuvers and achieves high readiness scores at the National Training Center will likely advance faster than one who spends years building relationships with local leaders or security forces in Country X, even if the latter might be more strategically impactful in a specific theater. The “soft skills” of IW—strategic patience, building trust, and influence operations—are often viewed as secondary, even peripheral, to the core competencies that define a successful conventional military career. They are rarely the attributes that earn a joint force commander a promotion.
Acknowledging this fundamental incompatibility is not a concession of defeat but a step towards developing more realistic strategies unless or until there is a paradigm shift in the joint force that goes beyond words on paper.
Training is another hurdle. Conventional forces operate on a cycle of preparing for their primary mission: large-scale combat operations. This demands immense resources, time, and dedicated facilities. Integrating meaningful IW training—which often requires language skills, cultural immersion, geographic specialization, and role-playing complex political scenarios—is difficult to pack into an already packed training schedule. When a unit prepares for a hypothetical near-peer conflict, the urgency of mastering tank gunnery or air defense often outweighs the need to practice village stability operations, even if the more likely deployment scenario involves the latter. The “tyranny of the urgent” in conventional joint force training environments prioritizes conventional over irregular. Note that there isn’t such a clear line between the two (conventional and irregular); however, this is unfortunately a common perception and part of the very problem outlined here. This subject is a popular topic of debate and warrants its own discussion.
Bureaucratic inertia and resource allocation within large defense departments also hinder IW integration. Budgets, equipment procurement, and force structure are optimized for conventional warfare. Developing and fielding specialized equipment for IW, establishing robust language and cultural training pipelines for the joint force, or altering career paths to reward IW expertise requires a paradigm shift that clashes with deeply entrenched processes and vested interests. It’s easier to procure a fighter jet or tank than it is to re-engineer the cultural DNA of a land, air, or sea maneuver unit. While individual service members and units may demonstrate incredible adaptability and courage in IW environments, as witnessed in countless instances during the War on Terror, these are often reactive adaptations born of necessity, rather than a proactive embrace of a new way of war. They are performing IW despite their conventional training and culture, not because of it.
Conclusion
The vision of a conventional force fully embracing irregular warfare, where every unit is equally adept at kinetic strikes and population engagement, remains elusive. The cultural, structural, and institutional forces at play within conventional formations create a lasting barrier to such integration. While doctrine will continue to advocate for it, and individual successes will occasionally fuel hope, the reality is that conventional forces will always gravitate back to their core identity. Acknowledging this fundamental incompatibility is not a concession of defeat but a step towards developing more realistic strategies unless or until there is a paradigm shift in the joint force that goes beyond words on paper.
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