An Opportunity for Success: Don’t Repeat Iraq’s Catastrophic Mistakes in Venezuela
A Battlefield Commander’s Warning: Venezuela’s Political Transition Offers Hope, But the Shadows of Iraq Reveal Risks We Cannot Ignore
In April 2003, I commanded Task Force 2-7 when we destroyed the Iraqi Republican Guard at Baghdad International Airport and reinforced 2nd Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division in their decisive attack into Baghdad. After the invasion, my task force secured downtown Baghdad and Iraq’s Al Rashid banking district during those critical early weeks, giving me a front-row seat to both America’s swift military victory and the catastrophic failures that followed.
The lessons from Iraq offer crucial insights into risks that may not be immediately obvious from Washington.
As Venezuela transitions to new leadership under President Edmundo González Urrutia, I’m watching with cautious optimism but growing concern. The Trump administration has orchestrated a remarkable diplomatic achievement: Nicolás Maduro’s departure with limited shots fired, existing Venezuelan government structures remaining largely intact, and no American boots on the ground. But as someone who witnessed how quickly political transitions can collapse into chaos, I see warning signs that demand attention.
The administration’s restraint is commendable. By avoiding direct military intervention, Washington has sidestepped the catastrophic error we made in Baghdad when we dissolved Iraq’s military and attempted to rebuild a nation from scratch. But restraint alone does not guarantee success. The lessons from Iraq offer crucial insights into risks that may not be immediately obvious from Washington.
Beyond Military Force: The Complete Spectrum of National Power
One of Iraq’s most critical failures was our over-reliance on military power while neglecting other instruments of national influence. Venezuela offers the opportunity to get this right from the beginning, applying what national security professionals call DIMEFIL: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Finance, Intelligence, and Law Enforcement instruments of power.
The beauty of the current Venezuela situation is that military force, while available if needed, is not the primary instrument. But this requires deliberate, coordinated application of each element, something we failed to do in Iraq until years into the conflict when the cost became tragically apparent.
The Iraq Experience: What We Didn’t See Coming
The conventional narrative about Iraq focuses on obvious mistakes: disbanding the military, too few troops, mismanagement. These were real failures, but my experience revealed something more insidious: how quickly security vacuums emerge in transitions, even when political structures appear stable.
In those early weeks after Baghdad fell, there was dangerous euphoria. Saddam was gone, government ministries stood intact, and Iraqi civilians cheered. It felt like success. But beneath that surface calm, three dynamics were already emerging that would shape the next two decades of war.
First, criminal networks filled security gaps faster than anyone anticipated. Within days, organized looting stripped government buildings and infrastructure. These networks would later provide logistics and financing for insurgent groups.
Second, existing power structures proved remarkably resilient. Ba’athist networks didn’t disappear, they went underground and reorganized. The assumption that removing Saddam meant dismantling his power structure proved dangerously naive.
Third, the gap between regime change and legitimate governance created a void where foreign actors, Iran, Syria, jihadist networks, exploited the window to establish influence. By the time we recognized what was happening, these networks were too entrenched to eliminate.
Iraq taught me that the most dangerous period in any political transition isn’t the moment of regime change, it’s the six to twelve months afterward, when the old order is gone but new legitimacy hasn’t solidified.
Venezuela’s Unique Vulnerabilities
Venezuela faces similar dynamics with complications that make Iraq look straightforward. The administration’s decision to leave existing structures intact avoids some pitfalls but creates others.
The Narco-Terrorist Time Bomb
Venezuela has become one of the world’s major narco-terrorist states. Under Maduro, the country became a primary cocaine transit hub, with regime officials, including senior military leaders, directly profiting from drug trafficking. The ELN and FARC dissidents operate freely, running sophisticated operations. This isn’t peripheral criminality, it’s a parallel economy rivaling the legitimate government.
Here’s the critical question: With Maduro gone but institutional structures intact, what happens to these narco-terrorist networks? Many military officers, security officials, and government administrators who facilitated drug trafficking under Maduro remain in positions of authority. The infrastructure enabling the drug trade didn’t disappear when Maduro left.
Without direct American involvement on the ground, the new Venezuelan government faces the challenge of dismantling these networks using the very institutions that were compromised by them. The risk isn’t immediate failure, it’s that narco-terrorist networks will adapt to the new political reality, maintaining operations while offering surface cooperation.
The danger for the United States is that a year from now, Venezuela might be politically stable enough that intervention seems unwarranted, but narco-terrorist networks remain intact and operational, continuing to flood American communities with cocaine while we lack justification for direct action.
Foreign Actors: The Quiet Infiltration
Iraq taught me that foreign adversaries are most dangerous when they operate quietly during transitions. Iran’s intelligence services didn’t announce their presence, they cultivated relationships, funded militias, and positioned assets while we focused on immediate security challenges.
Venezuela faces similar exposure with multiple adversaries: Cuba has intelligence operatives deeply embedded in Venezuelan security services; Iran has established relationships with Venezuelan military and intelligence officials; Russia has economic and military interests; and China has massive investments in Venezuelan oil infrastructure and debt holdings.
The Trump administration’s diplomatic achievement likely required accommodations with some of these actors. But without American presence on the ground to monitor and counterbalance this influence, foreign actors have opportunities to quietly expand their positions. Venezuelan leaders, desperate for international support and economic assistance, face temptations from Cuban intelligence offering “technical assistance,” Chinese companies promising infrastructure investment, and Russian energy experts offering to restore oil production.
The Legitimacy Gap
Political legitimacy takes time to establish, but threats don’t wait. González’s advantage is that he’s Venezuelan, elected through a process most Venezuelans recognize as legitimate, and unburdened by association with foreign occupation.
But legitimacy is conditional. González’s government will be judged on its ability to deliver tangible improvements: personal security, economic opportunity, basic services, and justice for Maduro-era crimes. If the new government struggles to meet expectations, narco-terrorist groups and foreign actors can position themselves as necessary alternatives.
Without sufficient international support, economic assistance, security cooperation, technical expertise, the González government will struggle to meet expectations, creating space for dangerous actors to fill the void.
Applying DIMEFIL: What Success Requires
Venezuela needs comprehensive application of all instruments of national power, delivered quickly and sustained over years:
Diplomatic: Senior presence in Caracas immediately, coordinating with Colombia, Brazil, and Argentina to create unified hemispheric approach, and counterbalancing Chinese, Russian, Cuban, and Iranian diplomatic efforts.
Informational: Technical assistance establishing independent media, countering disinformation, building communications infrastructure, and actively exposing hostile information operations.
Military: Military-to-military relationships, security cooperation agreements, training assistance for counter-narcotics operations, and liaison officers providing planning expertise. The goal is enabling Venezuelan forces to succeed, not fighting their battles.
Economic: American energy companies can restore Venezuelan oil production, but need security guarantees and rule-of-law protections. USAID, Export-Import Bank, and Commerce Department must coordinate to make Venezuela attractive for American business while ensuring investments serve Venezuelan recovery.
Finance: Treasury expertise for identifying and freezing narco-terrorist financial networks, seizing assets stolen by Maduro-era officials, establishing anti-money-laundering frameworks, and providing technical assistance to rebuild Venezuela’s financial systems.
Intelligence: Provide Venezuelan government with intelligence on narco-terrorist networks, foreign operative activity, and regime holdouts, while providing U.S. government with ground truth about what’s actually happening.
Law Enforcement: DEA expansion for counter-narcotics; FBI expertise in investigating corruption and organized crime; U.S. Marshals training for fugitive apprehension; and assistance professionalizing Venezuelan police forces. This law enforcement surge can dismantle criminal networks while building Venezuelan institutional capacity.
Coordination: The Missing Element
The challenge isn’t lacking these capabilities, it’s coordinating them effectively. The National Security Council must establish a Venezuela coordination mechanism, perhaps a senior director specifically responsible for synchronizing DIMEFIL elements, ensuring they support rather than contradict each other.
The Window Is Closing
Political transitions have momentum. In the early weeks and months, there’s energy, hope, and willingness to accept difficult changes. But this window closes as competing interests organize and initial enthusiasm fades. In Iraq, we had perhaps six months when truly transformative changes were possible.
Venezuela is in that critical window now. Narco-terrorist networks are vulnerable because they’re uncertain about the new government’s intentions. Foreign actors are calibrating their approaches. Venezuelan institutions are malleable, open to reform. Venezuelan people are hopeful.
But this window is already closing. Every day that narco-terrorist networks operate without serious challenge, they grow more entrenched. Every week that foreign actors engage without American counterbalance, their influence deepens. Every month that economic conditions don’t improve, popular support erodes.
Every week that foreign actors engage without American counterbalance, their influence deepens.
Conclusion: Choose Success Through Comprehensive Power
I’ve seen what happens when Washington treats post-conflict transitions as afterthoughts, relying on military force while neglecting other instruments that determine long-term success. But I’ve also seen what American power can achieve when properly applied.
Venezuela is achievable, but only if we employ the full DIMEFIL spectrum in coordinated fashion. The tools exist. The lessons have been learned, painfully. The question is whether we have the wisdom to apply them comprehensively and the discipline to sustain attention when Venezuela fades from headlines.
The administration’s approach, regime change without military occupation, was the right call. But that decision creates obligations. Having orchestrated Maduro’s departure and helped install González, the United States now has moral and strategic responsibility to help ensure this transition succeeds using all instruments of national power.
This isn’t nation-building fantasy. It’s cold strategic calculation: investing now in Venezuela’s stability through comprehensive application of American power is far cheaper in blood and treasure than dealing with Venezuelan state failure later. It’s counter-narcotics enforcement through law enforcement and financial tools rather than military occupation. It’s great power competition using diplomatic and economic instruments to prevent China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran from consolidating influence in a resource-rich nation in America’s backyard.
Iraq taught me what failure looks like when we over-rely on military power and neglect other instruments: years of war, thousands of lives lost, trillions spent, limited success. Venezuela offers the opportunity to demonstrate what success looks like: smart application of all elements of American power, adequately resourced and sustained over years, achieving strategic objectives through comprehensive engagement rather than massive military commitment.
The opportunity is in front of us. The risks are clear. The lessons are known. The instruments of power are available. Venezuela can succeed, but only if we commit to employing all instruments of national power in synchronized fashion. Anything less, and we risk repeating Baghdad’s catastrophic mistakes in a new theater, with consequences that will haunt American security for decades.
Venezuela can succeed, but only if we commit to employing all instruments of national power in synchronized fashion.
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