ASEAN’s Digital Infrastructure Paradox – OpEd
The digital ministers of ASEAN member nations met in Hanoi from January 12-16, 2026, where they adopted the new ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2026-2030. The plan outlines a blueprint that would take the region from basic connectivity to connected intelligence, where technologies such as AI, robotics, IoT devices, and next-generation networks and technologies work together as seamless digital infrastructure. Indeed, a futuristic vision for the region's technology future. However, for this to materialize, the region would need to assess who builds and controls the infrastructure that this connected intelligence depends on.
The declarations stressed the need to build intelligent infrastructure, which would require next-generation network technologies, such as 6G, the expansion of existing submarine networks, and the launching of low earth orbit satellites. AI must be properly harnessed so that its potential can be properly utilized for innovation. No doubt, AI would fundamentally change the way we go about doing our business and lives. Nonetheless, there is also a need for it to evolve both inclusively and responsibly so that communities can be empowered.
The aspirations of the Declaration are noble. But beneath the rhetoric lies a fundamental contradiction that was missed - the ambitious infrastructure agenda may in fact widen digital disparities, leading to the deepening of technological dependencies. Several ASEAN nations lack internal capacity to build critical components. In such a scenario, racing to deploy advanced digital infrastructure would not reduce dependencies, as intended. Diversification would not increase resilience, rather it could lead to the multiplication of dependencies coming via Chinese hardware, western software, or European regulatory frameworks. Cross-border governance, cybersecurity, and other such challenges can neither be solved alone nor even when ASEAN nations come together. The reason being that fundamental technologies are in the control of nations outside the region.
ASEAN’s digital infrastructure is not only foreign-owned but also foreign-operated. Take the cloud computing market for example. The sector had a fabulous growth in 2025, reaching about USD 22 billion. The market is expected to double by 2030 to about USD 44 billion. But here is the problem – while public cloud services account for 67.6% market share, it is dominated almost entirely by foreign service providers. US hyper-scalers such as AWS, MS Azure, and Google Cloud control the largest share, while the Chinese giants such as Tencent and Alibaba also have a significant presence. These companies have invested heavily in the region, with AWS committing a combined USD 20 billion in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand. Google is expanding in the region and has invested significantly. Chinese players are not far behind – they have also invested heavily in Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Tencent has allocated USD 500 million in Indonesian infrastructure.
The region is promising for these foreign players, and there is no surprise that investment is coming in. Investments now and entering early would mean more market share and profits later. Alibaba is offering cost-effective alternatives to US-based platforms, which appeal to industries prioritizing local data residency. All this is good news for ASEAN, as the region gets to have capacity that it desperately needs. Both Malaysia and Singapore are gaining capacity quickly.
Singapore is the digital hub of the region. However, their cables are largely built by telecom operators from France, Italy, the US, and Japan, though regional players like Singtel are also involved. Meta and Google, both US players, are building their own submarine cables. The Apricot cable that connects Indonesia is scheduled to come online by 2026. All these reveal a similar pattern. Every submarine cable that connects the ASEAN region to the world is built by players based in other jurisdictions. Hence, the Hanoi Declaration's goal to assure the region's resilience and cross-border continuity has to overcome this submarine cable paradox.
Transition to 5G also brings out yet another infrastructure trap. As technology prepares for a shift to 6G, this trap gets further accentuated since the core network equipment is supplied only by a handful of providers. While China and South Korea have suppliers such as Huawei and Samsung respectively, Ericsson and Nokia extend an external link of suppliers from the western side. ASEAN's current weakness is that they do not manufacture this equipment and therefore have to depend on these foreign suppliers.
Vietnam, for example, has a target of 99% coverage with 5G network by 2030 and yet another target of at least six undersea fiber optic cables, hyper-scale data centers, and development of digital hubs. The current progress of Vietnam is exemplary, as on the mobile internet speed it saw its ranking go up by 50 places and entering the elite group of the world's top 20. Recently, ZTE and Thailand’s AIS have conducted 6G trials. Indonesia is having external partnerships with Nokia, NVIDIA, and its Indosat is deploying AI-driven networks. But still, all these elements of success depend on foreign technology. There is sometimes an assumption that access and control are the same thing. But as recent examples show, they aren’t.
The digital divide in ASEAN would have the risk of a two-tier infrastructure. Some ASEAN nations lack full 4G infrastructure. Myanmar and Laos face rural connectivity gaps. Rushing toward 6G while basic connectivity remains incomplete would bring advanced networks to urban centers, while rural areas would still be on old generation networks.
While the ASEAN Digital Masterplan 2026-2030 is ambitious, well-intentioned, and addresses real needs, it emphasizes infrastructure diversification. This emphasis obscures a harder truth that the region is not building independent digital infrastructure but integrating more deeply into foreign-controlled tech ecosystems. The Malaysian-initiated sustainable data centers are welcome efforts, but more needs to be done. Connected intelligence requires intelligence about connected infrastructure. This also requires the understanding of who controls it. Hence, any assessment of the region must also cover technological dependencies. Policy makers would need realistic strategies for managing these dependencies for long-term resilience of the region and its digital future.