Greenland is America's frontdoor — forgetting that has dangerous consequences
President Donald Trump’s announcement that the United States will impose a 10 percent import tariff on eight European countries opposing U.S. control of Greenland has forced a long-ignored Arctic debate into the open. Several European governments responded with immediate objections, while skepticism at home followed just as quickly.
Critics warn that tariffs risk alienating allies and straining NATO. Polling shows widespread public unease with any move that sounds like American domination of Greenland. Those concerns are real, but they do not change the strategic facts. Dismissing Greenland as optional ignores a central lesson of modern history: the Arctic has never been peripheral to the defense of the American homeland.
Washington confronted a similar — and far more dangerous — strategic dilemma during the Cold War.
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During that period, U.S. defense planners did not view the Arctic as a distant theater. They treated it as the most direct avenue of attack against North America. Soviet bombers and missiles followed the shortest routes over the Pole, forcing Washington to confront an unavoidable geographic reality.
Because missiles and bombers traveled over polar paths, Arctic geography drove American defense planning. In cooperation with Canada and with Denmark’s consent in Greenland, the United States constructed an unprecedented early-warning system across the high north. The Pinetree Line, the Mid-Canada Line and the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line together formed more than sixty radar stations stretching from Alaska across the Canadian Arctic toward Greenland. When intercontinental ballistic missiles replaced bombers as the primary threat, Washington adapted again, fielding the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System at Thule in Greenland, Clear in Alaska and Fylingdales in the United Kingdom — designed to provide decision-makers with critical warning time in a nuclear crisis.
Those Cold War lessons still apply because missile flight paths, warning timelines and homeland defense remain shaped by Arctic geography.
Some analysts argue that existing defenses — particularly those at Fort Greely, Alaska — reduce the need for strategic positioning in Greenland. Fort Greely is a vital component of U.S. homeland missile defense. But, it does not operate in isolation.
In a crisis measured in minutes, even small gaps in detection or tracking can mean the difference between deterrence and disaster.
Missile defense depends on multiple sensors and early-warning systems positioned across vast distances. Forward radar installations in the Arctic extend detection time and improve tracking against threats approaching from polar trajectories. During the Cold War, Washington did not choose between Alaska and Greenland; it reinforced both. Defense planners still rely on geographic depth to preserve warning time and decision space.
Greenland’s importance, however, extends well beyond missile defense and early warning.
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In addition to its military significance, Greenland’s deposits of rare earths and other critical minerals have become a focal point of competition among the United States, Europe and China. These materials underpin modern weapons systems, energy technologies and advanced manufacturing. Unfortunately, the U.S. remains uncomfortably dependent on Chinese-dominated supply chains.
The strategic objective regarding Greenland should not be ownership for its own sake. It is access and denial: ensuring reliable Western access while preventing Beijing from securing long-term leverage over future supply. That objective can be pursued through long-term investment agreements, joint development and security partnerships with Greenland and Denmark — without annexation.
But access without security is fragile. China has repeatedly used commercial footholds to translate economic presence into political leverage. Agreements endure only when backed by credible deterrence.
For years, Arctic shipping lanes were dismissed as speculative. That era is over. The Northwest Passage is becoming increasingly navigable, shortening transit between Asia, Europe and North America. Russia already treats Arctic waters as sovereign corridors, enforced by military power. China is positioning itself for future control of ports, resupply nodes and undersea infrastructure. Greenland occupies a pivotal position along these developing Arctic routes.
An expanded NATO presence in the Arctic — including Greenland — would strengthen deterrence, particularly if it includes substantial U.S. forces. But NATO remains a consensus alliance, and consensus slows decision-making in moments of crisis.
During the Cold War, Greenland’s defense worked because American leadership was clear and operational authority was unambiguous, even as Danish sovereignty was fully respected. Effective deterrence requires clear authority and responsibility, not uncertainty about who decides when time is scarce.
How this debate is framed carries real consequences. Talk of "taking" Greenland or overriding local opposition invites comparisons to imperial ventures the United States should never repeat. America does not need occupation forces, nor does it need another protracted insurgency. History — from the Philippines after 1898 onward — offers blunt warnings about the costs of confusing strategic geography with colonial ambition.
Greenland and Denmark have made clear that Greenland is not for sale. Tariffs may draw attention to the issue, but coercion should not become a substitute for diplomacy, investment and alliance leadership.
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Polling shows that many Americans oppose acquiring or dominating Greenland. That skepticism reflects war fatigue and distrust of open-ended commitments. But it reflects a failure to explain the stakes — not their absence. Greenland is not Iraq or Afghanistan. There would be no nation-building project, no counterinsurgency campaign and no attempt to impose governance.
This debate is about access, basing rights, early-warning capability and denial authority — objectives the United States has pursued in Greenland before, successfully and peacefully.
Washington faces a choice that is often mischaracterized as empire versus restraint. In reality, the decision is whether to remain engaged, with respect for sovereignty and alliances, or to step back as strategic competitors consolidate influence. As China and Russia expand their reach in the high north, American leadership — rooted in history, geography and restraint — remains indispensable.
America once learned that the Arctic is the front door to the homeland. Forgetting that lesson now would invite consequences far more dangerous than remembering it.