The key to normalizing relations between Moscow and Washington lies in our own stability and strength
In recent years we have become accustomed to a great deal, yet world politics continues to set new records. Or perhaps sink to new depths, depending on your taste. One week in January provided a full set of examples: the kidnapping of Venezuela’s presidential couple by US special forces; the tightening of a naval blockade through the seizure of foreign ships; and threats to take Greenland from Denmark “by any means necessary.” Add to this the American president’s public remark that the only limitation on US foreign policy is his own sense of morality. Iran, too, is in turmoil, and the external factor is not even being concealed.
In such an atmosphere, analytical composure is hard to maintain. But that is precisely the task.
For several years analysts have been writing about the demise of the liberal order – a system of global governance built around international institutions overseen by the most powerful group of states: the West. That order consisted not only of organizations at different levels, but also of norms rooted in a specific ideological foundation. It has now become clear that this structure, originally tailored to Western preferences, has ceased to satisfy even its designers.
The reason is simple: other players learned to extract benefits from the system – sometimes greater than those enjoyed by its authors. China, for example, succeeded by following the rules so skillfully that it outplayed those who wrote them. Meanwhile, a wave of mass immigration from poorer states into richer ones brought not only economic advantages, but also political and social complications of increasing severity.
As the balance of power shifted, leading states began to adjust the model. But this had its own internal logic. Distorting it too far deprives the entire framework of coherence and stability. The result is what we are witnessing now: the abandonment of liberal pretenses and the rejection of restrictions that existed under the previous order.
Donald Trump embodies this change in a particularly blunt form. He frustrates European partners not because they cannot change, but because they do not want to: it was precisely the liberal system that gave the European Union its unique international advantages, which are now evaporating together with that system.
Trumpism is not an attempt to restore the global leadership of the 1990s–2010s, when Washington aimed to regulate the entire planet. The new approach is different. It exploits every lever of American power accumulated through decades of hegemony. Not for universal rule, but for specific gain. It is also strikingly honest. Material interest is openly declared, and there is little effort to disguise it behind “values.”
One could say that Washington is acting this way because it understands, instinctively or consciously, that American capabilities are diminishing. That awareness only intensifies the urge to extract maximum benefit while the accumulated advantage still exists.
Trump’s version of the Monroe Doctrine resembles the construction of a ‘Fortress America’ in the Western Hemisphere: a protected base for further raids onto the world stage. He grants clear priority to domestic issues, and in his political worldview Latin America is itself a domestic issue.
The most frequently discussed themes are drug trafficking, mass migration, labor market pressures, and the changing composition of the electorate. These link the United States to the region far more directly than do abstract international doctrines. Canada and Greenland are exceptions; however, as current events show, only partly.
From this emerges another Trump paradigm: the “enemy within.” In his political mythology, leftists and liberals obstruct the ‘America First’ project. Meanwhile, this logic extends to Latin America where he is ideologically hostile to left-wing governments. Speaking to military personnel hastily assembled from across the world, Trump recently emphasized that the army has a duty to confront internal enemies. Despite court rulings, the use of armed force in US cities has already become a hallmark of this presidency.
Thus, the primacy of the domestic agenda –including full control over the American continent as a guarantee of national security – forms the core of Trump’s political approach. External actions are linked to internal objectives: increasing revenue, stimulating investment, securing resources and minerals for the American economy.
There is, however, one special case: Israel. Support for Israel is also deeply embedded in US domestic politics, but it carries enormous external consequences. Washington is expected to back Israel’s ambitions to reshape the Middle East even when it is unclear whether such efforts are expedient for American interests themselves.
The Trump administration is therefore prepared to disregard many commitments inherited from the liberal era, including obligations toward allies and partners. If commitments are burdensome and offer no direct benefit, the White House sees no reason to honor them.
Of course, this is an “ideal type,” which may be distorted by circumstances. Above all the lack of unity within the American elite and even within Trump’s own circle. Lobbying, too, remains a structural feature of US politics. Yet so far Trump has pushed his vision through with notable effectiveness.
Assuming this interpretation is broadly correct, how should Russia behave?
Despite his outward recklessness, Trump is in fact risk-averse. He fears being dragged into the kind of long, exhausting confrontation that defined America’s “endless wars,” especially if it involves casualties. He prefers a spectacular raid, strong imagery, then quick withdrawal and a declaration of victory. Venezuela offers a textbook example. Where the risk of retaliation is real, or the outcome unclear, Trump chooses caution: pressure behind the scenes, indirect leverage, and special operations rather than open war.
When faced with true resistance, Trump rarely insists to the bitter end. We saw this in the episodes involving India, and especially China, over punitive tariffs. With India the results were modest. With China, it became obvious that Beijing had its own countermeasures. Trump moved toward negotiation. He dislikes blackmail when the other side does not bend. But he respects steadfastness.
Trump also treats the concept of “great powers” seriously, and believes only a handful of states qualify. He is fascinated by leaders who wield absolute or near-absolute authority. This explains his special interest in the leaders of China, Russia, India, North Korea and others of that category. Trump does not hide his envy for such models of governance.
This has practical implications. By insisting on American primacy in the Western Hemisphere, Trump still fails to recognize that other great powers have comparable interests in their own regions. Yet he now understands the existence of other interests better than before, especially when they do not directly conflict with American ones. This creates more room for negotiation than existed under the previous apostles of “global leadership.”
The current US administration prefers bilateral bargaining. It believes America is stronger than most counterparts. It is irritated by alliances between states designed to strengthen their positions. From this follows a clear conclusion. Russia should deepen cooperation inside BRICS and within regional communities. Not for rhetorical symbolism, but as a practical shield against pressure applied one-on-one.
Finally, Trump’s interest in undermining rivals by indirect means stems from his wish to avoid head-on confrontation. He respects deals and seeks partners abroad who can deliver them. He will therefore exploit internal divisions among the leadership of other states to steer policies in directions favorable to Washington.
That is why the key to normalizing relations with Trump’s America lies not in trying to charm or persuade it, but in ensuring internal resilience. The best defense against interference is stability and strength. Not strength that provokes, but strength that makes interference unprofitable.
This article was first published in the newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and was translated and edited by the RT team