Why the home secretary can’t fire a police chief who has done wrong – it’s key to the integrity of British policing
Craig Guildford, the chief constable of one of Britain’s largest police forces, West Midlands Police, will retire, after coming under pressure over a controversial decision by the police to ban visiting supporters of the Israeli football team Maccabi Tel Aviv from attending a match against Aston Villa.
Things escalated after it was revealed that the police used incorrect evidence that was hallucinated by AI in a report that led to their decision. Guildford had previously twice denied that AI was used. In an apology, the force said it had not deliberately distorted evidence.
The home secretary, Shabana Mahmood, then told MPs that she had “lost confidence” in Guildford, and announced that she would bring in new powers to allow any future home secretary to sack a chief constable. But such a promise, I argue, may be a threat to a key principle of policing in the UK.
When Robert Peel created the current British policing model, he insisted that officers must be non-partisan and free from political control and influence. Holding the office of constable means a police officer (including a chief constable) swears their allegiance to the king rather than any elected politician.
They should execute their duty independently, without fear or favour. Neither politicians nor anyone else may tell the police what decisions to take or what methods to employ, or not employ, to enforce the law. This is why the home secretary can’t just fire a chief constable.
How police are governed
For policing purposes, the UK has three separate criminal justice jurisdictions: Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales. Whatever Mahmood implements will only apply to her jurisdiction, England and Wales. Since the 1970s, this includes 43 separate police forces, each covering a county or larger urban area such as the West Midlands.
The English and Welsh forces are governed by a shared system. Responsibility is divided between the Home Office, which provides half the police budget and sets national pay awards and regulations; the police and crime commissioner, an elected official with a mandate to set certain policing priorities; and the chief constable for an area, who is supposed to be operationally independent to decide how those priorities are met.
The notion of “independence from politics” has been under threat since the introduction of police and crime commissioners (PCCs) in 2011, most of whom are aligned to one of the main political parties. In addition, there have been questions raised about interference in the operational day-to-day running of police forces by at least one recent home secretary. The judge involved in this case said she found police had “maintained their operational independence”, and that the home secretary’s conversations with senior police had not influenced on-the-ground operations.
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Before 2011, the second limb of the three-pronged arrangement was a police authority. This consisted of 17 members drawn from local council, the magistracy and some members of the public. They were responsible for selecting (and if necessary, removing) their chief constable. The national police inspectorate would advise the police authority on suitability and qualifications, but there was no role for central government in the decision. Arguably, this removed personal enmity and political influence from the system.
Things changed in 1996, when the Police Act gave a home secretary the power to direct a police authority to force their chief constable to resign on the grounds of gross inefficiency or ineffectiveness. This was an extremely rare event, and generally chief constables were pretty safe in their role until a time of their choosing.
When the Conservative-led coalition government came to power in 2010, the prime minister was enamoured with the policing model in the US, whereby the local mayor had direct control of policing. This inspired Cameron’s government to create the current system of locally elected PCCs. They removed from the home secretary the power to sack a chief constable, and passed it to the PCC.
Last November, the government announced they were scrapping the model of PCCs. While we don’t yet know exactly what will replace them, the mood seems to be to give responsibility for policing to elected mayors or council leaders. Whether they will have sole power to fire the chief constable remains to be seen, but given Mahmood’s current stance it seems unlikely.
Policing by consent
To work effectively, “policing by consent” requires a sufficiently high level of public trust in the police. For several reasons, public confidence in the police is currently at a low ebb.
People want to be sure that their police service is free from political interference. It is, in my view, obviously undesirable for a chief constable to be scared of upsetting the home secretary of the day, and undesirable that any politician might bully a chief constable to suit their political ends. Losing a £100,000 pension is no doubt a sobering prospect.
As is often the case in politics, this fairly new home secretary probably wants to create the impression that she is strong, and will personally tackle inefficiency in policing. On the face of it, what Mahmood is planning to do is not particularly radical or remarkable – she is simply giving herself back the power that her predecessors had before the Tories took it away in 2011.
Although that power was rarely used, we must ask whether it was ever a desirable power for the home secretary to have in the first place.
John Fox is a former senior police detective.