For all of the noise about regime-change in Iran, anti-regime activists in the United States have thought very little about a post-Islamic Republic future.

The policy debate on Iran has long been muddled by overlapping networks of Iranian-American influencers, domestic lobbying groups, aspiring political appointees, and several Arab Gulf states, leaving the US government no better prepared for revolution now than it was in 1979. 

Iran Influencers in Washington

The issue of Iran has always been highly polarized in Washington, where hundreds of government employees claim expertise despite having never been to Iran nor having spent any significant time with Iranians, for fear of losing their security clearances. Most are only able to distinguish themselves for career advancement by confidently asserting their policy and political opinions. They are either staunchly anti-regime in the belief that the Islamic Republic is comprised only of hardliners unwilling to make concessions, or they are equally convinced that the only path to moderating Iran’s behavior is through peaceful negotiation. 

The situation is no different for the many Iranian influencers at think tanks and universities who visit Washington to brief the US government and share their first—or (much more often) second-hand insights. Moreover, the influx of money from a range of domestic and foreign donors for anyone willing to take a strong stance in one direction or another creates a perverse incentive structure for the foreign policy debate. 

Reza Pahlavi should have been a unifying force for Iranian opposition activities in Washington, rallying Iranian voices around a common vision for change. He spent the last 45 years in the suburbs doing the typical DC routine, mingling with politicians and policymakers at unofficial gatherings of former neocons, Iranian dissidents, and pro-Israel activists. In all of that time, he never formed a government-in-waiting, which was probably wise, given how it would have invited factional disputes. 

The closest he came was the launch of his Iran Prosperity Project in May 2025, with a large cast of technocratic advisors making broad policy recommendations. Some of them might be characterized as a transition team. But as a transition to what? The policies they recommend are clear enough, and there is wisdom in their stated goal of wanting to avoid severe retribution against clerics or alienating former regime loyalists. Yet, all of it is purely aspirational as long as Pahlavi remains outside Iran. 

Pahlavi checks off every box for the many lobbyists who would advocate for radical change in Washington. He is the symbol of a secular Iran. A country at peace with its neighbors, friendly toward Israel and America, which is willing to discuss denuclearization and regional security cooperation in good faith. And yet it is impossible to ignore the fact that the Pahlavi brand is marked by a long history of association with corruption, brutality, and overly cozy relations with the US government. That is surely a key reason why so many in Washington, Jerusalem, and in certain Arab Gulf capitals have been willing to associate with him in private over the years, but not necessarily in public. 

So you have Iranian-Americans in Washington trying to influence the policy debate, a crown prince waiting on the sidelines, lobbyists trying to insert their talking points into the discussion, and a large number of US government officials hoping that somehow these connections will help boost their careers. The resulting policy discussion is often devoid of nuance, detail, or insight, leaving Washington as hopelessly uninformed as it was when the Shah fled the country nearly fifty years ago. 

The Interests of the Arab Gulf States in Iranian Regime Change

The Arab Gulf states have played their own complex game of engaging Washington on the issue of Iran. Several of them spent years harping on the threat of conventional warfare in the Gulf to justify sales of advanced American defense systems. As they incorporated these platforms into their national defense strategies, they carefully avoided other forms of region-wide collaborative defense architectures that would have required serious efforts at joint planning and doctrine development. Some even developed quiet back-channel relationships with the Islamic Republic to de-escalate tensions and hedge their bets against negative blowback from American sanctions. 

At times, the interests of certain Arab Gulf states have aligned with other pressure groups, resulting in a dramatic amplifying effect. Following the Green Movement protests in 2009, some Arab Gulf partners became involved in supporting Iranian oppositionists and separatist groups more directly. This activity surely brought some Arab Gulf officials into close proximity with Israeli counterparts who sought to build regional security alliances that might help isolate Iran and contribute to the demise of the regime. And, in turn, such activities may also have encouraged some Western policymakers to think that combined active measures against Iran could have a substantial impact on shaping the future of Iran and its proxies. 

Iran’s Fragmented Public Sphere

The messy reality on the ground in Iran is far removed from the clean lines of policy debate between various interest groups in DC. As Shahir Shahidsaless has noted, the Iranian public today is inundated with information, making mobilization of protesters much easier, but also making their organization much harder. The public sphere is highly decentralized and fragmented, with countless competing narratives once you move beyond a general opposition to government abuses. 

The only coherent faction that has an existential imperative to seize control and maintain a firm grip over politics is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), affiliated security organizations like the Basij, and their economic beneficiaries. Even if a transitional government were to make allowances for certain former regime defense and security personnel, it should be clear to everyone that, in the event the Islamic Republic falls, popular retribution will almost certainly be carried out against its loyalists in every village and town. As Arman Mahmoudian put it in The National Interest, no one can fill the power vacuum that is likely to open after regime failure and deliver security in the chaotic months that follow. 

Nationwide protests are now a regular feature of what is clearly becoming the protracted end-stage of the current regime. The current round could prove decisive in overthrowing the Islamic Republic, or the IRGC may succeed in a brutal crackdown, setting the stage for a coup at a later date when the supreme leader finally passes on. After all, the one predictable element of current events in Iran is that the IRGC has the greatest incentive to maintain firm control over the situation, as Alex Vatanka points out. Regardless, we are likely to be surprised by the many new personalities and organizations seeking international attention and support, most of which will have no connection to the Washington establishment. 

Who Is Responsible for a Post-Revolutionary Iran?

The increasingly complex and convoluted influence operations that have played out in DC over the last two decades have come at a cost. The money, politics, and institutions, many of which involved American citizens as both donors and recipients, were merely background noise as long as the Islamic Republic remained firmly in place. But when the time comes for real change in Iran, Washington will be unprepared. And the many pressure groups seeking to influence the policy debate will have done us all a disservice. 

The Trump administration has signaled its readiness to conduct airstrikes on regime targets, most likely with the intention of creating fractures within the security services and defections among senior officials. But it is unlikely to take ownership of the chaos that could ensue. The Trump administration is far more likely to take credit for any immediate success in breaking the regime and then wait to see what the various opposition factions and their backers can do to rally Iranian public support and restore order. All of these pressure groups came to Washington over the years to lobby American support for overthrowing the regime. Still, it will be incumbent on them to pick up the pieces themselves, a job for which most of them are wholly unsuited.

About the Author: Joshua Yaphe 

Joshua Yaphe is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, host of the Key Judgments podcast on Intelligence Studies, and author of Time and Narrative in Intelligence Analysis: A New Framework for the Production of Meaning (Routledge, 2025), which is available for free in an Open Access edition online. He was a senior analyst for the Arabian Peninsula at the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) and a visiting professor at the National Intelligence University (NIU). He received a PhD in History from American University in Washington, DC. He authored the book Saudi Arabia and Iraq as Friends and Enemies: Borders, Tribes and a History Shared (University of Liverpool Press, 2022).

The opinions and characterizations in this piece are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the US Government.

Image: Alexandros Michailidis / Shutterstock.com.

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