Resilience, not dominance, will shape the next era of space competition.

Space has become indispensable to modern warfare. Precision strike, global communications, missile warning, navigation, intelligence, and joint command and control all depend on space-based systems. What was once a largely enabling domain has become operational terrain that can directly shape outcomes on land, at sea, and in the air. As space becomes more deeply integrated into warfare, competition in orbit is no longer peripheral to conflict; it is foundational to it. 

For much of the post-Cold War period, however, US space forces operated under unusually permissive conditions. American satellites were few in number, extraordinarily capable, and assumed to be politically sensitive targets. While never formalized as doctrine, this environment encouraged an implicit logic of restraint. Major powers were expected to avoid overt interference with space systems that underpinned not only US military operations but global economic and security stability. Escalation risks, attribution challenges, and fear of retaliation combined to limit contestation. That environment no longer exists. 

From Dominance to Continuous Disruption in Space

Space is now congested and continuously contested. Adversaries do not need to seek decisive victory in space to gain an advantage. Instead, they can engage in limited disruption by degrading communications, navigation, or intelligence gathering at particular moments in order to cause meaningful operational effects without crossing clear thresholds of war. As a result, interference has become more cost-effective and more deniable. In this respect, space increasingly resembles the early days of maritime competition, which was an open domain before widely accepted rules of the sea. States tested one another through harassment and limited force rather than decisive battle. 

US space architecture remains shaped by that earlier strategic environment. The force that emerged emphasized small numbers of exquisite, high-cost satellites operating in predictable orbits and supported by centralized ground infrastructure. These systems deliver exceptional performance, but they also concentrate military value in assets that are difficult to replace and operationally costly to lose.

In a contested environment, this structure creates asymmetric incentives. Adversaries need not match US capabilities; they gain less from competing over strength and more by targeting our weaknesses. A handful of satellites, particularly in Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (GEO) or specific mission orbits like Highly Elliptical Orbit (HEO), are key points of weakness. Reversible electronic attacks or cyber intrusions can impose outsized effects at relatively low cost. Long replenishment timelines magnify these risks by turning temporary disruption into lasting degradation.

Space Is Becoming a Gray-Zone Domain 

This concentration enables gray-zone competition. Because interference can be incremental and plausibly deniable, adversaries can probe US systems without triggering clear escalation thresholds. The result is persistent friction that degrades Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) confidence and disrupts communications. In such conditions, deterrence by punishment is structurally unsound because attribution is contested, and escalation risks are asymmetric.

As such, adversaries increasingly treat space as an arena for continuous competition rather than decisive wartime blows. This is making space increasingly similar to cyber conflict. Early expectations that credible retaliation would deter cyberattacks eroded once attack attribution proved difficult. The United States responded by shifting from deterrence by punishment toward persistent engagement and forward defense. Similarly, temporary jamming of satellite communications or navigation signals can disrupt operations in specific regions or time windows and then disappear without a trace. Cyber intrusions into satellite command-and-control or ground infrastructure can delay tasking, corrupt data, or force defensive shutdowns while remaining difficult to attribute with confidence.

Additionally, Co-orbital capabilities reinforce this gray-zone strategy. Satellites capable of proximity operationscan shadow US assets, increasing risk and uncertainty without constituting an overt attack. Over time, interference becomes normalized rather than escalatory. As such, the strategic advantage comes from the ability to absorb disruption and continue operating.

Resilience as Power and Deterrence

In this environment, resilience is the most reliable form of power in space. To achieve this, the United States must focus on redundancy, dispersion, and rapid reconstitution. Resilient systems reduce the payoff of disruption, as each attack does less damage. Proliferated constellations in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO) can ensure that the loss or degradation of individual satellites produces only marginal effects. Dispersion across orbital regimes complicates targeting and forces adversaries to expend greater resources for diminishing returns. Finally, increasing the speed of satellite reconstitution through launch-on-demand, modular replacement satellites, and prepositioned spares can compress the windows that adversaries seek to exploit.

Strategically, resilience functions as deterrence by denial. Rather than threatening punishment after the fact, it limits the benefits of attack in the first place. Persistent counterspace operations lose effectiveness when disruption fails to translate into operational leverage. An adversary forced to jam dozens of satellites continuously to achieve modest effects confronts a fundamentally different cost-benefit calculation than one targeting a handful of exquisite assets.

Resilience strengthens deterrence indirectly by reducing adversary gains rather than threatening punishment as retaliation. This places space deterrence in a different category than Cold War nuclear doctrine, which relied on clear attribution, stable thresholds, and catastrophic punishment. Space offers none of these conditions.

Denial-based deterrence is better suited to a domain defined by ambiguity and constant interaction. When interference yields limited operational benefit, escalation becomes irrational even when attribution is uncertain. Over time, this discourages investment in counterspace capabilities that fail to deliver strategic returns. Deterrence in space should therefore be understood as shaping behavior through structural disadvantage, not enforcing restraint through fear.

What Endurance Requires

Operationally, this means deploying large constellations across LEO and MEO for communications, ISR, and navigation rather than relying on a small number of high-end platforms. Structurally, it requires integrating commercial launch, manufacturing, and on-orbit services to build out the speed and scale that the government cannot replicate alone. Prepositioned replacement satellites, modular payloads, and streamlined sign-off authority mean that losses can be absorbed quickly. The commercial sector already operates at the required cadence. The challenge is institutionally aligning acquisition and operations with the realities of contested space. Doctrine and exercises should assume partial degradation as the norm, not the exception.

In space, power derives less from dominance than from survivability. Disruption is inevitable. States that plan to endure will shape the balance of power. By investing in resilience through distributed architectures, commercial integration, and improved reconstitution, the United States can reduce the payoff of aggression and preserve operational freedom. 

In space, the ability to keep fighting matters more than the ability to threaten punishment. 

About the Author: Haydon N. Parham

Haydon N. Parham is a graduate student at Johns Hopkins University, where he focuses on economic and national security. He currently works in mortgage finance and has held fellowships at the Fund for American Studies, The Institute on Religion and Democracy, and Providence Magazine. He has written on security strategy, political economy, and the philosophy of history. He lives in Washington, DC.

Image: Rawpixel.com/shutterstock

The post In Space, Survival Is Strategy appeared first on The National Interest.