Upheaval in Iran would likely destabilize Pakistan’s western region.

In the triumphant wake of the abduction of Venezuelan president Nicolas Maduro, the idea that Iran is the next logical target for “corrective” regime change is gaining traction in Washington’s hawkish circles. Proponents imagine a swift decapitation of the Islamic Republic followed by a pliant, pro-Western order, perhaps led by the son of the deposed shah, Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi.

Their confidence is buoyed by the escalating protests in Iran, which have evolved from an expression of economic frustration into a challenge to the foundations of governance. President Donald Trump warned the Iranian authorities that the United States would “come to the rescue” of the protestors if they were to be repressed, without specifying the kind of action he would take.

The hawkish Senator Lindsay Graham (R-SC) showed less inhibition. In an interview with Fox TV, he threatened Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei; President Trump “will kill him” if the crackdown on the protestors escalates. 

Trump’s fresh threats come on the heels of the earlier threats to take on Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal, delivered during his meeting with the Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Yet the idea that the tactical success of the Venezuela operation indicates that the United States could execute a smooth regime change in Iran is a grave misreading of the regional realities. The Middle East is not Latin America. Treating Iran like Venezuela would not merely fail; it would ignite a multi-front crisis from the Levant to South Asia, proving the ultimate folly of a one-size-fits-all interventionism.

To begin with, Iran is not in the Western Hemisphere, which the new National Security Strategy prioritizes. A sustained operation against a country thousands of miles away would require a mobilization of resources, focus, and political will that the president, seemingly addicted to flashy, one-off operations, might not possess.

A decapitation strategy that Israel tried during the 12-Day war in June last year showed its limits—the assassinated military commanders were swiftly replaced. Even removing the current political leadership, including the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei, would run against what the researcher Sina Toosi calls the “Islamic Republic’s layered security structure” and “political realities that make elite fragmentation under foreign coercion harder to engineer.”

Furthermore, Iran, unlike Venezuela, has considerable military capabilities, notably its ballistic missiles, and an ability to disrupt the oil trade through the Persian Gulf.

Most critically, the regional alignment facing the United States could not be more different. In Latin America, the US action in Venezuela was supported by regional allies like Argentina and Ecuador, with their leaders publicly praising the operation as a victory for freedom.

In stark contrast, America’s closest allies in the Middle East, except Israel, are actively opposing any move toward an all-out war with Iran. Fearful of catastrophic regional fallout, Gulf Arab states such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar are racing to de-escalate tensions, pressing Washington to pursue diplomacy over conflict.

This opposition is not limited to the Persian Gulf. It extends across the region to critical US partners in South Asia, most notably Pakistan, with which relations markedly improved following General Asim Munir’s meeting with Trump in the White House last June.

The primary fear in Islamabad, like in other regional capitals, is not the Tehran regime’s endurance, but its violent disintegration. The vacuum would empower Baloch separatist militants who operate across their shared 900-kilometer border, providing them with a vast new sanctuary and arms. The specter of refugees flooding into Pakistan is another core national security concern.

Immersed in perennial tensions with India and facing terrorist attacks from Afghanistan, Pakistan cannot afford a war and destabilization on its western border, too.

This analysis points not to a military solution, but to a diplomatic pathway that the Trump administration has pursued in the first half of 2025, but then abandoned in favor of military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities. Rather than pursuing a renewed war with ever-shifting goalposts—from dismantling Iran’s ballistic missiles to the “protection” of anti-regime protestors—Washington should leverage regional partners who have a vested interest in stability. Pakistan is one of them. Crucially, Islamabad maintains diplomatic channels to both Tehran and Washington.

That interest is reciprocated by Iran. As it faces American and Israeli threats, Tehran has heavily invested in improving its regional standing. Notably, Iran welcomed a security pact between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, even though it has had strained relations with both in the past.

Iranian president Massoud Pezeshkian paid a state visit to Pakistan last year, followed by the visit of the chair of Iran’s national security council, Ali Larijani, in November 2025. Generally, as Tehran searches for its place on the evolving regional chessboard, with a looming leadership succession in the background, the pragmatic part of the Iranian elite views Pakistan as a potential source of lessons to be learned.

This case for Pakistan as a potential facilitator is reinforced by the fact that the United States has unwisely alienated Oman, which has traditionally—and successfully—played this role. US-Israeli strikes in June started the day before the United States and Iran were supposed to hold a round of negotiations in Muscat, thus undermining Oman’s credibility as a mediator.

Yet the incentive for Washington to seek off-ramps with Tehran is as valid today as it was in June. Trump himself seemed to recognize that by conducting a one-off strike and refusing to engage further in a regime change war.

With the Iranian nuclear infrastructure severely damaged, and no longer enriching uranium—the US red line—presently taking place in Iran, Trump would be wise to pocket the win and seek a deal, not war, with Tehran.

Pakistan could help in that endeavour. It is already engaged in discreet efforts to diffuse tensions, appreciated by both Washington and Tehran. The goal is not to make Islamabad Washington’s messenger, but to recognize it as a major stakeholder whose national stability depends on preventing a conflagration. A policy that actively supports Pakistan’s diplomatic outreach to Tehran would be far cheaper and more effective than deploying a single carrier strike group.

The Venezuela operation has emboldened those who believe America can reshape the world through force alone. Meddling in Iran would likely prove this theory bankrupt, as it would destabilize the region. The viable, strategic choice is to pursue relentless, regional diplomacy to avoid an apocalyptic war. The path forward runs through patient statecraft in capitals like Islamabad, not more shock and awe.

About the Author: Eldar Mamedov

Eldar Mamedov is a Brussels-based foreign policy expert. He has degrees from the University of Latvia and the Diplomatic School in Madrid, Spain. He has worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia and as a diplomat in Latvian embassies in Washington and Madrid. Since 2009, Mamedov has served as a political advisor for the Social Democrats in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament (EP) and is in charge of the EP delegations for inter-parliamentary relations with Iran, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula. Find him on X: @EldarMamedov4.

Image: Noam Galai / Shutterstock.com.

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