What lies ahead for Latin America after the Venezuela raid?

The Trump administration has justified the recent capture of Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro as a law enforcement operation to dismantle a “narco‑state”. It also claimed it would break Venezuela’s ties to China, Russia and Iran, and put the world’s largest known oil reserves back under US‑friendly control.

This mix of counter‑narcotics, great power rivalry and energy security had already been elevated to a central priority by the administration in its national security strategy. Published in late 2025, the document announced a pledge to “reassert and enforce American preeminence in the western hemisphere” and deny “strategically vital assets” to rival powers.

Donald Trump has referred to this hemispheric project as the “Donroe doctrine”, casting it as a revival of the Monroe doctrine policy of the 19th century through which the US sought to stop European powers from meddling in the Americas. He seems to be seeking to tighten the US grip on Latin America by rewarding loyal governments and punishing defiant ones.

If Venezuela is the first test case of the Donroe doctrine, several other Latin American countries now sit squarely in Washington’s crosshairs. The most immediate target is Cuba, which the US has opposed since 1959 when communist revolutionary Fidel Castro overthrew a US-backed regime there.

Trump and his secretary of state, Marco Rubio, have openly hinted that Cuba could be Washington’s next target. They have described Cuba as “ready to fall” after the loss of Venezuelan oil and have boasted that there is no need for direct intervention because economic collapse will finish the job.

Cuba is enduring its worst crisis since 1959. Blackouts now regularly last up to 20 hours, real wages are collapsing and roughly 1 million Cubans have fled the country since 2021. This is all happening as Venezuelan crude oil is being redirected under US control.

For over two decades, Venezuela has provided Cuba with fuel and financing in exchange for doctors, teachers and security personnel – 32 of whom were killed in the US capture of Maduro, according to the Cuban government. Strangling Cuba’s remaining lifelines may well be enough to topple the government there without US forces needing to fire a single shot.

It is possible that Mexico will also soon come under fire. Mexico has quietly become Cuba’s main oil supplier, shipping roughly 12,000 barrels per day in 2025 to account for about 44% of the island’s crude imports. This is unlikely to please the Trump administration, which has recently renewed its threats to “do something” about Mexican drug cartels.

The raid in Venezuela’s capital, Caracas, took six months of meticulous planning and required an extraordinary amount of resources. So it is unrealistic to expect similar raids on other Latin American countries. However, targeted military strikes cannot be excluded.

Speaking on Fox News’s “Hannity” show on January 8, Trump said: “We are going to start now hitting land with regard to the cartels. The cartels are running Mexico.” He did not provide further details about the plans.

Mexico’s president, Claudia Sheinbaum, is trying to construct protective buffers. She has combined condemnation of the raid on Caracas with intense cooperation with the US on migration and security. This includes a deal for Mexico’s navy to intercept suspected drug-running boats near its coastline before US forces do.

But as part of a strategy that pushes US dominance of Latin America, Trump has already floated classifying Mexico’s cartels as terrorist organisations and the fentanyl they traffic across the border as a weapon of mass destruction. These are legal framings that could be used to justify strikes on Mexican soil in the name of counter-narcotics in the near future.

Trump’s other targets

Colombia, historically Washington’s closest military ally in South America, has flipped from “pillar” to possible target. The country’s president, Gustavo Petro, has been one of the loudest critics of the Venezuela raid. He called it an “abhorrent violation” of Latin American sovereignty committed by “enslavers”, adding that it constituted a “spectacle of death” comparable to Nazi Germany’s 1937 carpet bombing of Guernica in Spain.

Trump, who imposed sanctions on Petro and his family in October, responded by labelling the Colombian president a “sick man who likes making cocaine and selling it to the United States”. He then mused that a Venezuela‑style operation in Colombia “sounds good to me” before a hastily arranged phone call and White House invitation dialled back the immediate threat.

How long the conciliation between the two men lasts remains to be seen. Colombia has entered a heated presidential campaign season in which Trump’s remarks are already being read as an attempt to tilt the race, much as his interventions shaped recent contests in Argentina and Honduras.

Further down the hierarchy, Nicaragua’s government will also have watched events unfold in Venezuela with terror. Long treated in Washington as part of a trilogy of dictatorships with Cuba and Venezuela, Nicaragua features in US indictments against Maduro as a transit point for cocaine flights. Nicaragua was also recently designated by the US as a key drug‑transit country.

The unusually cautious statement on the Venezuela raid by Nicaraguan presidential couple Daniel Ortega and Rosario Murillo, as well as the rapid reinforcement of the presidential compound in the capital Managua, suggest a regime that knows it could be next in line should Trump choose to extend his “narco‑terrorism” narrative.

Trump appears to be turning longstanding US concerns – drugs, migration and interference by other major powers – into a flexible toolbox for coercion in Latin America. Countries that defy Washington or host its rivals risk being framed as security threats, stripped of economic lifelines and, possibly, targeted militarily.

Those that keep their heads down may avoid immediate punishment. But this comes at the price of treating hemispheric dominance as a fact of life rather than a doctrine to be resisted.

Nicolas Forsans does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.