The Danger of the Maduro Model for Iran
When reports emerged that the U.S. ousted Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela, a familiar assumption quickly took hold about another longtime foe of Washington. If the U.S. could engineer the extraction of a sitting authoritarian leader in Caracas, many reasoned, then Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could suffer the same fate. But that assumption is deeply flawed, if not dangerous, particularly for Iranians who hope for meaningful political change.
[time-brightcove not-tgx=”true”]Despite President Donald Trump’s repeated rhetoric about controlling Venezuela and ending authoritarian rule there, the reality is far more sobering. While Maduro was captured by U.S. forces and flown to New York to face charges, his longtime Vice President, Delcy Rodríguez, a regime loyalist, was sworn in as interim President. Her hold on power, backed by Venezuela’s Supreme Court and much of the military, shows that the core institutions of the state have not collapsed and that the governing elite continues to exercise authority. Even opposition figures, such as the Nobel laureate María Corina Machado, have been excluded from shaping what comes next, revealing the limits of a genuine political transformation.
What has emerged for now is a system that survived by adapting, absorbing pressure, and recalibrating external relationships while preserving its internal foundations. This outcome suggests a central truth about Trump’s approach that is not directed toward regime transformation or democratization, but rather the production of a more pliable and manageable governing structure that favors American interests.
For Iran, this distinction is critical. Those who assume that Trump would pursue the wholesale dismantling of the Islamic Republic misunderstand his record. The Maduro episode suggests that Washington’s priority is leverage rather than liberation, and compliance rather than collapse. For the Iranian people, that is a bleak prospect, because a weakened but intact authoritarian state is often more violent and less accountable.
The belief that the Maduro episode could be replicated in Iran also rests on a misleading comparison. Venezuela and Iran differ profoundly in their political structures, strategic environments, and modes of regime survival. The assumption that military action could fracture Iran’s leadership without triggering wider consequences is particularly dangerous at a time when Iran is experiencing sustained protests across multiple towns and cities and internal strain that is not just economic but fundamentally political.
At the same time, the Maduro episode is likely to resonate deeply within Iran’s own elite circles. For a leadership grappling with economic exhaustion, declining legitimacy, and looming succession questions, Venezuela is a case study of endurance. The message is that regimes can survive extreme pressure if they maintain internal cohesion, suppress dissent decisively, and offer just enough flexibility to external actors to relieve pressure without conceding power. That lesson, if absorbed, could push Tehran toward greater repression at home even as it explores tactical accommodation abroad through negotiation with Trump.
For Iranian society, this trajectory is deeply troubling. Large segments of the population are no longer merely demanding reform, but openly rejecting the Islamic Republic itself. Yet external pressure in the absence of a clear internal political alternative does not empower them, it constrains them. This is why the current moment demands a difficult but necessary reckoning among Iranians themselves. Opposition movements have been effective at naming what they will no longer tolerate but have struggled to articulate a coherent alternative to replace it. Without a shared vision of political order, governance, and social compromise, protest risks being instrumentalized by both domestic elites and foreign powers, neither of which is invested in genuine democratic transformation.
History shows that external pressure has occasionally coincided with systemic collapse, as in the case of the Soviet Union. But more often it reshapes authoritarian regimes rather than topples them. A system that feels cornered can buy time by tightening control, insulating itself further from society, and taking greater risks beyond its borders. Trying to use the Venezuela playbook on Iran invites miscalculation and chips away at an already unstable regional balance, especially at a moment when tensions with Israel are once again approaching dangerous thresholds.
The central lesson of the Maduro episode should be one of caution. External coercion absent a credible internal political project does not deliver freedom. For Western policymakers, mistaking pressure for transformation risks leaving the Islamic Republic bruised but standing. For Iranians, expecting salvation from abroad risks delaying the harder work of defining what kind of political future they want, rather than simply what they wish to escape.