US action against Greenland would undermine Nato, but now is not the time to panic

Shortly after the US military operation to capture Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro on January 3, US president Donald Trump restated his claim to Greenland. The White House sees Greenland, which is part of the kingdom of Denmark, as crucial for national security and is reportedly considering a range of options to acquire the island. This includes “utilising the US military”.

Trump’s proclamations have led to a sense among Europeans that US aspirations for dominance over the western hemisphere extend beyond Latin America. And the fact that Trump’s secretary of state, Marco Rubio, told congressional leaders in Washington that the administration wants to buy Greenland, not invade it, is unlikely to make them feel much better.

Their worries that Trump is serious about annexing Greenland are not unfounded: the US president has repeatedly expressed his desire to make Greenland part of the US, starting back in his first term. But some of the presumed implications, like the dissolution of Nato as foreseen by Danish prime minister Mette Frederiksen, are at least for now overblown.

Assuming there is an American move against Greenland, this would not be the first time two Nato allies have been at loggerheads. France pulled out of Nato’s military structures in the late-1960s over concerns about losing its foreign policy autonomy and possibly being drawn into the Vietnam war.

Greece withdrew from military participation in the alliance in 1974 after neighbour and fellow Nato member Turkey invaded Cyprus and occupied the northern, predominantly Turkish-Cypriot, part of the island. Tensions between the two Nato members continue to this day but have not brought the alliance down.

Nato also rode out the Suez crisis in 1956. This crisis saw Britain and France, together with Israel, invade Egypt to regain control of the Suez canal before withdrawing after intense US pressure.

The alliance also survived the “cod wars” between the UK and Iceland in the 1970s. And Nato did not disintegrate during the rift that emerged between its members in the run-up to – and in the aftermath of – the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.

What sets all of these previous examples apart from an American move against Greenland is that this would be the first time the US engages in an aggressive act against a Nato ally. This would hardly be something that Denmark and its European allies could accept, especially if it involves the use of force.

But not accepting US aggression can come in many different forms. On the spectrum of possible responses, the least likely is an activation of the EU’s mutual defence clause, which would be followed by military hostilities between European states and the US. The EU does not have the military capabilities, nor is it likely to have the political will, to go to war with the US.

A mass European exodus from Nato is also far from a foregone conclusion. Nato’s founding treaty does provide an option for members to leave in its article 13, which foresees a “notice of denunciation” and a 12-month period until an exit takes full effect. But given the security threats that Europe currently faces from Russia, even a temporarily dysfunctional Nato would be better than no Nato at all.

In the event that the US moves to take control of Greenland, political paralysis within Nato would almost be certain. This would probably involve escalating rhetoric on both sides of the Atlantic and a Danish withdrawal from military participation in Nato.

European diplomatic protests against American action over Greenland might lead Trump to declare that the US is withdrawing from Nato. But that, too, is not straightforward. Such a move would require approval in the US Senate and consultation with members of both houses of Congress.

There would probably be significant pushback both from US lawmakers and from the Pentagon. This is because a US withdrawal from Nato would entail a possibly rushed and almost certainly chaotic transfer of responsibilities in the Nato command structure and would raise major questions about US military bases in Europe.

None of this would be in the interests of American security and would certainly undermine US abilities to project force outside the western hemisphere.

Europe’s next steps

So, for Europe, the first order of the day is not to panic and rush into any ill-advised actions. While it is important to match Trump’s aggressive rhetoric, it is also key not to be drawn into needless escalation. In the long-term, an even deeper transatlantic fracture is ill-suited to the European interest in a revitalised Nato.

Security in the Arctic is a joint priority for the alliance, not just for the US. Greenland is a critical node in north Atlantic security, but so are Iceland and Norway as well as US bases in Europe. Emphasising these shared interests may not cut much ice with Trump but it is likely to strengthen congressional resolve to push back against the president’s threats to the transatlantic alliance.

At the same time, Europe should not rush into any hasty deals with Trump over Greenland. While US security concerns, and possibly even economic interests, could be accommodated in existing arrangements, anything beyond that – such as selling Greenland to the US in exchange for renewed US commitments to Nato and Europe – would be foolish.

Not only can Trump not be trusted to keep any promises he might make in order to get a deal done but he could also not credibly commit his successors. Hence, any arrangement that the Europeans may now undertake to manage American hostility may be counterproductive if it cannot be undone should the mood in Washington change to become less anti-European.

And there is still a faint hope in Europe that things might get better either after the US mid-term elections in 2026 or the presidential elections in 2028. As always, there is also the possibility that Trump’s strategic focus might zoom in on some other issue – such as a protracted failure of US policy in Venezuela – and so take his eyes off Greenland.

David Hastings Dunn has previously received funding from the ESRC, the Gerda Henkel Foundation, the Open Democracy Foundation and has previously been both a NATO and a Fulbright Fellow.

Mark Webber is Senior Non-resident fellow at the NATO Defence College in Rome and a trustee of NATO Watch. He has previously received funding from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and the British Academy to carry out research on NATO.

Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.