A throne made of sand

“Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!”
Nothing beside remains.
The lone and level sands stretch far away.
— Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias

Percy Shelley’s Ozymandias is not a poem about failure, but about the illusion of permanence. A ruler commands the world to admire his achievements, yet history leaves behind only fragments – authority without consent, power without foundations, surrounded by sand.

Cyprus today risks a quieter but no less consequential version of this fate. In the pursuit of singular control through strategic alliances, security rhetoric and energy diplomacy, the foundations of federal peace are steadily being abandoned.

The same warning appears in a more contemporary form. In Game of Thrones, the Iron Throne promises absolute power – but those who sit on it rarely rule for long. The throne itself is a weapon: it cuts, corrodes, and ultimately consumes its occupants. Power pursued for its own sake proves unstable and self-defeating, often damaging the very realm it claims to protect. Cyprus today risks a similar illusion: the pursuit of singular authority under the guise of diplomacy, security and strategic alliances, while the deeper architecture of peace quietly erodes beneath our feet.

Recent actions and statements by President Nikos Christodoulides – on Nato, on proclaimed “readiness” for talks, on regional partnerships, and on energy and security frameworks – should not be read in isolation. Taken together, they form a coherent strategy. The difficulty is that this strategy does not aim to make a federal solution more likely. It aims to outlast it.

Power without inclusion

The Republic of Cyprus continues to present itself as committed to negotiations and political equality in principle, while simultaneously deepening an external policy architecture that rests on exclusive authority: sole international representation, unilateral regional alignments and full control of EU leverage, energy diplomacy, and security narratives.

This is not diplomacy designed to prepare a federal future. It is diplomacy designed to normalise a divided present.

Under a genuine federal settlement, such unilateral manoeuvring would not be possible. Authority would be shared. External policy would require internal consensus. Turkish Cypriots would be co-owners of regional strategy, energy resources and international engagement. That reality – shared sovereignty – is precisely what makes federalism inconvenient to those who benefit most from the status quo.

The two-state trap and its mirror image

Much has rightly been said about the emptiness of the two-state rhetoric advanced by Turkish Cypriot Foreign Minister Tahsin Ertugruloglu and echoed in Ankara. It offers no credible path to international recognition, lasting security or equal rights. It is politically defiant but diplomatically sterile – a posture that may consolidate domestic constituencies yet leads nowhere in practice.

What is less openly acknowledged is the mirror image of this setup on the Greek Cypriot side.

Recent statements by Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Constantinos Kombos, emphasising readiness for expanded or enlarged talks, are presented as constructive. They are cause for concern. Calls to widen formats or adjust procedural arrangements usually signal the opposite of progress: they suggest that preliminary contacts have failed to produce even a vestige of substantive consensus. Had such convergence existed – on framework, sequencing, or core parameters – there would be no need for public debate about formats. The path forward ought to have been already clear.

This approach risks recreating precisely the conditions that led to the collapse at Crans-Montana: a process heavy on symbolism and timing, but light on mutually accepted substance. Convening talks without prior clarity may appear diplomatic and active, yet it predictably leads to impasse – and allows responsibility for failure to be displaced rather than assumed.

In contrast, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Tufan Erhurman, should be acknowledged for not retreating further into an imperturbable two-state posture. He has been clear in recognising that an unqualified insistence on a two-state outcome is less a viable strategy than a reactive reflex –one that lies outside the United Nations framework endorsed by the international community. His stance reflects political maturity: an understanding that such demands, however emotionally resonant, would leave Turkish Cypriots more isolated rather than empowered. By maintaining a constructive orientation toward a negotiated settlement, Erhurman signals a posture that, while cautious, remains aligned with the long-term requirements of peace and coexistence on the island.

Together, these positions reveal a deep problem: only a narrow space remains for genuine federal compromise. The result is a self-sustaining stalemate in which each side uses the other as justification, while federalism is steadily hollowed out without ever being formally abandoned. Both paths lead to the same destination: a permanently divided island – internationally legitimised on one side, politically marginalised on the other – and a federal solution rendered unreachable not by declaration, but by design.

Alliances without settlement

It is against this backdrop that recent regional alignments – such as the deepening engagement with the UAE – must be understood. These moves are not fundamentally about bilateral relations or distant regional disputes. They are about timing and leverage. As Cyprus prepares to assume the EU Council presidency, its international weight temporarily increases.

That influence is now being used to strengthen an energy-to-Europe narrative and a network of regional partnerships – without resolving the Cyprus problem itself. Such moves entrench the logic that Cyprus can indefinitely act as a singular regional player, while the internal political problem remains frozen.

Under a federal solution, this kind of solo diplomacy would necessarily give way to shared decision-making. That is precisely why it is resisted.

Renewed talk of Nato, partnerships and security umbrellas follows the same pattern. They harden Ankara’s suspicions, embolden maximalist rhetoric in the north, and pull the European Union and regional actors into a confrontation logic rather than a settlement logic. Security cannot be built around division. It can only be built through its resolution.

The cost of delay

President Christodoulides did not create Cyprus’ division. But his approach risks making it permanent – by managing it, legitimising it and presenting it as strategic maturity. History offers little comfort to leaders who confuse control with consent or strategy with justice.

Cyprus does not need a ruler seated alone on a fragile throne of alliances, vetoes and temporary leverage. It requires leadership willing to relinquish unilateral power in exchange for shared sovereignty, political equality and durable peace.

Federalism is not a concession to Turkish Cypriots. It is the only framework that preserves the dignity, rights, and future of all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish alike – within Europe.

Cyprus stands at a narrowing crossroads. One path leads to managed division, externalised blame and deeper regional entanglement. The other leads to compromise, shared authority and reconciliation.

The first offers the illusion of strength. The second demands courage.

Shelley reminds us that power built on sand does not endure. Cyprus cannot build its future from the instruments of division or the comforts of unilateral control. It must be built – urgently and deliberately – on a federal settlement that restores trust, equality, and peace.

The window remains open.