Propaganda Versus Reality – OpEd
The same tendency in the discourse of the region has emerged again with the recent stumbling of the Pakistan-Afghanistan interactions to arrive at a security framework that would be agreeable to both parties; the failure of dialogue initiates the benefits of propaganda. The Afghan web-based Al-Mirsaad has escalated its attacks on Pakistan in a way that is not totally unexpected or novel. The outlet has instead resorted to the backlash tactic of repeating accusatory narratives that blame and generalize a very complicated counterterrorism environment rather than contributing to the grave assessment of common security challenges. It is not a rhetoric strategy and can only have short term rhetoric effects without much to do with the regional stability and structural facts of militancy in the region.
The general motive of the latest social media campaign by Al-Mirsaad is an uncompromising attempt at obscuring documented facts concerning the territorial area of the activity of the militant groups. A United Nations analysis has remained to confirm the fact that the institutional operating core of Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) remains in Afghanistan. These have not been the same speculations as are the findings of independent monitoring in addition to field reporting and intelligence corroboration by the external players. Nevertheless, Al-Mirsaad is recycling arguments that suggest otherwise, and one can discern that the author is being disingenuous with his effort to ignore the evidence deliberately to fit an existing story line where Pakistan is at the centre of the instability.
Such misrepresentation is even more troublesome considering the current threat of ISKP and gangs associated with this kind of companies as FAK which operate on the land of Afghanistan. These aspects have demonstrated repetitive intent and capability of assaulting Pakistan, weaken internal security and complicate counterterrorism planning. Ignoring this fact does not bring about a change in this fact. Instead, it is taking away attention to the fact that we are in dire need of the coordinated action against groups who are utilizing uncontrollable or loosely controlled spaces. However, the framing by al-Mirsaad reduces these challenges to the dichotomy of accusation and denial, between which there is little to be done to assist in achieving a cooperative solution.
This is further signalled by the fact that the new messaging of the outlet was a step to derail the previous and current anxieties that Pakistan has had about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operations and the highly publicized presence of ISKP nests in the territory of Afghanistan. These are not rhetorical mechanisms but rather founded on experience of operation, number of casualties, and cross border incidences. Once these issues start to be seen across borders, the instinctive response on the propaganda-threatened websites is to externalize the narrative at this stage, to recode the discussion as an assault on Pakistan rather than a version of collective responsibility.
These arguments are in sharp contrast with the counterterrorism status of Pakistan. The international community has not been left out of the constant battle against ISKP and other similar networks. The notable output of partners, including the United States, of Pakistan consistency, and effectiveness in counterterrorism are being judged by the apparent outcomes: networks have been broken, power structures have been undermined, and the room in which transnational militants operate has been limited. It is the result of such that Pakistan has remained an invaluable counterterrorism ally despite the massive human and economic costs it has suffered.
Such assessment has been further boosted by outside reporting by the United Nations and European Union acknowledgment. Such institutions have documented many times over the trade-offs and the operational successes made by Pakistan and how its counterterrorism effort has burdened its national resources to contribute to the greater security of the region. This is the reason why such testimony is credible, i. e., that it is external, is methodologically correct, and falls under domestic politics. It is on this background that when people are attempting to rewrite the story using social media campaigns, it appears to be not so much of criticism but rather the easy way out.
It is not solely the activity of the West that can be discussed as causing entrenchment of ISKP in Afghanistan. Of them all, Russia has been continually threatening that with such havens, the greater region will be destabilized, and they will manage to attack beyond the borders of Afghanistan. These threats bring out one bare fact that militancy in a geographical context can hardly stay within a geographical context. In that respect, the creation of the Pakistan as the central problem is a failure to consider the transnational view of the threat and the consensus of the great powers that unhindered havens are posing threat to all is a fact.
This is where the distinction between propaganda and fact is most distinguished. The activities of al-Mirsaad to sabotage Pakistan do not demonstrate the inefficiency of the Pakistan counterterrorism policy; they indicate that the arguments are poor and cannot be placed under an independent scrutiny of the argument. Putting too much emphasis on rhetoric instead of evidence, the outlet ends up expanding the credibility gap that it is attempting to bridge by making it even bigger.
The information campaigns that will not place a blame or politicize the security issue on neighbour state will not lead to stability in the region. It requires honesty, candidness and willingness to accept ugly truths. Pakistan has never emphasized on individual responsibility but rather on joint duty and collaboration. The only way out is such a strategy.
It is also interesting that Al-Mirsaad has no specific reputation within the discourse of the defence and security in Pakistan, yet it is so complacent about its visions concerning military budgeting and strategies. What is worst is that it is also inclined towards repeating narratives that are extremely parallel to the rhetoric of the terrorist groups that are prohibited by the UN. This is an overlapping that casts some serious doubts of motivation and credibility. It is not the continuation of the counterterrorism policy of Pakistan, which is the actual problem, however, but the continuation of platforms that substitute the engagement with propaganda now when the region can afford it the least.