From embargoes to strategic partnerships
The recent lifting by the US and Norway of the long-standing arms embargoes on Cyprus is not about weapons. It is about strategy. It is about recognition that Cyprus has become a credible, predictable and dependable security enabler in the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean.
These decisions reflect a wider geopolitical realignment long in the making in the East Med, anchoring Cyprus more firmly within the Western security architecture at the strategic crossroads of Europe and the Middle East.
This was reinforced by the Strategic Partnership Agreement between Cyprus and France signed in Paris on Monday by the two presidents.
Since joining the EU in 2004, Cyprus has shifted, in word and deed, from Non-Alignment to active engagement within Western security structures. Successive governments understood that security and prosperity lay in this direction.
The East Med has long been a vital theatre — safeguarding the Suez Canal, ensuring regional security, protecting energy and trade sea lanes and countering terrorism. It is no coincidence that the UK still maintains two military bases 65 years after Cypriot independence. Geography does not retire.
The Gaza conflict, the 12-day war between Israel and Iran, and continuing instability in Syria and Lebanon have underscored the need for reliable security enablers and security producers. What has changed is not geography but perception: Washington and Brussels now view the East Med as a single strategic continuum where regional stability, great-power competition and European defence are inseparable.
From embargoes to strategic partnerships
Lifting the embargoes formalises Cyprus’ integration into the Western defence architecture and weaves it into a broader East Med network linking the US, the EU and regional partners. In practical terms, this means interoperability, i.e., the ability to operate, train and communicate seamlessly with allied forces. It does not imply militarisation, but predictable, transparent and defensive capabilities that strengthen crisis-management and humanitarian operations. Politically, it institutionalises trust and closes a long chapter of strategic isolation.
In the East Med, the EU provides the political and structural framework within which Cyprus operates. Yet the decisive security actor remains the US – the only power capable of shaping outcomes at scale. Recognising Cyprus as a reliable security enabler fits squarely within this strategic reality.
For Washington and Brussels alike, Cyprus now consolidates a democratic anchor on Nato’s south-eastern flank, at the edge of the defence perimeter of Europe.
Toward a new strategic status – MNNA
The logical next step is to designate Cyprus a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) of the US – a framework for cooperation, not confrontation. MNNA status does not confer alliance membership or automatic US security guarantees. What it does is deepen defence cooperation, facilitate joint training and defence-industrial projects and provide priority access to selected US programmes.
Today, more than 20 states – including Morocco, Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar and, as of November 2025, Saudi Arabia – hold this designation.
For Cyprus, MNNA would codify a partnership already under way with Washington, reinforce US-EU synergy in the East Med, and enhance stability without escalation. It would anchor Cyprus more firmly within Western security structures, serving as a bridge between Nato’s south-eastern flank and Europe’s emerging defence architecture.
(For a deeper analysis, see my article, “Nato, Cyprus and the Final Leap,” Sunday Mail, October 27)
The wider strategic design
Cyprus now operates within an increasingly coherent East Med security ecosystem. The 3+1 framework – Greece, Cyprus, Israel and the US – links energy, security and technology, while the East Med Gas Forum and the CYCLOPS centre in Larnaca provide institutional depth.
The Great Sea Interconnector (GSI) adds a critical energy-security dimension. Designed to link the electricity grids of Cyprus, Greece and Israel, it binds regional energy security more closely to Europe and reduces vulnerability to coercion or disruption.
In parallel, the updated Cyprus-Lebanon EEZ agreement on November 26 has opened the way for a possible future electricity interconnection, further embedding the East Med within the wider energy and security architecture of Europe. It may also interface with other regional states.
This security ecosystem is strengthened by the QUAD framework (Cyprus-France-Greece-Italy), which deepens joint exercises, maritime coordination and crisis-response mechanisms among key EU and Nato partners. It is further complemented by wider connectivity initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which situates Cyprus within an emerging Indo-European strategic network. IMEC is not merely economic. It is geopolitical – a counterweight to China’s Belt and Road Initiative and a central element in the renewed US focus on the Indo-Pacific. As I have argued elsewhere in the Sunday Mail, Cyprus and India have moved from non-alignment to strategic alignment within these evolving frameworks.
This trajectory was further reinforced on Monday with the signing in Paris of a Cyprus-France Strategic Partnership Agreement. The agreement elevates bilateral cooperation in defence, security and strategic coordination, anchoring Cyprus more firmly within Europe’s emerging security architecture. Its timing, on the eve of Cyprus’ presidency of the EU Council in 2026, underscores Nicosia’s growing role as a credible European security enabler.
The day before, the first official visit to Nicosia by the President of the United Arab Emirates took place, highlighting another dimension of Cyprus’ expanding strategic partnerships, as both sides committed to deepen cooperation across investment, energy and infrastructure, reinforcing Cyprus’ role as a stable and credible partner ahead of its EU Council presidency.
This architecture is not a Nato sub-system in formal terms. It operates, however, in close alignment with Nato standards and practices. What is taking shape is a functional web of maritime, energy, digital and diplomatic cooperation among like-minded partners. It is within this network that MNNA status for Cyprus would acquire real substance and momentum.
Ankara actively opposes Western support for and regional openings by Cyprus – including the updated EEZ maritime delimitation agreement with Lebanon signed on November 26 and the Strategic Partnership Agreement with France – even as it pursues an expansionist military footprint from Syria and Iraq to Libya and Azerbaijan, while continuing the militarisation of the occupied part of Cyprus to project power across the East Med and the wider Middle East.
This pattern extends beyond diplomacy and energy cooperation. Turkey has openly opposed the GSI, despite its designation as a high-priority project by the EU, underscoring Ankara’s broader effort to constrain Cyprus’ strategic and energy integration with Europe.
Cyprus harbours no illusions. It cannot deter Turkey militarily. What it seeks instead are options and resilience: the capacity to remain a predictable and dependable security enabler, aligned with the foreign and security policies of the EU.
Turkey, by contrast, has repeatedly demonstrated that it is an unpredictable and transactional Nato partner. It pursues a foreign policy often at odds with US and Nato objectives. It frequently undermines collective cohesion. In practice, it behaves as an à la carte ally – embracing alliance benefits while rejecting obligations that constrain its agenda.
Ankara’s strategic objectives regarding Cyprus have remained fundamentally unchanged for decades: to neutralise Cyprus’ foreign-policy autonomy and prevent Nicosia from functioning as an independent and credible EU actor. A constrained or coerced Cyprus cannot serve as a reliable security enabler. Instability at Cyprus’ crossroads is incompatible with the security interests of Europe, the US and the broader West.
(For a fuller analysis, see my article “The Two-State Gambit: Decoding Turkey’s Strategic Play in Cyprus”)
The road ahead
Cyprus must now translate opportunity into structure. It must modernise defence and deepen cooperation with regional partners – especially Greece, Israel, Egypt and Jordan – while, as conditions evolve, broadening practical engagement with Lebanon, the new Syria and, eventually, Turkey.
At the same time, MNNA designation should remain a strategic priority. It would embed Cyprus more firmly within the Euro-Atlantic security ecosystem in a manner fully compatible with its EU vocation.
Cyprus stands at the intersection of energy, technology and security. The embargoes belonged to another era. Modern Cyprus is democratic, European and strategically literate. It understands that peace without capability is illusion – and capability without restraint is peril. Geography is destiny. Policy is choice.