We cannot win 21st-Century conflicts with a 20th-Century electric grid.

The Trump Administration’s new National Security Strategy goes to great lengths to do what every good strategist is taught: align means and ends in a coherent and credible way. Reviving our defense industrial base and achieving energy dominance are laudable ends for a 21st-century strategy. But the essential means of realizing those goals, the nation’s electric grid, remains mired in the 20th century. It is fragmented, aging, and underbuilt. Unless the United States invests in expanding and fortifying the grid, we not only risk falling short of our strategic aspirations, but we also put our national defense in jeopardy. 

Cascading Risks: Inclement Weather, Increased Demand, Aging Wires  

Over the last several decades, the US military has transformed into a globally networked force. Remotely piloted aircraft and advanced cyber technology are part of the fabric of modern warfare, with troops often performing these missions from installations right here at home. That has made the electric grid, which serves our installations, essential to all military missions, including those overseas. And we have dramatically underinvested in it. 

Today, America’s bulk electric system — the poles and wires that powered the United States through the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — is dangerously ill-equipped for the kind of great power conflict the US military is planning. Take the example of Winter Storm Uri in February 2021. A historic ice storm swept across Texas and forced the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) to shed 20 gigawatts of load from its system, the largest single directed load shed in North American history. That one event caused multiday outages at 12 of 15 military installations in Texas and left many troops and military families stranded. 

While Winter Storm Uri stands out as a cautionary tale of the risks facing the grid, it’s not an outlier. Across the United States, threats from wildfires and other extreme weather events are routinely forcing utilities to de-energize power lines, and malicious actors are constantly testing the robustness of the system. The simple fact is that if a major war were to break out tomorrow, the power grid that supports nearly every military installation, weapons factory, and AI data center will be the first — and potentially weakest — line of defense. 

Lessons From the Past: The Electrical Grid and the Two World Wars

For all the talk about unprecedented challenges facing the power grid, we’ve actually been in this situation before. When World War I and World War II broke out, the demands of total war strained the power grid to the brink of failing to deliver what the American war machine needed to win the fight. But the immediacy to supply wartime energy needs catalyzed coordination between the federal government, the electric industry, and the military. 

In both conflicts, regional power sharing, diverting available resources to critical industries, adjusting factory schedules to accommodate off-peak times, and centralizing oversight for planning and resource allocation ensured the power industry met the relentless demands of wartime energy needs. New bodies like the Federal Power Commission were created to help mobilize and sustain the national momentum for these efforts (later becoming the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). In all, the urgency of wartime demonstrated that a large-scale transformation of the power grid to serve national defense is possible through proactive coordination.

But as Herculean an effort as that was, wartime electricity demand was concentrated almost entirely in the defense industrial base. If conflict were to erupt today, it would not be that simple. The US electric grid would immediately be tapped to deliver uninterrupted electricity for critical missions at military installations that support a global footprint and rev up wartime manufacturing to a level we have not seen in more than 80 years, all while competing with energy-intensive sectors that are vital to the US economy. And the risks of America falling short of its defense energy needs are real. 

The Path Forward: A New Grid for a New Century

The Trump Administration appears to understand this threat and has called for expanding and fortifying the grid. But we need to meet that rhetoric with actions that will ensure the grid is capable of deterring conflict and maintaining our military superiority.  

First, policymakers must prioritize interregional transmission—the large wires that cross several states—so we can bolster our ability to wheel surplus power to regions facing shortfalls, diversify our energy resources, and reduce consumer costs by delivering the lowest-cost electricity possible. We know where we need to build these wires. In recent studies, the Department of Energy concluded that we need to more than double intra-regional transmission capacity and quadruple interregional transmission capacity by 2035. We should prioritize transmission lines that serve defense-rich regions—communities with military installations, defense manufacturers, and critical national security industries — and use these lines to reimagine how we build transmission across states to realize the speed and coordination that we need from federal, state, and local regulators to get these lines completed. 

To get ahead of the financial burden that would otherwise fall on ratepayers, the federal government should derisk the cost of transmission expansion by granting loans to utilities and using other capitalizing instruments. For loads directly serving defense facilities, the US military can act as an anchor tenant by agreeing to purchase electricity flowing through transmission lines to help create a guaranteed revenue stream for developers taking the upfront financial risk. 

Simultaneously, federal investment in innovative grid technologies can create a flexible, efficient, and lean grid by maximizing the use of existing wires. According to one report, grid enhancing technologies (GETs) have the potential to quadruple the capacity of the current grid at one-fifth the cost of new transmission. We should deploy these and other technologies to squeeze as much from the current grid as we possibly can, even as we build new transmission.  

There is no one solution here. Expanding and fortifying the grid requires that we do a lot in a short amount of time. But we need to be thoughtful in our approach. We must, as the saying goes, measure twice and cut once, so we’re not building new lines where expanding the existing lines with advanced conductors would be faster and more cost-effective. That’s why federal coordination is so essential here, and that’s where the National Energy Dominance Council could play an outsize role in the short term. 

 The message is clear: the United States cannot deter, let alone fight, a major war in the 21st century with a 20th-century grid. Strengthening transmission, modernizing our infrastructure, and aligning energy planning with national defense needs are not merely about strengthening America’s resilience — they are pivotal to maintaining peace in our time. And should that fail, a modern grid will ensure the US military can fight and win a war if it comes to it.

About the Authors: Leah Emanuel and Will Rogers 

Leah Emanuel and Will Rogers are co-authors at Converge Strategies, which connects and aligns the people and organizations needed to strengthen the resilience of our communities and infrastructure. You can find more of their work at convergestrategies.com

Leah Emanuel supports work to convene the electricity industry and the national security enterprise to develop concepts that align transmission investment with national defense. Leah applies her engagement experience to identify stakeholders, understand their individualized vulnerabilities, and build specialized energy resilience strategies. She has authored several pieces that focus on energy security risks and the changing geopolitical landscape.

Will Rogers brings more than 15 years of experience in government and civil society to drive national defense strategies, policies, and initiatives. He previously served as the Senior Climate Advisor to the Secretary of the Army, where he helped use the Army’s $165 billion buying power to strengthen the U.S. critical infrastructure that enables the warfighting mission. He teaches in Johns Hopkins University’s Global Security Studies program and is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.

Image: Shutterstock/dinosmichail

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