America Needs To Rethink Relocation Challenges For Its Afghan Fighters – Analysis
After NATO forces evacuated Kabul in August 2021, the U.S. government implemented Operation Allies Welcome to remove Afghan allies, including interpreters, embassy staff, and others who worked alongside U.S. forces.
The program provided humanitarian parole and resettlement opportunities for those evacuated during the chaotic airlift from Kabul.
Included in “others who worked alongside U.S. forces” were 10,000 to 12,000 Afghan fighters in the CIA-sponsored “Zero Units.” These special forces supposedly belonged to the Afghan National Directorate of Security, the intelligence and security service of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, but they were trained, paid, and tasked by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for targeting anti-government insurgents, high-value Taliban commanders, and suspected terrorists.
The Afghans fought almost daily for ten years and, unlike U.S. forces, had no opportunities for rest and recovery outside the country. But despite the severe operating tempo, there are no public reports of “green on blue” attacks by members of Zero Units.
Over 76,000 Afghans were admitted to the U.S. under Operation Allies Welcome, one of the largest humanitarian evacuation efforts in recent U.S. history. Many were processed through temporary housing facilities at U.S. military bases before being resettled in communities across the country.
Evacuees underwent security screenings and health checks before resettlement. They were connected to resettlement agencies for limited assistance with housing, employment, and integration.
Many Afghans entered under humanitarian parole, which allowed them to stay temporarily while applying for asylum or special immigrant visas.
Here is where most Afghans were resettled:
Smaller numbers were resettled in in Colorado, Ohio, Michigan, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Georgia, each hosting between 1,500–2,500 evacuees. 47 U.S. states received at least some Afghan families.
After the recent attack by Rahmanullah Lakanwal, a veteran of a Zero Unit, against two West Virginia National Guard Soldiers, one of who later died of her injuries, U.S. president Donald Trump ordered a pause in immigration applications from citizens of 19 high risk countries. Many Americans – and President Trump – questioned if the Afghan refugees admitted in 2021 were carefully screened.
In 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported on “Operation Allies Welcome.” The OIG found: CBP [U.S. Customs and Border Protection] “did not always have critical data to properly screen, vet, or inspect the evacuees. We determined some information used to vet evacuees through U.S. Government databases, such as name, date of birth, identification number, and travel document data, was inaccurate, incomplete, or missing. We also determined CBP admitted or paroled evacuees who were not fully vetted into the United States.”
According to Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, at least 2,000 Afghan refugees “have ties to or are known or suspected terrorists,” though that is disputed by refuges advocates.
The U.S. government has a problem if some of the Afghans it admitted are not be eligible for entry to the U.S.: What to do with them?
Options:
- Deportation. This is easy enough and the social media will be satisfying to many, but the
“Zero Unit” veterans would likely be executed or imprisoned on arrival, and the Taliban will share the video with the world. The veterans’ return would be a PR boon to the Taliban who will arrange public confessions by the returnees who will admit they were fooled by the Americans and beg for forgiveness.
Some of the Afghans will no doubt have legal counsel protesting their removal as it would result in death or lengthy imprisonment for doing America’s bidding for a decade. It may be tied up in the courts for years.
- Resettlement. This sounds attractive, but finding hosts will be expensive for Washington, financially and politically. Third country leaders will be loath to explain to their citizens why they are admitting people the U.S. considers too dangerous, and would have to accede to security assurances and monitoring agreements.
In 2009, President Barack Obama ordered the closure of the Guantanamo Bay detention camp, and 197 detainees were transferred, repatriated, or resettled in third countries during his presidency. Negotiations for resettlement often took months to years because countries had to be convinced to accept detainees who could not return home due to risk of persecution
And the receiving countries will want to be paid up-front. A thank-you note from the American ambassador will not suffice.
- Reformation. Keep the fighters under observation and provide better resettlement support. The Afghan fighters may have received security vetting before entering the U.S., but medical and psychological screening may not have screened for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or other combat-related maladies such as Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI). (Lakanwal, reportedly was a “door breacher” and was likely exposed to explosive blasts during raids. He, and other like him, may suffer from PTSD and TBI, which may have contributed to his decision to attack the Soldiers.)
The U.S. will have to determine if Lakanwal was radicalized after his arrival in the U.S., and how and why. He was apparently in good spirits when he arrived in the U.S. but his mental health deteriorated as he struggled to adapt to his new life. Now we learn Lakanwal may have been blackmailed by the Taliban who threatened to kill his family members in Afghanistan if he did not follow their orders. And that is not an idle threat: a Taliban unit, Yarmouk 60, has tracked down and executed Afghan collaborators and their families, in one case beheading two small girls.
DHS failed to commit the resources to properly vet Afghans entering the U.S., and the CIA appears to have failed to ensure its Afghan partners were successfully onboarding in the U.S. and to act when they were failing.
American soldiers who had years between combat deployments have had challenges adjusting to life in the U.S. after deployment; therefore, it is no mystery that soldiers from a different culture who were in continuous combat for a decade might have problems adjusting to life in the U.S.
In addition to more resources, the U.S. should consider a term of “continuous vetting,” similar to that required for holders of security clearances to guard against blackmail or radicalization that occurs after arrival in the U.S.
There is no low-hanging fruit here. The U.S. government should survey the Afghan refugees not just for security concerns but for mental health maladies as part of an evaluation on how successfully they are integrating into American society. Then it should address any integration shortfalls by committing the funds for medical and psychological care, and job and skills training to ensure the Afghans, and especially the fighters and their families, can integrate into life in the U.S. It will be expensive but that’s the cost of having someone else do your fighting for you.
The dead are dead, and Rahmanullah Lakanwal will spend the rest of his life in jail, but America’s Afghanistan project is not yet complete.
- This article was published at SLDinfo.com