India: Maoist Surrenders And Rehabilitation In LWE Endgame – Analysis
By Deepak Kumar Nayak
On December 11, 2025, two Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres, Deepak aka Sudhakar, a 'Divisional Committee Member (DVCM)' and Rohit aka Manglu, an 'area committee member (ACM)' surrendered at the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) camp in Korka under the Birsa Police Station limits in Balaghat District of Madhya Pradesh. Rewards of INR 2.9 million and INR 1.4 million had been announced for Deepak and Rohit, respectively, and both surrendered expressing the desire to return to the mainstream. With the surrender of the two cadres, Chief Minister Mohan Yadav claimed that the state was free of the Maoist menace.
On December 10, 2025, 11 senior CPI-Maoist cadres, including four 'commanders' with a combined bounty of INR 8.2 million, surrendered before State Police chief Rashmi Shukla in the Gadchiroli District of Maharashtra. Among the surrendered leaders were 'divisional committee members (DVCMs)' Ramesh aka Baju Lekami and Bhima aka Kiran Hidma Kowasi. Lekami, associated with the movement since 2004, served as 'president' of the Edasgondi Panchayat (village level local-self Government institution) Janatana Sarkar (People's Government of the Maoists) before becoming a DVCM in Bhamragad. Kowasi joined the Maoist ranks in 1998 and became a DVCM in 2019. Other surrendered Maoists included Poriye aka Lucky Adama Gota, Ratan akaSanna Masu Oyam, Kamala aka Rago Iriya Veladi, Poriye aka Kumari Bhima Veladi, Ramaji aka Mura Lacchu Pungati, Sonu Podiyam aka Ajay Sanu Kato, Prakash aka Pandu Kundra Pungati, Sita aka Jaini Tonde Pallo, and Sainath Shankar Made.
Elsewhere on the same day, four CPI-Maoist cadres, including a cadre involved in the 2009 Madanwada ambush that killed 29 security personnel, surrendered in the Kanker District of Chhattisgarh. The four, among them two women, collectively carried a reward of INR 2.3 million. They surrendered before senior Police and Border Security Force (BSF) officials under the Poona Margem (from rehabilitation to social reintegration) initiative. Among the surrendered cadres, Kajal aka Rajita Vedada (19), a member of Company No. 10 of the Gadchiroli (Maharashtra) division of the Maoists, carried a reward of INR 800,000, while three others, Manjula aka Laxmi Potai (37), Vilas aka Chaitu Usendi (42) and Ramsai aka Lakhan Marrapi (42), carried bounties of INR 500,000 each. Potai, a member of the west Bastar division's technical team, was involved in 16 Maoist-related incidents between 2006 and 2025, including the 2009 Madanwada-Korkoti ambush in which then Rajnandgaon Superintendent of Police (SP) Vinod Choubey and 28 other personnel were killed. Marrapi, an 'area committee member (ACM)', was involved in more than 42 Maoist-related incidents from 2004 to 2025, including the 2008 Gumdideeh-Konde ambush, which killed six SF personnel and the 2019 Mahla attack in which four jawans were killed.
According to partial data collated by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), at least 1,378 Maoist surrenders have been recorded in Chhattisgarh; 445 in Telangana; 103 in Maharashtra; 38 in Andhra Pradesh; 21 in Jharkhand; 13 in Madhya Pradesh; eight in Karnataka; six in Odisha; and two in Bihar, since the beginning of 2025 (data till December 14). During the corresponding period of 2024, 326 Maoist surrenders were recorded in Chhattisgarh; 45 in Andhra Pradesh; 29 in Telangana; 26 in Jharkhand; 21 in Odisha; 16 in Maharashtra; and one each in Bihar and Kerala. In the remaining period of 2024, another six surrenders were recorded in Chhattisgarh; three in Maharashtra; and one in Telangana. A total of 268 Maoists (201 in Chhattisgarh; 33 in Jharkhand; nine each in Andhra Pradesh and Telangana; five each in Maharashtra and Odisha; and six in Bihar) had surrendered in 2023. At least 19,241 Maoist surrenders – including 7,320 in Odisha; 5,850 in Chhattisgarh; 3,903 in Andhra Pradesh; 775 in Telangana; 444 in Bihar; 415 in Maharashtra; 396 in Jharkhand; 66 in West Bengal; 28 in Madhya Pradesh; 21 in Karnataka; 13 in Assam; four in Uttar Pradesh; three in Tamil Nadu; two in Kerala and one at an unspecified location – have been recorded across the country since March 6, 2000, when SATP began documenting data on Left Wing Extremism (LWE).
The state's campaign against the LWE has entered a decisive phase. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) has repeatedly articulated March 2026 as the terminal deadline for ending LWE as an organised internal security threat. Over the past decade, sustained kinetic pressure, infrastructure expansion, intelligence penetration, and governance outreach have sharply reduced Maoist influence. The number of LWE-affected districts, which once exceeded 223 across the so-called 'Red Corridor', has now shrunk to 11. However, history suggests that military success alone does not guarantee irreversible conflict termination. The final outcome hinges on whether residual cadres, over-ground workers (OGWs), and support ecosystems are dismantled or allowed to regenerate under new organisational or ideological forms.
In this context, a Unified National Surrender & Rehabilitation Policy (UNSRP) assumes strategic significance. While surrender and rehabilitation constitute one of UMHA's four core pillars - alongside security operations, development, and governance - the existing policy architecture remains fragmented across states, producing uneven incentives, legal uncertainty, and scope for exploitation. A unified framework directly addresses this gap and aligns surrender mechanisms with the 2026 end-state objective.
The current operational phase is characterised by intensified Security Force (SF) dominance in core Maoist zones such as Abujhmadh, Bastar Division, parts of Bijapur-Sukma, and residual pockets in the Odisha-Telangana border areas. The focus is on neutralising senior leadership and dismantling People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA) formations.
At this stage, a unified surrender framework would function as a force multiplier, converting operational pressure into organisational attrition. Under heightened operational pressure, middle-ranking 'commanders' (Category B) and 'armed cadres' (Category C) often seek exit options but hesitate due to uncertainty over legal outcomes, rehabilitation credibility, and disparities across state policies. A nationally standardised reward structure, legal review mechanism, and protection guarantees could convert battlefield pressure into organisational disintegration. Expected outcomes include accelerated surrender of middle leadership, erosion of the continuity of command-and-control, and increased intelligence inflows on hideouts, arms caches, and movement corridors. Strategically, UNSRP has the potential to convert tactical security gains into structural weakening of the Maoist hierarchy.
As per a report dated November 29, 2025, Vikas Nagpure aka Ananth, 'spokesperson' of the Madhya Pradesh-Maharashtra-Chhattisgarh Special Zonal Committee (MMCSZC), unexpectedly laid down arms and surrendered before the Police in Maharashtra's Gondia District on the night of November 28. This development followed a series of communications from Ananth indicating a markedly different intent. In a letter dated November 22, 2025, addressed to the Chief Ministers of Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh - Devendra Fadnavis, Vishnu Deo Sai and Mohan Yadav, respectively - as well as Chhattisgarh Home Minister Vijay Sharma, he had sought a 'breathing space' until February 15, 2026, to enable consensus-building. Subsequently, in another letter and accompanying audio clips released on November 27, 2025, Ananth stated that the Maoists were prepared to surrender arms on January 1, 2026, while simultaneously exhorting cadres not to capitulate in small groups but collectively. He had also circulated a radio frequency (435.715), instructing MMC cadres to establish daily contact with the leadership between 11 am and 11:15 am until January 1, 2026. Contrary to these declarations, Ananth, along with 15 associates, surrendered abruptly to the Gondia Police. The precise factors precipitating this sudden volte-face remain unclear; however, the move is likely to exacerbate uncertainty and disarray within Maoist ranks already under severe pressure due to sustained security operations, frequent encounters, and the elimination of senior leaders.
Once leadership cohesion is fractured, the conflict enters a phase of attrition against residual armed elements, militia, OGWs, and village-level facilitators. This phase is critical, as insurgencies historically regenerate from support ecosystems even after armed units are degraded. The UNSRP directly targets this vulnerability. Uniform incentives remove the motivation for cadres to delay surrender or cross state borders in search of more lucrative packages - a recurring issue along the Chhattisgarh-Odisha-Telangana axis. Legal safeguards and time-bound case reviews reduce fear among OGWs, who often face procedural cases but lack confidence in rehabilitation promises. Community-based incentives-such as LWE-free Panchayat declarations and development packages-further weaken the Maoist social base by realigning local interests with state stability. The expected result is a surge in lower-category surrenders, village-level disengagement from Maoist logistics, and the reduction of insurgent presence to isolated fugitives rather than organised units.
The post-deadline phase determines whether LWE is reduced permanently to a law-and-order issue or risks ideological reconstitution. Previous cycles, particularly post-2008, demonstrate that, without sustained reintegration and monitoring, militant ecosystems can regenerate under altered banners. Here, UNSRP's long-term reintegration mechanisms become decisive. Employment anchoring, housing security, education for dependents, and conditional sustenance allowances reduce recidivism incentives. A national biometric-linked database can prevent "double surrender" fraud and enables longitudinal tracking. The strategic objective is to deny space for re-mobilisation by ensuring surrendered cadres are socially and economically embedded in the constitutional mainstream. Without such a unified framework, 2026 risks becoming a symbolic, albeit major, milestone rather than an irreversible settlement.
According to an October 30, 2025, report, recently surrendered senior Maoists, including 'Central Committee Member (CCM)' Pullari Prasad Rao akaChandranna, and Telangana 'State Committee Member (SCM)' Bandi Prakash aka Prabhath, who surrendered on October 28, 2025, are believed to have told Police that the organisation has enough cash reserves to survive for nearly four years, even if all fresh inflows from extortion and 'levy' collections were to cease. In this context, an unnamed senior Police officer quoted the wife of a 'CCM' thus stating, "Even if there are no new funds from contractors or illegal donations, the party can financially sustain itself for about four years."
Indeed, interrogation reports suggest the Telangana State Committee alone received about INR 30 million a month, while Maoist funds in Chhattisgarh were estimated at INR 3 billion annually, with INR 230 million coming from mining operations in the north Bastar-Maad region. Further, Mallojula Venugopal Rao aka Abhay aka Bhupati aka Master aka Sonu told Police that the Maoist party follows a January-December financial cycle and collects INR 100 million to INR 120 million annually in the Dandakaranya special zonal committee (DKSZC) area through levies. Sonu, a former Politburo, CCM, and Central Military Commission (CMC) member who served as official spokesperson and long-time ideologue of the CPI-Maoist, surrendered along with 60 other cadres, before chief minister Devendra Fadnavis in the Gadchiroli District of Maharashtra on October 15, 2025.
In such a scenario, surrender policies which are high-impact tools, are also vulnerable to misuse. A realistic assessment of risks and countermeasures is therefore essential. The UNSRP will safeguard against fake or inflated surrenders, rejoining insurgency after rehabilitation, legal dilution and victim alienation, financial leakage and corruption, ideological re-radicalisation, and SF morale.
A unified surrender and rehabilitation policy is not a concession to extremism; it is a strategic instrument of conflict termination. Security operations degrade capacity, development restores legitimacy, but a predictable and credible surrender framework breaks organisational will and continuity. If implemented nationally by early 2025, the UNSRP significantly enhances the probability that India's 2026 LWE-end deadline becomes irreversible rather than cyclical. It is pertinent to note here that lasting victory over LWE will be achieved not only through the elimination of armed cadres, but through the systematic closure of all exit ramps back into violence.
- Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management