The Horn Of Africa States: The Region’s Enduring Dilemma – A Rich Geography And Poor Institutions – OpEd
The Horn of Africa States region comprises Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Djibouti (the ‘SEED’ countries) and together with Yemen and other neighboring countries, it truly occupies a major geostrategic location through which pass global trade routes and choke points including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Somali Sea and the Bab El Mandab Strait. It is a fragile region on the political plain, offers substantial opportunities on the economic front, and is marked by an unsteady security landscape. It is a region whose future leans more how it can manage not only its internal idiosyncrasies but also how it can strengthen its institutional frameworks and regional cooperation, while managing the external influences, which remain critical for sustainable development.
On the political front, the region remains marked by weak governance institutions, generally noted for contested authority and lack of solid democratic development. The governing regimes of the region are generally authoritarian and/or semi-authoritarian with powers concentrated in a small group of recyclable political elites. There is very little of political pluralism in the region, which contributes to the continuing internal strives that convert themselves into direct ethnic confrontations in the region. Two of the major countries of the region (Somalia and Ethiopia) are, indeed, politically organized on ethnic federalism, which divides the populations of these countries creating ethnic loyalties in the place of national loyalties. It is the source of most internal grievances and competition for power and resources. The region has, so far, failed to produce efficient leaders of the calibre it used to produce in the past.
Political relations at the regional level are often fluid and transactional. This is complicated more by the historical rivalries and territorial disputes, and more recently by quest of landlocked Ethiopia for an access to a sea. The region has only one regional organization – the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which just recently lost a member, Eritrea, precisely because of the unnecessary quest for an access to a sea by Ethiopia, although the organization has members from non-Horn of Africa States region. IGAD is often marked by weaknesses in collective approach to regional matters as its members do not actually have loyalty to it. Some of them, indeed, belong to other regional institutions, whose goals are different from those of IGAD, like the East Africa Community. Why such countries double-dip on these two organizations is not quite clear.
The Horn of Africa States region and its political dynamics are often influenced by external players, including Gulf countries (the UAE and Qatar and to some lesser extent by Saudi Arabia), Türkiye, China, Western countries and others. Their involvement has sustained the region to some extent but rivalries among them has also contributed to the current chaos in the region as they pull the already weak leadership each to its side. They have contributed, albeit indirectly, to the continuing local rivalries and/or exasperated them. They often prioritize their own interests before the interests of the countries of the region. They have not contributed much to the building of viable institutions in the countries of the region, which suffer most from weak and inefficient governance systems.
On the economic front the region remains one of the least developed in Africa and the world, despite claims otherwise, although in some cases like fintech technologies and mobile telephony and banking, the region may be more advanced than some more advanced countries. The economies of the region is marked mostly by dependence on agriculture, livestock exports, remittances from the large regional diaspora and of course foreign aid. They are all vulnerable to external shocks and pressures, such as commodity price fluctuations and political pressures, which stress and reduce productivity. In the largest two countries of the region, Somalia and Ethiopia, much of the agriculture and livestock industries depend of rain-fed farming. Insecurities, climate stresses, and other structural weaknesses affect them.
But this is not the full story. The region possesses a significant economic potential for it owns a large resource base including a large youthful population which are both a labor force and a consumer market. This represents a demographic dividend, which can be exploited for economic growth and development. The region owns a large maritime space where ports with rail and road connections can be built, allowing usage of the large sub-soil minerals of the region. These include, among others, oil and gas, uranium, cobalt and copper, rare earths, lithium, and many others, including gold, silver and platinum. All the coastal countries of the region can develop port and services based economies, maritime and blue economies and much more. This can be achieved through private sector activity, telecommunications and financial services, which are improving throughout the region. They need to attract their counterparts in other parts of the world to join them.
The region continues to face security challenges involving addressing not only the ethnic-based competition for power and resources and religious terror. In Somalia religious terror groups still pose the most danger, but they are also a threat to the other countries of the region. Ethiopia’s ethnic loyalties should be curbed if Ethiopia has to avoid breaking down to its component nations. All of these security challenges are exploited by external actors of all shades and sizes.
In summary, the region's outlook is characterized by both challenges and opportunities, rather than being exclusively negative or positive. The current situation represents a pivotal juncture. Somalia approaches another election cycle, and it remains to be seen whether this will yield improvements in governance structures compared to the present. The existing ethnic-based federal system has not produced favorable outcomes for the country thus far. Ethiopia seems to be poised to further ethnic conflicts. How it will mange this is not clear and is to be seen. Eritrea is not expected to change much in the coming year but certainly there is another renewal for Djibouti ruing authority the coming year as well.
The ongoing conflicts in the region appear to lack a foreseeable resolution; however, meaningful political reform, conflict de-escalation, and enhanced regional cooperation could unlock significant economic and geostrategic opportunities. For instance, if Ethiopia were to reconsider its approach to securing access to the sea, a pursuit that currently places it at odds with neighboring coastal nations, the prospects for collaboration and development would be greatly improved.
The future stability of the region will largely depend on climate adaptation, youth job creation, and stronger institutions. In the end, the Horn's progress hinges on whether its nations can rise above zero-sum political tactics, handle diversity without conflict, and coordinate international involvement with lasting development and security objectives instead of focusing on short-term strategic rivalry.