Yemen’s War After Arab-Iran Normalization: Still A Proxy Battlefield? – OpEd
This article examines the political dynamics and strategic consequences of Saudi Arabia and Iran's intervention in the Yemeni war, tracing how their rivalry and national security interests have turned Yemen into a proxy war arena. The conflict began with political tensions following the Arab Spring in 2011, accompanied by instability during the transition of power, socio-economic grievances, and a power vacuum. The Houthi rebellion in the north escalated into major conflict in 2015. External actors, including Saudi Arabia and Iran, exploited this situation to expand influence while pursuing national goals. Although relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia were normalized in 2023, Yemen continues to reflect geopolitical competition. Local actors, including the Yemeni government and the Houthis, have become extensions of these powers, allowing indirect confrontation and serving as tools for negotiation with major powers.
Bab el-Mandeb: The Breaking Point
Yemen occupies a strategic position along Bab el-Mandeb, which connects to the Red Sea and serves as a vital route for global energy flows to Europe, Africa, and Asia. The conflict between the Yemeni government and the Houthis raises concerns for regional security. Yemen’s institutions weakened after 2011, the military fragmented, and the Houthis seized Sana’a in 2014. This internal vulnerability enabled Saudi Arabia and Iran to expand influence through local actors.
Despite the 2023 normalization of relations, competition continues. Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea since 2023 have created a crisis. As of March 2024, the Houthis attacked sixty foreign commercial vessels, most recently a Dutch ship in October 2025. These attacks indicate Iran's continued support and the threat to regional stability, prompting U.S. and U.K. military operations. The Yemen conflict remains a strategic arena for Saudi and Iranian power projection.
Riyadh vs Teheran: Clash Over Yemen’s Fate
In contrast, Saudi Arabia is most notable for its intense involvement and aggressiveness through large-scale military operations in Yemen. It deployed around 100 fighter jets and 150,000 soldiers on March 26, 2015, targeting air bases, command centers, and weapons storage to weaken the Houthis (Hadi & Purwono, 2023). Historically, Saudi Arabia was cautious in regional conflicts. Its involvement in Yemen reflects strategic concerns about national security, border peace, limiting Iran’s expansion, and stabilizing the Yemeni government under President Hadi.
Iran’s involvement is motivated by ideological and strategic considerations, strengthening Shia influence and opposing Saudi dominance. Since 2009, Iran supplied weapons to the Houthis and expanded support through missiles, drones, military technology, and training via Quds Force and Hezbollah. In 2024, intelligence reports confirmed Iran helped the Houthis coordinate Red Sea attacks, demonstrating an external dimension that strengthened the group’s capabilities.
Proxy Flames: Yemen’s War Beyond Borders
In the Middle East, proxy wars are shaped by alliances and efforts to balance regional power. Yemen’s conflict has transformed from a domestic struggle into a proxy war due to external actors, including the United States, each pursuing national interests. Despite the 2023 normalization between Riyadh and Tehran, reconciliation has not resolved conflicts rooted in networks of non-state actors and long-term rivalries. Saudi Arabia has shifted strategy toward domestic stability through Vision 2030, emphasizing direct negotiations with the Houthis over military action.
Missile and drone threats remain serious because Saudi Arabia views Iran as indirectly responsible for Houthi aggression. The Gaza conflict since 2023 has intensified proxy warfare and expanded the involvement of actors outside the region. The escalation of the Red Sea crisis since late 2023, and U.S. and U.K. military responses in 2024 and 2025, show Yemen’s conflict is linked to broader regional rivalries. Proxy war dynamics persist and are growing stronger, reflecting the indirect confrontation between Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United States.
Still a Proxy War?
Competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia continues to exacerbate regional tensions, reinforcing Yemen as a central arena for proxy wars. Riyadh’s military interventions and Tehran’s support for the Houthis have turned local actors into extensions of their geopolitical and security interests. The 2023 normalization has not changed the fundamental patterns between states and non-state actors. The escalation in the Red Sea and U.S. involvement underscores Yemen’s ongoing role in regional and international proxy dynamics.
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