The Golan Heights: From Demilitarization To A Pursuit Of Peace – Analysis

By Kabir Taneja and Samidha Jain

The dramatic collapse of the Ba’athist Syria under the Bashar al-Assad government in December 2024 triggered a dramatic recalibration of the Golan Heights’ status in West Asia. Israel rapidly asserted military control over the remaining Syrian portions of the territory, leaving little space for ambiguity in its strategic calculus.

Benjamin Netanyahu asserts the stance that the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) presence in the region acts as a deterrent, echoing historic domestic anxieties of renewed Syrian aggression. However, Ahmed al-Sharaa's newly consolidated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) regime has pivoted sharply from the historic hostility. Favouring Israel, Syria has refused to engage with Hamas, expelled factions of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and Hamas, arrested two senior Palestinian Islamic Jihad figures, and attempted to thwart smuggling attempts between Iran and Hezbollah.

With Netanyahu’s demand for the complete demilitarisation of Southern Syria in the provinces of Quneitra, Deraa, and Suweida, is it a possibility that Sharaa could cede control of the region? The answer would be no unless he wants to face catastrophic domestic outrage, which could impact his nascent government and fracture his image. Thus, Sharaa’s “quest for inner grace” sparks curiosity about whether the new Syrian regime is merely seeking legitimacy and co-operation from key players such as the United States (US), or if it has any possible past links with Israel.

Israeli Involvement in the Syrian Civil War

In 2019, an outgoing Israeli military commander confirmed in an interview that his government had been arming some anti-Assad rebels in Syria. Over the years, there have also been news reports of Syrian rebels being treated in Israeli hospitals. Under “Operation Good Neighbour,” Israel sought to leverage humanitarian aid and other altruistic initiatives, such as public education and economic incorporation, to turn the dissatisfied Syrians in the Golan region against the Assad government.

The 2011–12 incidents at the Majdal Shams square, resulting in the Syrian Civil War, are an epitome of the same. It is widely speculated that this goodwill project was a back channel that Israel used to silently fund 12 Syrian rebel groups, with the notorious media reports of 2017 identifying the specific group as the Fursan al-Jawlan ("Knights of the Golan"), a group based in the rebel-held town of Jubatha al-Khashab that lies just opposite the Druze town of Buq'atha in the Israeli-held Golan Heights. The identities of other rebel groups have not been disclosed, but many internet reports portray these funds in a different light. It is speculated that Israel funded these rebel groups to protect the power vacuum along the border from being usurped by Iran-backed Hezbollah and other such linked outfits.

HTS’ Fundings & the Türkiye connection 

The new climate in Damascus and intermittent signs of “progress” of bilateral relations for the first time since the 1973 Yom Kippur war pose certain questions, such as whether or not Israel in any way funds HTS.

Fursan al-Jawlan was a faction of the Free Syrian Army that was ideologically distinct from HTS because of its nature. HTS is an offshoot of the al-Qaeda outfit and remains a designated terrorist group by the United States (US) and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). So, Israel did not fund HTS, but the other opposing secular groups served the same purpose as HTS. Moreover, HTS has historically been an independent self-funding rebel grouping because it considered itself to be either apostates or infidels. However, in the new political environment, they want to actively rebuild relationships with other countries to legitimise the government internationally.

Then President-elect Donald Trump told a press conference that Türkiye was behind Assad's downfall, calling it an "unfriendly takeover."  al-Sharaa, with roots from Golan, is claimed to have established backdoor intelligence channels with the US. Some speculate they may have sold intelligence to Türkiye as well through intermediaries such as NGOs. It is essential to note that one of the cornerstones of Sharaa’s policy is to lift Western sanctions and enable Syria to engage globally, especially with the US. If Syria wants to achieve a relationship with the US, it will have to become a deterrent of Islamic and Jihadist forces such as Hezbollah, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and ISIS and ensure their end of the bargain for peace and unity in the region. The realpolitik pursued by non-state actors such as Hamas and the Houthis fragments Arab consensus and impedes multilateral conflict resolution mechanisms, contributing to heightened regional fragility.

This translates to them maintaining cordial relationships with Israel and Türkiye. Syrian rebels have received refuge in Türkiye. At the Bab-al-Hawa crossing on their official border with Türkiye, HTS collected up to US$15 million per month as a toll fee. Israel receives unequivocal support from the Trump administration in a “blanket manner” without any preconditions, which undermines other key players in the region who have symbolic influence, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Türkiye.

Conclusion 

Despite Sharaa's recent diplomatic overtures, Netanyahu has maintained a firm position on two critical issues: Israel refuses to withdraw to the pre-2024 demarcation line and continues to insist upon UN-regulated demilitarisation of the Southern Syrian Region. This impasse has characterised bilateral relations since early 2025, with neither side willing to modify its core demands.

The normalisation of Israeli-Syrian relations faces significant structural constraints that have produced a diplomatic stalemate throughout 2025. Syria's categorical rejection of participation in the Abraham Accordsuntil Israeli forces withdraw from the Golan Heights further circumscribes potential diplomatic frameworks for engagement.​

The Golan Heights question is the principal obstacle to bilateral progress. Syrian public sentiment towards the occupation remains deeply adversarial, constraining the Sharaa government's negotiating latitude on territorial concessions. This position reflects both domestic political imperatives and Syria's limited capacity to sustain renewed conflict, given its economic fragility. Syria's political trajectory remains uncertain amid contradictory pressures. While the Assad government maintained steadfast opposition to Israel, Damascus cannot reconcile with Israel and Washington without addressing territorial disputes or jeopardising regime stability.

The Trump administration has demonstrated a willingness to mediate agreements that disproportionately favour Israeli security interests, as evidenced by Netanyahu's maximalist negotiating positions. However, the Sharaa government appears unwilling to accept arrangements that perpetuate historical grievances or legitimise territorial losses inherited from the Assad era. Syrian President al-Sharaa has explicitly conditioned any final peace agreement on Israel’s withdrawal to pre-December 8, 2024, boundaries.​ Sustainable Israeli-Syrian normalisation requires Israel’s endearing commitment to genuine confidence-building measures rather than unilateral demands.

Progress depends on constructing non-coercive frameworks that address the Golan Heights’ sovereignty through equitable settlements accommodating both parties' core security interests. Without substantive Israeli engagement on territorial status and phased withdrawal mechanisms, diplomatic pathways remain foreclosed.​

About the authors:

• Kabir Taneja is Deputy Director and Fellow, Middle East, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation.
• Samidha Jain is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation

Source: This article was published by the Observer Research Foundation