Approaching the War on Terror in the Sahel

Since President Trump took office, he has focused on the American homeland, leading to a foreign policy characterized by isolationism and transactions. For Africa, this has meant expecting little support in areas that do not directly benefit the United States, exemplified by the Trump Administration’s rollback of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which in 2024 provided $6.5 billion in humanitarian assistance to the sub-Saharan Africa region alone. However, the Trump Administration has taken some, albeit selective, interest in countering the terrorist threat in Africa, which is enveloping parts of the continent. In Somalia, President Trump began “dramatically increasing” counterterror drone strikes, already fast approaching the total number of strikes during Biden’s term, 51. While the threat of al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda’s official East African affiliate, is prevalent, the larger terror threat looming in the Sahel has received little attention—until recently. The abduction of an American Christian missionary in Niger, conducted potentially by Islamist forces, who is perhaps being moved to Mali, which is near collapse due to a different Islamist group, along with President Trump’s recent focus on entirely different Islamist groups in Nigeria, all point towards the need for the US counterterrorism efforts to focus on the threat in West Africa.

Abduction in Niger and Collapse in Mali

At the end of October, an American Christian missionary, Kevin Rideout, was abducted in Niger. While no group has claimed responsibility, it is suspected that one of several Islamist groups operating in the Sahelian region could be behind the kidnapping, potentially having a criminal organization conduct the abduction and transfer the person to the Islamist group, which is not uncommon in the region. Both the Islamic State’s Sahel Province (ISSP) and their rival al-Qaeda affiliate, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), are active in the Sahel, largely in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Rideout’s phone location was tracked to approximately 56 miles north of Niger’s capital, an area between the Mali and Niger border where ISSP has a stronghold. While President Trump has made bringing Americans held hostage a focus of his administration, particularly in the Israel-Hamas conflict, the kidnapping in Niger poses a challenge to this promise. The United States has long held that it does not negotiate with terrorists; however, with little intelligence in the region due to the lack of diplomatic efforts, the abduction of an American citizen in Niger demonstrates that there may be a US interest in reigniting thoughtful foreign policy in West Africa.

While Niger has been a hotbed of Islamist activity, Mali is now on the verge of being overrun by JNIM. While JNIM does not have the capability, nor do some believe the intention, to seize the Malian capital city of Bamako, its fuel blockade strategy has been painfully successful in undermining the military government. Lasting over two months, the blockade is an attempt to undermine the current government and likely trigger another coup, the third in the country since 2020. The power vacuum would allow JNIM to operate more freely and amass more resources for its terror campaign. Furthermore, a collapse in Mali could have a domino effect in neighboring countries, such as Niger. JNIM is comprised of several Mali-based extremist groups and was born as an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) project for the Sahel, which coalesced under JNIM in 2017. In 2012, AQIM and other factions that formed JNIM controlled territory in Mali before a French-led military intervention in 2013, initially deemed a success, dispersed the jihadist groups and evoked a “more diffuse, population-centric” strategy. In 2024, JNIM was one of the deadliest terror groups, only second to the Islamic State and its affiliates. While JNIM operates across the Sahel region of West Africa, JNIM conducted its first known attack in Nigeria at the end of October, killing one Nigerian soldier.

Watching Nigeria

Nigeria has recently made headlines–though not because of JNIM’s troubling new presence. At the start of November, President Trump demonstrated intense interest in countering Islamist forces in Nigeria. There is several operating in the country, but the two main terrorist groups are Boko Haram and its rival, the Islamic State’s West African Province (ISWAP). President Trump has focused on the violence against Christians, although these armed groups have indiscriminately targeted the Nigerian population, composed largely of Muslims and Christians alike. President Trump has not provided details on whether he plans to target a specific Islamist group in the country or what action he plans to take, but Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has confirmed the Pentagon is prepared to take action. Countering Islamist groups in Nigeria alone is difficult, particularly because their stronghold is in the Lake Chad region, allowing them to move between Nigeria, Chad, and even Cameroon, but even more so with the consideration that Islamist groups in the region are thriving. Action against terrorist forces in Nigeria will be unsuccessful in the long term if there is not also action across the Sahel.

The Challenge of Counterterrorism in the Sahel

While the Trump Administration has become animated about the risks posed by Islamist groups in Nigeria due to the threat to Christians alone, given the complexity of terrorist groups in the region and the recent kidnapping of an American Christian missionary in Niger, US counterterrorism strategy in the Sahel is likely to encompass threats from Islamist groups throughout West Africa. The region’s security structures are going through a transformation. After requesting the end of a decade-long United Nations peacekeeping mission, which aimed to provide some internationally backed stabilization to the region, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso’s military governments signed a defense pact, prioritizing the fight against terrorism. Given the state of the region, those efforts seem to have minimal effect.

If the US conducts counterterrorism efforts in the Sahel, there is a grave need to be careful, so as not to move African leaders closer to China and Russia, as well as to not breed new, particularly anti-American, extremists in the region.

The US counterterrorism strategy in West Africa is essential to the broader great power competition. As Ambassador Nathan Sales described in his March 2025 testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, counterterrorism is a “comparative advantage of the United States, and… cooperation can cement partnerships with key states facing an array of terrorist threats, bringing them into closer alignment with Washington and detaching them from competitors such as China and Russia.” In particular, US counterterrorism success in Mali could prove a clear message to Russia, due to the previous presence of the Russian private military company, the Wagner Group, on the ground providing counterterrorism assistance. While US-Mali relations are tense, the lack of tangible success in Russian counterterrorism support could provide an opportunity for the US to strengthen relations with Mali by providing counterterrorism expertise.

Finally, if the Sahel is the new front in the war on terror, the US should heed warnings from Iraq. The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to significant turmoil, destruction, and a political vacuum in the country, which was exploited by extremist leaders for the proliferation of jihadist groups. It is this environment where al-Qaeda in Iraq formed, which later became the Islamic State (ISIS). As Nigeria asserts its sovereignty, insisting that military support from the US would only be accepted in a bilateral operation, President Trump’s sentiment to go in “guns-a-blazing” could spell disaster for the long-term counterterrorism efforts. The jihadist challenge in the Sahel is complex and requires careful, sustained international support. Whatever the reason to intervene, the US must consider how to best support strengthening local governments, or else let extremism in the region run rampant and cede partnerships to our competitors, China and Russia.

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