Mark Norman: Choosing our next air defence fleet shouldn't come down to one or the other
By Mark Norman
Canadians can be forgiven for believing that the ongoing debate about which fighter jet we should buy is actually about whether or not the F-35 is the best aircraft for our needs. Instead, the decision is a manifestation of conflicting and overlapping priorities . Our next fighter fleet will be an enduring symbol of who we are as a country and what matters to us at this moment in our history.
Thanks to our collective and systemic incompetence as a nation, we have afforded Mark Carney’s government both the blessing and the curse of choice. Had we seriously taken our responsibilities for our defence in preceding decades, we would already be flying a new fleet of fighters and this agonizing debate would have likely been avoided.
I support the review of the planned purchase of 88 F-35 aircraft not because it’s the wrong choice, but because it has forced us to have some uncomfortable conversations about what is important to us as a country, especially in the context of a world that doesn’t look as it did even one year ago.
There is no perfect answer to this conundrum. To believe otherwise is naive, dangerous and unfair. Whatever choice the government makes will be criticized and celebrated with equal vigour from opposing sides. There is no upside for the government and time is not its friend as pressure mounts to declare its chosen path.
Critics of the process and outspoken advocates for one choice over the other are missing the point. Yes, the relative technical merits of one aircraft over another will have unquestionable operational implications. The F-35 can do some useful things the Gripen can’t, and vice versa.
The government will have been given detailed analyses of the operational merits of one aircraft over the other, and ongoing interventions by so-called experts add nothing but noise to the process. But of all the factors government must consider, the operational impacts are less compelling than their strategic counterparts.
Reconciling the various advantages, risks and consequences of the two options is more difficult than it appears because this is about balancing competing national interests. At the risk of oversimplifying this issue, the conflicting tensions are our required military capabilities, our relationship with the United States and our broader economic interests.
Although this hot potato has been politicized beyond imagination for decades, politics is not a factor in the current paradigm. There is no potential political win in this decision for either the government or the opposition. This creates an unusually pure process that I actually find refreshing.
The F-35 is technically superior to the Gripen in many respects. That superiority is not without costs . The upfront price, technological dependence on the United States and associated infrastructure and sustainment costs are arguably disadvantages. Conversely, seamless integration with U.S. air defences (that is, the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) ), superior operational capabilities and participation in a multinational supply chain are undeniable advantages.
The Gripen, despite its apparent performance disadvantage, offers greater tactical versatility, logistical simplicity, cheaper operating and sustainment costs and technical independence from the U.S. The potential advantages in terms of jobs and economic benefits may also be significant, but this is currently unproven.
The Gripen’s greatest risk appears to be the potential for Canada to be operationally isolated (in the context of NORAD, for example) or punished by Washington (in the context of our ongoing trade disputes). Neither of these is absolute, however; they are theoretical.
Arguably, the two aircraft could effectively complement each other if we can move beyond the shallow and self-defeatist arguments about why a mixed fleet is perceived as a bad idea. Statements by the U.S. Ambassador that we can’t afford such a decision are as arrogant as they are inappropriate.
For the bulk of the 20th century, the Royal Canadian Air Force operated much larger fleets of multiple types of fighter aircraft. Yes, we face different challenges today, but if we keep constraining ourselves by what we think we can’t do, we will never become the country we need or want to be. This is about choice, and not everything is a zero-sum equation anymore.
If, for the purposes of analysis, we arbitrarily nullify many of the economic benefits, cost factors and operational considerations, this choice effectively boils down to how willing we are to endure unspecified potential threats of retaliation or consequences from the U.S.
If we have learned anything since February, it’s that no matter what we do or say, the Donald Trump administration will find some obscure reason to bully or intimidate us. In essence, therefore, the fighter decision is about whether we are prepared to pursue measurable advantages at the risk of some yet to be determined future consequences.
Or, do we proceed with the current plan and accept its inherent constraints and costs with the belief (or hope) that we can then move forward without any further risk or consequences?
Presenting this as a binary choice is perhaps the wrong approach. Instead, why not think bigger and acquire a robust fleet of both aircraft and do this properly?
It is curious that for decades of Swedish neutrality, the Gripen was an appropriate deterrent to Russian aggression, but that somehow is now considered inadequate against the same potential foe in a North American context. For those who might ask, what about China? Maybe that’s as good a reason as any to have more than one arrow in our quiver.
Imagine a hybrid fleet of both aircraft providing air defence at home, a squadron of Gripens forward-deployed in direct support to Canadian troops on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s eastern flank and another squadron of F-35s ready to deploy to the Pacific in support of our interests in that region. Is that not who we should be as a country?
Mark Norman is a retired vice-admiral who commanded Canada’s Navy and was vice-chief of Defence. He advises several Canadian defence companies.