Work Needed After NATO Floats Maritime Plan
The alliance has been in dire need of an updated naval plan to tackle a fast-evolving range of threats. Now, 14 years after the last iteration, it has finally delivered.
The updated strategy identifies Russia, China, and terrorism as the main dangers, alongside climate change and the challenges brought about by AI and other emerging and disruptive technologies.
Moscow “is reinforcing its conventional and nuclear capabilities, while carrying out increasingly aggressive destabilizing cyber and hybrid actions against the Alliance and its partners,” the document says. At the same time, Beijing’s “confrontational rhetoric, coercive policies and growing assertiveness” are an increasing concern for NATO’s defense.
It recognizes that “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations, is the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens,” and authoritarian regimes “are investing in sophisticated conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities, with little transparency or regard for international norms and commitments.”
The strategy outlines three main elements to maritime power’s contribution to allied security: deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Each comes with its own set of objectives and activities.
It says allied sea power must be used to provide credible nuclear deterrence, sea control and power projection, freedom of navigation, maneuver and action, and protection for sea-lanes and maritime critical infrastructure — with a particular focus on undersea cables and pipelines.
The alliance should leverage the “inherent agility” of its navies for crisis prevention and management, the document says. It also highlights the importance of maritime activities for building more robust cooperative security relationships between allies.
Implementing the strategy will need adaptation and innovation to improve interoperability and warfighting readiness. The document sees the importance of Standing Maritime Groups (SNMGs), which are currently inadequate, as vital tools for the alliance’s posture.
There is a clear change in language and intent compared to the 2011 strategy, with concise and to-the-point descriptions, including a broader definition of allied sea power and what it enables.
The new tone is underlined by the phrases “maritime power” and “projection of power,” which are mentioned 17 times, compared to just twice in 2011. There is also a clear emphasis on “hard power required to prevail in conflict,” and the role of naval capabilities.
There is, however, less attention paid to other aspects of allied maritime activity that might have added greater depth.
The current state of alliance members’ merchant fleets, and the need to address problems such as the growing use of flags of convenience, are not mentioned, for example. Neither are the challenges facing the shipbuilding sector.
The security of critical undersea infrastructure, while addressed, also receives less attention than might be expected, especially given January’s launch of Operation Baltic Sentry to protect pipelines and cables.
Building and sustaining capable fleets is an expensive and demanding business, as the $13bn Norwegian order for British Type 26 frigates illustrates. Senior policymakers will need to ensure taxpayers are well acquainted with the importance of the Navy to ensure they support the necessary investment.
The strategy could form the basis of a campaign to build awareness and momentum behind the need for future spending. It is “a solid, compact briefing document that we should be handing out like pamphlets at the church door on Sunday,” wrote the naval blogger Commander Salamander.
The updated Alliance Maritime Strategy is a positive and necessary step for NATO, but much work remains to be done. Not least, winning the support of allies and their populations.
Gonzalo Vázquez is a research associate with the Center for Naval Thought at the Spanish Naval War College.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
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