The “Wildfire” the Forest Service Ignited

Another fire recently escaped control in the Jemez Mountains of the Santa Fe National Forest (SFNF), west of the Chama River Canyon Wilderness and near the rural village of Gallinas, New Mexico. The escape occurred during “management” of a small lightning-strike wildfire, first reported on June 25 when it was a tenth of an acre in size. It was named the Laguna Fire.

By June 30, the lightning-strike fire had only grown to 176 acres and appeared to be burning out against cliffs known as the Rincon Colorado – steep, largely barren stone cliffs. The prevailing northeast winds blew the fire up against the edge of the cliffs, which created a natural fire break. At that point, the Forest Service made the decision to “contain” the fire within a 13,000-acre planned containment perimeter. This meant that they would expand the small 176-acre fire to fill an area 74 times larger. The burn would be intentionally ignited over a dry landscape of oak brush, ponderosa pine, and pinyon-juniper.

The Forest Service announced in their June 30th press release  “Fire managers will start firing operations as early as this week with the aim of restoring the ecological process of fire across approximately 13,000 acres of forest land.” They further explained, “We manage fire-adapted landscapes, and the Laguna Wildfire is an opportunity to create a resilient ecosystem that reduces the future risk of catastrophic severe wildfire to communities.” In other words, the agency was implementing a burn for landscape resource benefit — which is an intentional burn, not a wildfire. That is, until it went out of control and became a real wildfire. This follows a history of escaped prescribed burns in the SFNF, including New Mexico’s largest wildfire, the 341,000 acre Hermits Peak/Calf Canyon Fire of 2022, ignited by two escaped prescribed burns. The Hermits Peak/Calf Canyon Fire burned out entire communities, changing locals’ lives forever. In the past 25 years, more acres have been burned in the SFNF due to land management agency escaped intentional burns than by any other cause.

In the same press release, the Forest Service described firing operations – “To conduct a firing operation, firefighters cut away vegetation to make a line of bare soil ahead of a fire and then using aerial and hand ignitions burn the vegetation between that line and the actively burning fire front.” On July 1, the Forest Service commenced firing operations precisely along the planned containment perimeter of the fire. By July 4, the Forest Service had ignited a large area of the southeast section of the planned perimeter, over two miles south of the original fire, which was cooling off at that point. This burn was so far away from the original lightning-strike fire that it was effectively a separate fire ignited by the Forest Service.

A few small spot fires developed to the east of the planned perimeter due to increasing winds, but the agency continued carrying out its firing operations. The July 6 Laguna Fire briefing weather report warned that over the next few days – “There may be downburst winds, with gusts potentially exceeding 40 mph.” The agency continued lighting along the containment perimeter to the north of the original lightning-strike fire. On the eastern side of the planned perimeter, crews began connecting the original fire footprint to the north with the newly ignited fire to the south. Then they expanded the fire from east to west, against the prevailing winds, steadily filling the 13,000-acre perimeter.

On July 12, the Forest Service announced that a major spot fire was developing to the east of the Laguna Fire planned perimeter near Laguna Peak. In their press release, the Forest Service stated, “Fire crews are actively engaged in full suppression efforts using hotshot crews, engines, and helicopters to drop water.” At this point, the fire began to be managed as an actual wildfire.

The fire grew much further out of the planned perimeter to the east and northeast, due to intense downdraft winds from a storm. Such weather is relatively common in the area during the July and August monsoon season. Thunderstorms were forecast for the next week, increasing the chances of the fire entering into the Chama River Canyon Wilderness.

Two firefighters were entrapped due to the rapid fire growth and had to deploy their emergency shelters. They were fortunate to make it out without serious injuries. Rio Arriba County issued a potential evacuation status of “set” for the Monastery of Christ in the Desert and a status of “go” for Gallinas Ranch. A number of cows in a forest grazing allotment were killed by the fire, and others were injured. Some of the surviving cows had burned hooves and udders. The family who owned the cows claimed to a local news source that they found fire accelerant balls that the Forest Service had dropped from aircraft in the forest while they were looking for their missing cows. A family member stated, “This was not a wildfire. It doesn’t matter what they say. This was not a wildfire. This was intentionally spread by them.”

The Forest Service repeatedly stated that “the health and safety of firefighters and the public are always the highest priority.” However, converting a small lightning-strike wildfire into a large intentional burn during dry, windy and unpredictable weather exposed both firefighters and the public to increased risk. 

A Region 3 Complex Incident Management Team (CIMT) arrived on July 13. Up to this point, the progress on managing the fire had been quantified as percent completed – that’s how much of the planned firing operations the Forest Service had completed. After this point, fire management was quantified as percent contained, because they were now attempting to genuinely contain and suppress an actual wildfire. Despite igniting over 99% of the fire themselves, the Forest Service still classifies the entire incident as a wildfire.

Over the next several days, the spot fire grew towards the east, towards the Chama River Canyon Wilderness. Dense grey clouds of acrid smoke filled the air, stretching over 60 miles away. The CIMT utilized alternative firefighting strategies, primarily focusing on back burns and establishing fire lines with water instead of dropping fire retardant. This strategy was intended to protect the La Presa drainage, a critical component of the Rio Chama watershed which supplies water to numerous locations, including Albuquerque.

During a July 16 briefing, a CIMT operations section officer acknowledged that their efforts were limited by a shortage of Type 1 firefighting resources, particularly hotshot crews. Local sentiment became a combination of appreciation for the CIMT’s challenging work, and outrage that the fire had been mostly ignited by the Forest Service. One post on the SFNF Facebook page, under a CIMT Laguna Fire briefing, summarized the mixed local perspective well:

“I am grateful for the men and women who are fighting this fire, risking their lives for a fire that could have been put out or controlled rather than fueled. What was once under 200 acres around June 25 has grown to over 16,000 acres, how much wildlife and cattle have been killed? You are not showing pictures of the land burned beyond recognition, stripped of any vegetation nor the livestock burned to death that couldn’t escape. The command decision made by you to fuel a fire during a drought and windy season, just blows my mind.”

Another post summed up the impacts on the local population, landscape and economy:

“The impacts of this fire are widespread. Ranchers lost livestock, and still continue to do so. Grazing allotments have mostly been reduced to ash. Wildlife, including elk calves and deer fawns, were caught during their most vulnerable season. Smoke settled into the valleys for days, worsening health issues for people who had no way to escape the air or cool their homes with air conditioning. Some families were stuck indoors during the hottest part of the year.

Water used to fight the fire was pulled from the Rio Chama and Abiquiu Lake at a time when farmers in the Abiquiu Valley were already under water curtailment. Tourism has taken a hit. Outdoor recreation was shut down. And the insurance consequences are just beginning. Classifying this as a wildfire instead of a fuels treatment opens the door for cancellations and premium increases, with long-term effects on our local economy.”

The CIMT steadily contained the Laguna Fire over a period of weeks, and currently the acres burned are reported to be 17,415 acres. The wildfire/intentional burn operation is 85% “completed.” According to the Burned Area Emergency Response (BAER) report, the fire was mostly low severity, but 14% of the landscape burned at moderate severity and 5% burned at high severity. Many wildfires have a substantially higher moderate and high burn severity component, but for an intentional burn, those moderate and high severity components are unusually high. The trajectory is clear: if current practices continue, another megafire ignited by a Forest Service intentional burn will be virtually inevitable.

After the devastating Hermits Peak/Calf Canyon Fire, the Forest Service released the “National Prescribed Fire Program Review,” establishing new tactical, strategic and technological directives and upgrades for the implementation of prescribed burns. However, that document does not address intentional burns carried out under the auspices of wildfire management. And, the agency is not required to undertake NEPA (National Environmental Policy Act) environmental analysis before spontaneously implementing such intentional burns. The lack of firefighting resources to control containment escapes during wildfire intentional burn operations has not yet been sufficiently addressed.

Fires such as the Laguna Fire, which are being ignited and expanded while under emergency authority, are managed under a different set of rules – rules designed to be operative during actual wildfire emergencies. Emergency fire suppression funds are utilized, instead of funds allocated for project prescribed fire implementation. This gives the agency much more latitude to burn larger numbers of acres. But at what cost?

It would seem, at least in dry forests, it can be at a very high cost. However, Congress, in their 2022 ten-year “Wildfire Crisis Strategy,” has mandated an additional 20 million acres be treated (by logging and burning) on National Forest System lands, and an additional 30 million acres to be treated on other Federal, State, Tribal, and private lands. With the current cutbacks for federal agencies, wildfire expansions for resource benefit seems to be how the Forest Service is attempting to get the job done – even though safer burn windows are decreasing due to the warming climate. This adds up to more burn escapes.

The SFNF justifies converting small lighting-strike fires into large intentional burns with this guideline from the SFNF Land Management Plan — “Naturally occurring fires should be allowed to perform their natural ecological role to meet multiple resource objectives and facilitate progress toward desired conditions.” But this guideline does not instruct, nor does it allow, for the Forest Service to greatly expand wildfires with large-scale firing operations. Fire management policy must be developed in a national process, and analyzed through a comprehensive NEPA process.

Although there is widespread agreement that genuinely allowing naturally occurring fires to burn on landscapes can be ecologically beneficial, even that can go wrong. Arizona’s Dragon Bravo Fire, on the North Rim of the Grand Canyon National Park, ignited on July 4 and was allowed to burn for resource benefit. It was not intentionally expanded. The weather was fairly benign at that point, although vegetation was dry. On July 11, high winds came up and massively blew up the fire, destroying 70 structures, including the Grand Canyon Lodge, and burning 130,520 acres so far. Based on the presence of pyrocumulus clouds, we can expect a relatively large high severity component. Due to the warming climate, substantial conifer regeneration cannot always be expected in dry Southwestern forests. In an increasing number of cases, conifer forests appear to type convert to shrubland after high severity fire.

It’s abundantly clear that fires should not be allowed to burn during windy, hot, and/or dry weather – it’s just too risky. Weather can be unpredictable, especially in the dry Southwest, so burning should only occur during clearly safer burn windows. It is also necessary to carefully consider vegetation moisture and vapor pressure deficit – a measure of atmospheric dryness – before wildfires are utilized for resource benefit objectives.

Fire plays a vital ecological role in Western landscapes — but should only be ignited under the right conditions. To ensure that intentional burns are both beneficial and safe, sound science, comprehensive analysis, clear parameters, transparent decision-making, and genuine accountability are required. Without these elements, the next megafire may yet again be ignited by the agencies entrusted to protect our forests and communities.

Story Map of Laguna Fire
Intentional burn and burn escape progression

Forest Service wildfire briefing maps and photo.

7/4/25 – The original lightning strike fire is to the northeast, and the larger area to the southeast was ignited by firing operations two miles away. Firing operations are commencing along the north planned containment area boundary.

7/6/2025 – Firing operations are being implemented along the east planning perimeter boundary, and being widened along the north planning perimeter boundary.

7/7/2025 – Firing operations are continuing to close the gap between the original lightning fire and the southeast section of the fire that was ignited earlier. The fire is being pushed to the west, against prevailing winds. 

7/12/2025 – Spot fires are developing across the planned perimeter containment line due to thunderstorm overflow winds. They appear to be coming off of the firing operation fire, not the original lightning strike fire.

7/18/2025 – The firing operations escape extends almost up to the Rio Chama and is approaching Gallinas Ranch.

Laguna Fire burn area below the Rincon Colorado, on August 1. 

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