THE PROBLEM WITH INDIA’S NEW MISSILE GAMBIT

India is reportedly embarking on a significant strategic development: a high-powered conventional bunker-buster missile built on its Agni-V ballistic missile platform.

According to Indian media reports, the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) is modifying the Agni-V intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) to carry a colossal 7,500kg conventional warhead instead of a nuclear payload. This massive warhead (about 8 tonnes) is designed to penetrate 80-100 metres underground before detonating, enabling it to destroy deeply buried, hardened targets.

The missile’s range will be reduced to roughly 2,500km due to the heavier payload, but its impact power and precision will be dramatically increased. Two variants are reportedly under development: one with an airburst warhead for surface targets, and another a true earth-penetrator similar in concept to the US GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bomb. The penetrator version, carrying up to an eight-tonne warhead, would be among the most powerful conventional weapons globally.

India’s pursuit of a missile-based delivery system for bunker busters, as opposed to the US method of dropping bombs from stealth bombers, is notable. A missile allows India to strike fortified targets at long range rapidly and with little warning, enhancing operational flexibility and survivability of the launch platform.

The impetus for this development appears to come partly from recent events: the US’ use of MOP bunker-buster bombs against Iran’s underground nuclear facilities at Fordow and Natanz on June 21, 2025.

Seeing how US conventional munitions could cripple nuclear infrastructure, Indian strategists seem keen to acquire a similar capability. Indeed, Indian reports explicitly state the new Agni-V variant is meant to neutralise hardened enemy sites such as command centres, missile silos and other critical infrastructure buried deep underground in countries like Pakistan and China. In other words, India is developing a conventional weapon that can hold at risk the nuclear command bunkers and missile storage sites of its regional rivals.

India’s reported pursuit of a missile able to carry a ‘bunker-buster’ like the US’ Massive Ordnance Penetrator presents a perilous new chapter in South Asia’s evolving strategic and security landscape. It risks a hazardous entanglement between conventional and nuclear strategies. Rabia Akhtar explains why it’s a terrible idea, what lessons Pakistan can learn from global deterrence doctrines and what it can do to preempt another arms race…

This development blurs the line between conventional and nuclear strategy. On paper, using a non-nuclear warhead to destroy an enemy’s nuclear assets might appear to avoid crossing the nuclear threshold — after all, the weapon itself is conventional. India’s official doctrine remains ‘No First Use’ (NFU) of nuclear weapons, and an attack with a conventional Agni-V would technically not violate that pledge. However, this reasoning is dangerously simplistic.

Deploying conventional missiles against a nuclear-armed adversary’s strategic forces creates a classic nuclear-conventional entanglement that could lead to miscalculation and rapid escalation. India’s new bunker buster may offer a tempting counterforce option, but its use against Pakistan or China’s nuclear targets would carry grave risks. Here’s why.

THE ILLUSION OF A NON-NUCLEAR FIRST STRIKE

Indian advocates of the conventional Agni-V bunker-buster might argue that it allows New Delhi to strike Pakistani nuclear assets without breaking its NFU pledge or triggering nuclear retaliation. This is an illusion, perhaps even a dangerous hoax. From the standpoint of Pakistan or any nuclear-armed target, the method of attack matters far less than the target. Firing a high-speed ballistic missile at Pakistan’s missile silos or nuclear warhead bunkers would almost certainly be viewed as part of a nuclear first strike, regardless of the warhead type.

The launch of an Agni-series missile, traditionally associated with nuclear warheads, would put Pakistan’s forces on immediate high alert. In the fog of crisis, they would have no way to know whether the incoming missile is carrying a conventional high-explosive warhead or a nuclear bomb. The time from launch detection to impact would be only minutes, especially at short ranges; there would be no opportunity for comprehensive decision-making. By the time the reality, a conventional strike, is confirmed, the warhead will have already detonated on Pakistani soil.

Crucially, India’s declaratory NFU policy provides little comfort in such a scenario. In fact, Indian strategic thinkers themselves have cast doubt on how absolute that pledge really is. Former National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon wrote in his book Choices: Inside the Making of India’s Foreign Policy that “circumstances are conceivable in which India might find it useful to strike first”, for example if an adversary is clearly preparing a nuclear launch. He also noted that, if Pakistan were to use even one tactical nuclear weapon, it would effectively free India to undertake a comprehensive first strike against Pakistan in response.

These musings, from a senior official who helped shape India’s doctrine, undermine the credibility of NFU. India’s NFU commitment is already viewed with scepticism by Pakistan, and developing counterforce capabilities like a conventional bunker-buster missile will only deepen that scepticism. No public reiteration of NFU will seem persuasive to Pakistani planners when India is openly acquiring tools to attack nuclear targets pre-emptively.

Furthermore, India cannot hide behind entanglement or ambiguity to escape the consequences of striking nuclear assets conventionally. Some might argue that using a non-nuclear weapon gives India plausible deniability of intent to cross the nuclear threshold. But Pakistan is unlikely to indulge in such legalistic hair-splitting amid a crisis. An attempt to destroy or disable Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent by any means would be seen as an existential threat.

Indeed, the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement of 1988 recognised how provocative any attack on nuclear installations could be, even in a conventional war. That pact commits both countries not to attack each other’s declared nuclear facilities. While it covers primarily civilian facilities and open sites, the spirit behind it is relevant: an attack on nuclear infrastructure is extraordinarily escalatory.

If India’s new missile were used against Pakistani nuclear weapon storage sites or command-and-control bunkers, it would shatter the already fragile trust and violate the understanding that those strategic assets are off-limits unless all-out war has begun.

India’s NFU policy would offer no shield against escalation if a conventional counterforce strike were launched. Islamabad would likely interpret such an act as India effectively initiating nuclear hostilities under a different guise. The notion that using a conventional warhead keeps a first strike below the nuclear threshold is dangerously naive. To Pakistan, the threshold would already be crossed. This situation would create intense pressure on Pakistan’s leadership to respond in kind or even pre-empt, lest their deterrent be wiped out.

COUNTERFORCE TARGETING AND THE RISK OF NUCLEAR ESCALATION

Pursuing counterforce capabilities, the ability to destroy the enemy’s nuclear weapons and delivery systems, has long been recognised as destabilising. The reason is simple: it invites a hair-trigger, ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ mentality. If Pakistan believes India can snatch away its nuclear sword in a sudden strike, Pakistan’s incentive to use that sword early, before it is lost, increases dramatically.

Scholars at the American think tank Atlantic Council have warned that “inadvertent escalation may occur when conventional attacks put the adversary’s nuclear force at risk… Fearing the destruction or incapacitation of its nuclear deterrent, the target state might face a ‘use it or lose it’ dilemma.” In other words, once Pakistan perceives that India is going after its nuclear arsenal, even with conventional weapons, Pakistani leaders could feel compelled to unleash nuclear weapons rather than risk having them destroyed on the ground. The mere fear of a disarming strike can trigger escalation.

It is important to note that this ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ dilemma is not just theoretical. During the Cold War, both the United States and Soviet Union (USSR) realised that, if either side ever gained a realistic hope of wiping out the other’s nukes in a first strike, the endangered side might choose to fire its missiles on warning of attack. This was one factor that kept both superpowers cautious and led to arms control agreements — no one wanted to live in a perpetual hair-trigger scenario.

Today, analysts observe similar dangers in new technologies: advanced non-nuclear weapons and missile defences can blur the line and make nuclear arsenals feel vulnerable. This kind of nuclear-conventional entanglement “increases the risk that nuclear weapons could be used as a result of miscalculation, misperception, or an accident.” A conventional missile attack on nuclear forces is exactly the sort of entangled scenario where miscalculation could be catastrophic.

In South Asia, crisis stability is already fragile. Pakistan, with a smaller and more geographically constrained arsenal than India, has not adopted a ‘No First Use’ policy. Instead, its nuclear posture leaves the option of first use open, conditionally tied to scenarios involving existential threats, including an overwhelming conventional attack by India. Under its doctrine of “full-spectrum deterrence”, Pakistan reserves the right to employ nuclear weapons if the survival of the state is at stake, or if its key military assets are imperilled beyond recovery.

One can imagine, then, how Pakistan would view Indian ballistic missiles streaking toward its nuclear sites: as the onset of an existential threat. Even if those missiles carried conventional explosives, the effect might be to trigger Pakistan’s own nuclear release, for instance, firing tactical nukes at Indian forces or strategic nukes at Indian cities, under the logic of ‘better now than never.’

Such a response would of course be suicidal for both countries but the perception of imminent disarmament can override rational restraint. Any country whose nuclear forces are under attack might decide that a limited nuclear strike is its ‘least bad option’ before losing everything. When decision-makers are staring at the abyss of defeat, they may grab even terrible options.

Another escalatory risk is misinterpretation. If India launched an Agni-V with a conventional warhead, Pakistani early-warning systems would simply detect a missile launch and incoming trajectory. There would be no clarity on the warhead type. Rational military doctrine dictates, assuming the worst, that any incoming long-range missile is nuclear. Pakistan’s leaders would not have the luxury of trusting India’s intentions or waiting to see a mushroom cloud. This uncertainty could precipitate a launch-on-warning posture, or at least nervous readiness to retaliate instantly upon any indication of a nuclear detonation.

We must acknowledge this problem that firing a conventionally armed Agni in a conflict could be construed as a nuclear first strike and provoke a response in kind. During a crisis, neither side will have perfect information. A false alarm or a misunderstood signal could send things spiralling. The use of conventional counterforce weapons sharply lowers the firebreak between conventional and nuclear war. It compresses decision times and creates immense pressure on the targeted state to respond with its most powerful weapons before they are neutralised.

From India’s perspective, some hawks argue that Pakistan lacks robust real-time missile launch detection and does not practise launch-on-warning, implying India could execute a decapitating strike swiftly. They suggest Pakistan might be blindsided and unable to retaliate in time. This confidence, however, is a double-edged sword: if Pakistani leaders recognise India believes they can be caught off-guard, Pakistan will be all the more likely to adopt hair-trigger measures to avoid being a sitting duck. Such crisis instability means that a conventional strike, or even the fear of one, could rapidly trigger nuclear use by either side, with neither truly wanting it but each fearing to wait.

Finally, even if India’s leadership believed a counterforce strike could cripple Pakistan’s arsenal without immediate retaliation, they would have to be absolutely certain of getting all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Anything less than total disarmament would invite a nuclear counter-strike by whichever weapons survived. Analysts have cast doubt on India’s ability to achieve a 100 percent knockout of Pakistan’s nukes, given Pakistan’s growing number of mobile launchers, decoy sites, and secret storage facilities. If India launched a strike but failed to neutralise all of Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities, it would turn what might have remained a probable conflict into an inescapable one, making Pakistan’s retaliatory response not just likely, but virtually assured.

In other words, a botched counterforce attempt, even with conventional weapons, could result in the very nightmare India hoped to avoid: nuclear devastation of its cities. This reality places a question mark over the strategic logic of India’s new bunker buster. Is it a silver bullet that neutralises Pakistan’s deterrent, or a spark that ignites a nuclear conflagration? The escalation risks far outweigh any reassurance that the warhead is non-nuclear.

LESSONS FROM THE US AND CHINA: ENSURING DETERRENCE, AVOIDING PERIL

History offers sobering lessons on the dangers of entangling conventional and nuclear strategies, as well as some guidance on how to mitigate these risks. The Cold War superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, initially engaged in a counterforce competition that, at times, raised the spectre of disarming first strikes. Over time, however, both sides learned that true security came from a robust second-strike capability, not from a risky bid to strike first.

By the 1970s, the US and the Soviet Union embraced the doctrine of ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD), underpinned by each having invulnerable nuclear forces like submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which could survive any attack and retaliate. They even signed arms control treaties (SALT, START) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, to cap offensive arsenals and limit defences, essentially accepting mutual vulnerability.

This was not out of kindness, but cold logic: if neither side could realistically escape retaliation, neither had an incentive to start a nuclear war. South Asia’s situation is different in scale but the core principle still applies. The more secure and hidden Pakistan’s nuclear forces are, the less temptation India might have to contemplate a first strike, and vice versa.

Another lesson comes from how the US and China are handling the entanglement challenge today. China has watched US advancements in conventional precision strikes, missile defence and surveillance with concern, fearing that, in a conflict, the United States might try to neutralise China’s smaller nuclear deterrent. In response, Beijing has undertaken a significant nuclear modernisation, focused on increasing the survivability and credibility of its arsenal.

China is moving from a minimal deterrent posture to a more robust one: expanding its warhead stockpile, deploying more mobile solid-fuelled missiles, building a submarine-based nuclear force, and hardening its command-and-control networks. The goal is clear: deny any adversary the hope of a disarming strike.

At the same time, China officially still adheres to a ‘No First Use’ policy and emphasises nuclear weapons as political deterrents rather than war-fighting tools. This is coupled with increasing vigilance: reports indicate China may be keeping a portion of its forces on a launch-on-warning alert status, or at least moving in that direction, as its early-warning capabilities improve.

In internal debates, Chinese strategists have even discussed whether extreme circumstances, such as conventional attacks on China’s nuclear facilities or other strategic targets, might warrant reconsidering NFU. The takeaway for Pakistan is twofold: make your deterrent robustly survivable, and signal clearly the consequences of its attempted destruction. China’s build-up shows a determination to discourage an enemy from even thinking a first strike could work.

For Pakistan, ensuring a credible second-strike capability is paramount. In fact, Pakistan has already invested in several survivability measures over the years. It has constructed hardened, deeply-buried storage and launch facilities for its nuclear weapons, intending to ride out an enemy attack and retaliate. It has developed road-mobile missiles that can be dispersed to secret locations so they cannot all be targeted at once.

Pakistan is also pursuing a sea-based leg of its deterrent: the Babur-3 nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile, while limited in range, is a step toward having nukes deployable from submarines, which would greatly enhance survivability. Air defences around strategic sites have been improved, and extensive concealment and deception practices are in place. All these steps echo the practices of larger nuclear powers: diversify and harden your forces so no opponent can wipe them out in one blow.

Nevertheless, Pakistan faces an acute challenge with India’s emerging counterforce capabilities. Unlike the US or China, Pakistan’s strategic depth and resources are limited, so it must be clever and resolute in response. Here are some specific recommendations drawn from global experience that Pakistan could consider:

• Strengthen Early-Warning and Command Systems: Acquiring or developing better early-warning technology, satellite infrared sensors and long-range radar can provide crucial minutes of notice if India launches missiles. Even a short warning can allow nuclear forces to disperse or prepare for retaliatory fire. The US and Russia maintain extensive early-warning networks as a backbone of stable deterrence. Pakistan might seek technical assistance from allies, perhaps China, which is itself improving early warning, to plug this gap, a necessity especially post the May 2025 crisis.

Reliable communication lines and redundant command-and-control are also essential, so that Pakistan’s leadership can make clear-headed decisions under attack and avoid decapitation. This includes having mobile command centres or pre-delegated launch authority in a crisis, so that one strike cannot paralyse retaliation. Such measures, while risky in their own way, ensure India cannot count on knocking out Pakistan’s ability to respond.

• Clearly Articulate Red Lines: While ambiguity can sometimes aid deterrence, in this case Pakistan may benefit from explicitly warning that any strike on its strategic nuclear assets will trigger a nuclear response. Ambiguity about conventional versus nuclear could invite Indian miscalculation. A public or private declaratory stance, that an attack on nuclear forces or command centres will be treated as initiation of nuclear war, could reinforce deterrence by leaving no doubt in Indian minds.

Essentially, Pakistan would be conveying: If you target our nukes, even if the attack were with conventional warheads, we will assume a nuclear war has started and respond accordingly. This is a harsh posture, but it may be the only way to deter a would-be counterforce strike. Of course, such a stance must be coupled with continued commitment to never use nuclear weapons first in less extreme scenarios, to retain international support and moral high ground. It is a delicate balance of messaging.

• Avoid a Costly Arms Race, But Innovate Asymmetrically: Pakistan cannot economically match India warhead-for-warhead, nor does it have the desire to build equivalent eight-tonne conventional missiles. The aim should be to invalidate India’s counterforce gambit, not to mirror it. This means focusing on dispersion, decoys and penetration aids. For every new Indian sensor or warhead, Pakistan can respond with measures to complicate targeting: more fake silos, dummy launch units, electronic jamming of guidance systems, etc.

In the nuclear realm, developments such as the MIRV [Multiple Independently targetable Re-entry Vehicle] technology on missiles, which Pakistan has tested on the Ababeel missile, can ensure that, even if one incoming interceptor tries to hit a missile, the missile can release multiple warheads or decoys to overwhelm defences. Mobility, frequently moving warheads and launchers among various underground facilities, raises the uncertainty for Indian planners.

• Pursue Risk-Reduction Dialogue (Even Unilaterally): Pakistan can take a cue from Cold War crisis management and seek communication channels to defuse accidental escalations. The US and the USSR established hotlines and regular communication to avoid misunderstandings that could lead to nuclear war. India and Pakistan do have some communication links eg hotlines between DGMOs [Director Generals Military Operations], but these could be expanded to specifically handle nuclear-risk incidents. Pakistan could propose mutual measures such as advance notification of cruise missile launches (ballistic is already in place via an existing agreement) and an extension of the 1988 non-attack pact to possibly cover not just declared nuclear facilities but also a tacit understanding against counterforce strikes.

Even if India is not immediately receptive, simply raising these ideas internationally can put political pressure on New Delhi and signal that Pakistan is behaving as a responsible nuclear power, seeking stability. In the near term, raising awareness of the escalation risks stemming from entanglement is critical. If both governments and their publics better understand that certain actions could be a point of no return, they may be more cautious in a crisis.

India’s reported development of a conventional mega-missile to target nuclear assets is a classic case of the counterforce temptation that has lured many nuclear powers, but it carries enormous dangers. Pakistan must not panic, but it must prepare. The preparation lies in making any Indian strike, nuclear or conventional, futile and prohibitively risky. By bolstering the survivability of its deterrent, as the US, Russia and China have done in their own ways, and clearly conveying the dire consequences of crossing the nuclear Rubicon, Pakistan can maintain deterrence and avoid being coerced.

Ultimately, the lesson from other nuclear rivalries is that stability comes from restraint and communication as much as from weaponry. Both India and Pakistan would do well to remember that slowing down the nuclear arms competition is in their mutual interest.

Otherwise, they risk replaying the worst chapters of the Cold War on the Subcontinent, with even less margin for error. For Pakistan, staying vigilant, resilient and diplomatically proactive is the best way to counter India’s new bunker-buster gambit, and ensure that conventional provocations do not mushroom into nuclear cataclysm.

The writer is the Dean Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Lahore, Pakistan, and is a Visiting Scholar at the Harvard Kennedy School. She can be reached at rabia.akhtar@csspr.uol.edu.pk.
X: @Rabs_AA

Published in Dawn, EOS, July 20th, 2025