Politics of hate
THE Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) that stood the test of time for 65 years is under severe strain.
Many things have changed since it was assiduously crafted with the help of the World Bank in 1960.
While the treaty provides a dispute-resolution mechanism that has been used in the past to address complaints, this time the issue has taken a sordid turn. At the heart of the matter are two things most responsible for the current impasse — i) demographic changes that are outstripping supply with shrinking resources and rising demand, ii) the emergence of politics of hate and division fuelling religious nationalism to fan public sentiment.
The post-Cold War attempt to create a rules-based international order is under assault from a rising wave of populist demagoguery. The inciting rhetoric takes different shapes and forms, but the message of punitive action remains the same.
Now it is the heft of nations that determines acceptance or rejection of its unilateral actions by the global community. The arbitrary suspension of the IWT is part of this wider malaise. Nations are now looking increasingly inward, taking a more distributive approach to negotiations and using muscular diplomacy to assert their agenda.
The IWT has a past history of invoking the dispute-resolution clause.
The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn.
In 2007, the dispute resolution process over India’s design of the Baglihar hydroelectric plant on the Chenab was addressed by a neutral expert to determine the freeboard of India’s proposed dam.
In 2013, the Court of Arbitration rendered a decision on India’s diversion of a tributary of the Jhelum for the Kishenganga hydroelectric project. India was allowed to divert water for the Kishenganga project while maintaining a minimum specified storage in the reservoir and minimum release of nine cubic metres of water per second down river into the Jhelum tributary.
However, trouble started brewing in 2016 following the unresolved technical differences with regard to the Kishenganga hydroelectric project and India’s announcement of starting the Ratle hydroelectric project on the Chenab.
The strident tone adopted by India after the 2014 elections has continued to grow and alter political thinking with a palpable shift in its relationship dynamics with Pakistan. The already tense bilateral relations came under acute strain after the Pulwama terror attack in India for which it blamed Pakistan (without proof). This also marked the beginning of public statements from India threatening to use water as a weapon to punish Pakistan for its alleged role in sponsoring terrorism.
The revocation of Article 370 in 2019 stripping Indian-occupied Kashmir of its special status and its sharp rejection by Pakistan further poisoned the chalice.
In 2016 when Pakistan invoked the arbitral process via a Request For Arbitration, the water was already turning from muddy to murky. The RFA outlined seven disputes related to the disputed projects related to design and permissibility of pondage levels, submerged power intakes, low-level sediment outlets, spillway designs, and permissible freeboard intakes. India’s refusal to participate in the arbitral process led to a default appointment procedure for a five-year pause (2016-22) imposed by the World Bank. With heightened levels of animosity and a volley of threats hurled at Pakistan, India decried the ‘illegitimacy’ of the Court of Arbitration via a letter to the World Bank (Dec 21, 2022).
Parallel to this, India requested the appointment of a neutral expert under the Indus treaty. Pakistan’s refusal to participate resulted in the default appointment procedure for the appointment of a neutral expert after a five-year pause. In 2023, the Court of Arbitration issued an award upholding its competence for addressing the matter. In 2025, the neutral expert also issued an award upholding its competence to address the seven points of conflict.
The main problem is not overlapping jurisdictional competencies and their inconsistent outcomes. The real issue is the deepening divide between India and Pakistan. The issues between the two countries are no longer merely about territorial disputes but have taken a more insidious turn. The last 15 years have seen a sharp increase in animosity bordering on intense hatred. This trend has to be curbed.
The tragic and condemnable Pahalgam incident has, once again, ignited passions blinding reason and bringing the two countries to the brink of war. The unilateral suspension of the IWT by India is a sign of a new trend that blurs the line between separate incidents and uses a no-holds-barred approach to retaliation. The two countries have a history of bad blood laden with accusations of interference with the intent of fomenting disaffection and destabilsation. Such passionate feelings based on the politics of identity are a dangerous portent for the two nuclear-armed neighbours.
The multilayered dispute resolution mechanism of the fraying IWT must be seen in the context of the fractious geopolitical history of the region marked by its hydrological topography.
The IWT can no longer only be seen through the technical lens of neutral experts. Given the relationship dynamics the intent and ability to do harm needs to be examined by a Court of Arbitration. Judicial interpretation has the provision for taking a broader view while neutral experts are limited by their narrow mandate. Both countries can do more with less water if hate and hostility are not part of the equation.
When the dust has settled, both countries need to embark on a sincere journey of truth and reconciliation. The need for working together has never been greater than it is today.
The writer is head of the Civil Society Coalition for Climate Change.
Published in Dawn, May 19th, 2025