Online foot soldiers
AMIDST worsening ties between India and Pakistan, a noticeable feature was the differences in how citizens of both countries responded to the threat and fallout of violence. Pakistanis mostly, though not exclusively, turned to humour and nihilism around the possibility of Indian incursions. Indian social media, on the other hand, was dominated by jingoistic calls for escalating violence and revenge.
Events of the past week confirmed what many have observed for at least the past two decades: on national security issues, mainstream Indian political parties, news media, the cultural sphere, and internet using citizens tend to follow the state’s line tout court. The outcome of this homogeneity is an information ecosystem with little scepticism, no reluctance towards the idea of violence, and a deluge of misinformation. At the time of writing — before the ceasefire was announced — Indian news and social media accounts had proudly declared the destruction of Karachi, Lahore, and Islamabad, a fact that apparently eluded the residents of these cities.
None of this stands to absolve Pakistani news actors and social media users. There is a long history of anti-India jingoism on this side as well. In the current stand-off, celebrities who posted conciliatory messages after the first wave of cross-border attacks were heavily criticised and labelled as sell-outs by social media users.
But, before Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes against India, the overall atmosphere remained tinged with a degree of scepticism towards kinetic action and mainstream news reporting. This reluctance was not the outcome of some progressive, pacifist turn among Pakistani urbanites, but instead, the result of the last three years of domestic politics.
The fallout between the PTI and the state has led the latter’s favourability to drop among large segments of the population most likely to voice their views on the internet. The urban middle classes (among other groups), from KP through Punjab to Karachi, have parked their loyalties with Imran Khan, and in opposition to his incarceration.
Political legitimacy in India is generated not through tangible material gain but through right-wing communalism, nationalism, and the selling of — unattainable — dreams.
But there is another factor at play here as well. The economic crisis of the last few years has exacted a heavy toll on Pakistanis as a whole. There is a sense of disillusionment and exhaustion with the status quo, and with a government that has failed to keep up even the bare minimum of its end of the bargain. With struggles for both political rights and basic economic survival taking centre stage, generating support for the kinetic actions of a government lacking popular legitimacy would have appeared difficult.
The Indian state does not face such a crisis of legitimacy, at least in its heartlands. But the way this legitimacy is created and sustained deserves further scrutiny. Some suggest that the Indian state under Modi delivers on economic growth, basic security, and a rise in the standard of living, which explains the full-throttled support that it gets online.
But the reality is far more complex. It is well documented now that the gains of rapid economic growth in India have increasingly accrued to the top. Since liberalisation began in earnest, wealth differentials have ballooned considerably. As per the World Inequality Database, the top one per cent now holds about 33pc of national wealth while the bottom half of the population holds about 6pc; in 1991, these shares were 16pc and 9pc, respectively.
Among firms, there is a growing tendency towards monopolisation, aided by the state, that cuts across different sectors. As detailed in a paper by Pranab Bardhan, the 20 most profitable firms generated 14pc of total corporate profits in 1990, 30pc in 2010 and 70pc in 2019. These monopoly capitalists with close ties to the state now have a large footprint in Indian news media as well, which partly explains the lopsided nature of national security reporting in the country.
Mounting income and wealth inequality, and the creation of an enclave economy (which mostly caters to the needs of the well-off), are undisputed facts. India’s structural transformation is a strange one in so far that agriculture contributes a small share (15pc) to total output, yet employs nearly 45pc of the labour force. The vast majority of Indian workers, especially in the populous northern and central states, find themselves in low-skilled informal work that operates barely above basic subsistence levels.
In this context, political legitimacy is generated not through tangible material gain but through right-wing communalism, nationalism, and the selling of (unattainable) dreams. To the vast swathes of young men, the shiny enclaves of tier-1 cities like Mumbai and Bangalore are shown as a possible future, as long as they oppose the enemy (domestic minorities and their allies beyond borders), and fall in line behind the ruling party in its civilisational mission of Hindutva dominance.
The outcome of this strategy is what we see on the internet today. Organised troll and disinfo armies intervene not just in South Asian matters, but in right-wing discourse around the world. And they are ably supported by plenty of regular citizens chomping at the bit for war, laying out violent fantasies of conquest, and dreaming of restoring masculine honour.
This formula is proving to be remarkably successful for Modi and the broader right-wing Indian ecosystem. They can continue to deliver economic growth to their ultra-rich benefactors, and allow for just enough to trickle down to sustain a conservative middle class. For everyone else, especially those subsisting on the margins, temple politics, the tadka of Hindua cultural dominance, and dreams of ‘Akhand Bharat’ will remain sufficient. All the while drowning out and bullying dissident and progressive voices, and making the possibility of peaceful coexistence in the region ever more remote.
The writer teaches sociology at Lums.
X: @umairjav
Published in Dawn, May 12th, 2025