The micro and macro adjustments that led to the Warriors’ 2-1 series lead over the Rockets

Dubs gain control of the driver’s seat despite Jimmy Butler’s absence.

With the rather unfortunate news of Jimmy Butler’s absence in Game 3 — forcing Steve Kerr to rethink his starting lineup and rotations — the Golden State Warriors were, on paper, faced with an enormous mountain to climb, with Steph Curry being their only consistent shot creator, advantage generator, and point producer left on the team, in a 6’2” package that recently just saw its 37th year of existence.

To put it simply, Curry is considered old in professional basketball circles. But old age hasn’t stopped him from continuing his elite ways. Despite that truth, the burden he was suddenly inundated with doesn’t help him get any younger — nor does it make the Houston Rockets’ job trying to contain him any harder, at least on paper. It was easy as putting two to the ball with Curry handling the rock, or continuing their physical ways off the ball through a variety of ways that tread the thin line between acceptable physicality and mauling.

But after the Warriors’ 104-93 win over the Rockets to take a 2-1 series lead — without Butler’s services, to boot — a retrospective lens on what brought about the win shines a light on Curry’s brilliance, the much-needed support he was able to receive, and Kerr pushing the right buttons to make sure Curry and company thrived. The first decision Kerr made was perhaps the one that flew under the radar — but arguably was just as impactful and contributory to their win.

Starting Quinten Post

With Butler sidelined, Kerr made the decision to start Jonathan Kuminga in his place — a decision made to remedy the lack of a secondary scoring option behind Curry. The controversial Kuminga has had his share of ups and downs, but never has the latter been more pronounced than it has been after Butler’s acquisition. Kuminga’s inability to coexist in an efficient manner with Butler has forced Kerr to make the decision of benching Kuminga on a permanent basis.

However, Kerr decided to dust Kuminga off after Butler went down, which created a ripple effect across the rest of the starting lineup. Kerr felt the need to expand Kuminga’s room to operate, and therefore started Quinten Post at the five to create room, at the expense of Moses Moody. That decision to start Post in favor of offense came with risks on the other end — namely, Post potentially being targeted by Jalen Green in pick-and-roll action, a talking point from the Rockets’ Game 2 victory.

In order to minimize Post from having to defend against Jalen in pick-and-roll situations, Kerr shuffled Post away from defending Alperen Şengün toward “guarding” Amen Thompson. Post was comfortable with sagging off of Thompson — a non-threat from the perimeter and otherwise limited in his ability to self-create and make passing reads — in order to stay close to the rim and be in a position to contest drives and, more importantly, grab defensive boards.

In the event that the Rockets decided to bring Thompson up to screen for Jalen, the Warriors were content with having Post defend, with the knowledge that Thompson is a far inferior screener than Şengün, which allowed Jalen’s defender to navigate screens and allow Post to stay in contain mode comfortably:

In the possession above, having Thompson set the screen makes Jalen-centered ball-screen actions less effective than if Şengün was the one setting the screen. When the Rockets do eventually default to Şengün as the screener, it isn’t Post being involved in the action — rather, it’s the more capable Draymond Green:

But the Warriors also tried to uninvolve Post as much as possible, even if he was guarding Thompson. When Fred VanVleet motions for Thompson to come up and screen for Jalen, watch how the Warriors take that option away:

Post and Brandin Podziemski exchange assignments — Post taking VanVleet and Podziemski taking Thompson — in a maneuver called “pre-switching,” resulting Podziemski switching onto Green. Thus, Post is far removed from the action:

While Post wasn’t impactful with his scoring, he was able to slot into an archetype more befitting of his 7-foot frame. He protected the rim, discouraged shots, dared Thompson to put the ball down and create, and did manage to grab 12 rebounds — all of which translated to the Warriors winning Post’s minutes by a seven-point margin.

Curry’s impact, troubleshooting, and pairing with Gary Payton II

In a vacuum, Curry’s brilliance is undeniable, with its impressive nature matched only by how impressively dependent the Warriors’ offense is and always has been on Curry’s ability to warp defenses to an unprecedented degree. Kerr made the decision to stretch Curry’s minutes to 41 — a decision made easier by Kerr’s cumulative decisions over the course of the regular season that resulted in Curry averaging 32.2 minutes in the regular season, which kept Curry as ready and fresh as possible for high-stakes playoff minutes.

Curry dropped 36 points on 67.9% True Shooting, to go along with 7 rebounds and 9 assists. Before Curry’s stretch of successful offense (in a game that needed every bit of it, considering how the Warriors were limited to just 64.4 points scored per 100 possessions in the half court at halftime), the Rockets were having success containing Curry-centered actions both on and off the ball.

An example of the latter: the Rockets switching a baseline out-of-bounds set that had Curry set a screen for the inbounder, in which Curry’s defender and the inbounder’s defender simply switched.

In its most ideal form, the set aims to weaponize Curry as a screener in order to take advantage of one fundamental tenet: most defenders do not want to detach off of Curry.

Fast forward to much later in the game, where the Warriors run the same exact BLOB (called “Rub”). Curry’s defender and the inbounder’s defender once again prepare to switch, but instead of following through on his screen, Curry quickly comes off of Kevon Looney’s exit screen — catching Curry’s man off guard and unable to navigate over the screen on time:

Such micro-adjustments were lost in the shuffle of the overall picture, one that mostly consisted of Curry’s self-creation exploits and his playmaking for his teammates, most of which came through his ability to draw two to the ball. Gary Payton II was the notable beneficiary of such situations — although, to start, it wasn’t as seamless as it was expected to be.

Curry and Payton were initially out of sync with their timing in ball-screen actions. Curry’s pass to Payton below was not ideal, with Payton holding the screen perhaps a beat too long:

A problem with which the remedy was simple: Payton opting not to set the screen and instead slipping the screen in order to take full advantage of a lane opened by two defenders jumping out toward Curry:

To go along with the bigger-picture decisions made — one of which was Kerr opting to close the game with Curry, Podziemski, Buddy Hield (17 points on 65.4% TS), Payton, and Draymond, a lineup that outscored the Rockets by seven points in just under four minutes of game time — these micro-adjustments in terms of tactics, lineup decisions, and matchups collectively made up what was a scintillating Game 3 victory. More importantly, it was one that put the Warriors in the driver’s seat without the need for their second-best driver.