Undoing deterrence, and marching TOWARD Armageddon
The disarmament community in their pursuit of global zero makes a number of faulty assumptions. For example, they assume all retaliatory uses of nuclear weapons will quickly lead to the massive exchange of nuclear weapons and trigger a civilization ending nuclear winter. They assume even the use of a single nuclear weapon could devastate a large area from EMP damage and cause widespread panic and mass migration and would escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange as well. In short, no nuclear use, however limited, can be managed or controlled.
Thus, even the current U.S. deterrence strategy of nuclear retaliation, often referenced as a secure, second-strike capability, is dismissed as unworkable.” Consequently, we are told the U.S. can no longer rely upon such a deterrent strategy, as it is dangerous, immoral and a highly unreliable “war fighting” strategy that will not keep nuclear weapons from being used.
The only alternative? Ban all nuclear weapons, as called for by the United Nations treaty outlawing nuclear weapons as agreed to by the UN General Assembly.
In short what the disarmament community has concluded is that nuclear deterrence as now practiced is really a bluff. No rational (“sane”?) American President would order any nuclear retaliatory strike. Since any retaliatory use of nuclear weapons would trigger wholesale nuclear war, such a response has to be discarded. This means that a nuclear armed adversary of the United States could first use nuclear weapons against the United States without fear of a proportionate United States military response. And for all intents and purposes this would leave the enemy’s nuclear forces in a sanctuary free from American retaliatory nuclear strikes.
Absent the current deterrent strategy, what then should the United States do in the face of China and Russia adopting a strategy of escalation to win, or using limited numbers of nuclear weapons to either forestall conventional defeat or secure conventional victory? [Let alone the threat of a massive, pe-emptive strike that worried the United States through much of the Cold War.] As many U.S. military officers have explained, this is serious business, as once nuclear weapons are introduced into a conventional conflict, all the United States assumptions about prevailing in a conventional conflict “don’t hold” or go out the window.
Now both Russia and China have often claimed to have a minimal deterrent strategy, and assert they would not use nuclear weapons first, and threaten only a massive retaliatory strike if hit with nuclear weapons. But then how to explain the decree issued by President Yeltsin in April 1999 declaring for Russia to build highly accurate low yield small battlefield nuclear weapons, plans which the current President (Mr. Putin) has implemented over the past 25 years? Or China’s threat to Japan to repeat the World War II atomic strikes should Japan come to the defense of Taiwan?
Similarly, the disarmament community has ignored the very large current Chinese buildup of nuclear weapons, even claiming hundreds of newly discovered silos were nothing more than prospective energy producing windmills. When subsequently American high ranking military officials confirmed the very real “breathtaking” Chinese build in Congressional testimony, the military brass were falsely accused of warmongering.
What is most dangerous is that advocates of zero nuclear weapons don’t tell us what is to replace current deterrent policy while nations figure out how to get to zero—even though that goal has not been formally adopted by any power possessing nuclear weapons. Without deterrence of any kind, the likelihood of nuclear weapons use will actually increase as the current deterrent strategy would be revealed as just bluff. Especially at a time when America’s enemies are markedly building up their nuclear forces and increasing the salience of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.
Worse however is the juvenile idea that diplomacy can substitute for current deterrent strategy. But diplomacy leading to what? If China and Russia threaten to use limited nuclear strikes for coercive purposes, what “diplomacy” changes that? As Dr. Kissinger once explained, “A free standing diplomacy is an ancient American illusion. History offers few examples of it. The attempt to separate diplomacy and power results in power lacking direction and diplomacy being deprived of incentives.” Or in a pithier manner, as Senator Malcolm Wallop put it, “Diplomacy without the threat of force is but prayer.” If the United States takes its nuclear forces off the deterrent table, whatever diplomacy we might exercise is going to ring hollow.
Advocates of better diplomacy argue that diplomacy is meant to help us discover the “underlying causes” of why nations have nuclear weapons. It is assumed the U.S. can root out the reason China and Russia are building larger nuclear arsenals just by talking to them.
Well, the United States would first have to figure out the origins of the CCP’s hegemonic ambitions. And its declaration that the moon and Mars to say nothing of Taiwan and the South China Sea, are Chinese territory! Or Russian centuries old paranoia that believes the only secure Russian borders are those that perpetually expand. Or why the end of the USSR was a great tragedy.
If one explores the disarmament literature, the most common explanation for Russia and China’s aggressive stance in world affairs is that “America made them do it” an interesting version of Ambassador Kirkpatrick’s 1984 refrain “They always blame America first.””
There are six common complaints by the global zero advocates.
First the United States started an arms race, although we simply replaced legacy nuclear forces allowed by the 2010 New Start agreement.
Second, the United States built or will build 44-66 missile defense interceptors in Alaska and California, although it is perplexing how dozens of interceptor missiles somehow threaten multiple hundreds and even thousands of enemy warheads.
Third, the U.S. was mean to North Korea, although all the U.S. did was call them out for cheating on the Agreed Framework.
Fourth, the U.S. withdrew from the INF treaty, although Russia was serially violating the treaty terms.
Fifth, the United States withdrew from the JCPOA, but that was because Iran never came clean, as required, on its nuclear military activities.
Sixth, Washington too energetically supports the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Israel, but since when was helping your democratic allies a sin.
Given this mindset, it is not a wonder that the “solutions” pushed by the disarmament community to jumpstart a movement towards global zero start with unilateral USA concessions which, just coincidentally, involve taking down USA nuclear capability whether cancelling the LRSO, the Sentinel or Minuteman III, the JSF or F-35, the SLCM-N, or the B-61 warhead. And not proceeding with any missile defense, dropping our hostile policy toward Iran and North Korea, and restore the INF and the JCPOA.
In short diminishing USA nuclear capability just as China and Russia are markedly expanding their nuclear capability is somehow going to turn out as a successful strategy that reduces strategic instability and magically restores deterrence. Although such unilateral restraint has never previously worked. And weakness is provocative and can lead to war. And a United States shed of a deterrent strategy will indeed be perceived as weak.
Peter R. Huessy is President of Geo-Strategic Analysis and Senior Fellow, National Institute for Deterrent Studies.