Economic miracles
“EARLIER it was CPEC — a game changer!
“Then, SIFC — agriculture export boom!
“Now minerals!
“All claimed to rain foreign investment $s!… final solution to foreign debt crisis!
“Results zilch!
“How long will we continue to be subjected to such gimmickry?”
With their legitimacy crisis, the rulers are scrambling to ‘fix’ the economy rather than reforming it.
This was a recent tweet by Kaiser Bengali, an economist who has also served in government more than once, and it came shortly after the most successful mineral conference in Islamabad.
But as someone who follows the claims and promises of those in charge, he is right in that governments in Pakistan have always promised an overnight miracle rather than explained the need for it, and then led the people down a long and slow path to success and fortune. We are always just one twist away from the proverbial happy ending, and this seems to have been the case since I opened my eyes in journalism, as the saying goes.
Other than CPEC, there was also a mine in Chiniot during the earlier PML-N government, which was to bring fortune and happiness. In a similar vein, the PTI held its breath as some offshore drilling took place, while Faisal Vawda promised jobs, employment and migration to Pakistan.
After that, there was the possibility of an exports bonanza — once the rupee had been devalued — and when all else failed, there were the overseas Pakistanis, who were to invest in Pakistan (this is mentioned even now). The PDM since then has promised foreign investment in various shapes and sizes.
There is an entire story to this obsession with manna from overseas — mostly the West and now China — but that too is neither new nor recent. But the need for a quick fix or a ‘Hail Mary’ is rooted in far more than our ability to flourish only when foreign aid has reached Pakistani shores and crash once the moolah dries up.
Is it essentially due to the weak position of those who come to power, be it through elections or brute force or power? In either case, the absence of legitimacy or weakness because of the civil-military imbalance forces those in power to look for quick fixes, in the hope of shoring themselves up rather than focusing on long-term planning.
Most civilian (and elected) officials are so besieged, thanks to their own weak positions, strong oppositions and the machinations of the establishment, that they spend their time firefighting and looking to the fabled second term when the ‘real work’ will be carried out — even if they have it all figured out. And this second term, it is assumed, requires ‘growth’ at whatever cost necessary.
The net result is a balance-of-payments crisis and the election victory is never had. Then the cycle begins again.
A similar dance for survival also confronts our dictators. They face fewer machinations but there is opposition in the shape of politicians, who can win elections, and a lack of legitimacy which bothers them greatly. For it is not without reason that they need to hold referendums or local government elections or general elections. Indeed, one can say ‘humain to dictators bhi achay nahee milay’ (we didn’t even get good dictators) for they immediately want to be liked and loved — even if in background conversations, people are told that elections are for the politicos.
As a result, these exercises (however managed), instead of shoring up their position, leave dictators in vulnerable positions, where they too are aiming for ‘growth’, miraculous recoveries and an election victory. As someone once pointed out, Gen Musharraf’s problem was that he wanted to win popularity like a politician. And so he left us with an overvalued rupee, utility prices that needed revision and a tough IMF prescription.
But the problem is to assume this is the personal choice of individual dictators rather than a compulsion; once in place they have little choice but to compete with the politicians.
In the previous two election cycles with their orchestrated results (to varying degrees), both Imran Khan and Shehbaz Sharif were left struggling with a legitimacy crisis as well as an opposition that seemed to be more popular than the government. As a result, their choices, like Musharraf’s, were aimed at winning over the people rather than readying and then guiding them through the pain of reform.
That is why the current government would also clutch at investment from the Gulf states or a mineral miracle; with a legitimacy crisis greater than the one that Musharraf faced, it is scrambling to ‘fix’ the economy rather than working on reforming it.
Indeed, these are far-from-ideal circumstances for any long- or medium-term planning — with an opposition leader sitting in jail, who is now more popular than the entire government put together, who is going to tell the people to prepare for hardship or take on special interests? No wonder then that there are whispers about how Imran Khan’s release or the next election is dependent on the economy.
This is the reason why economic illiterates such as myself are so sceptical of the government’s claims of success. And so are those who insist the problems in the economy will not be resolved till the political issues are. The latter do not just require a fair election but also a resolution of the civil-military imbalance — political governments looking over their shoulder for the latest ‘cunning plan’ of the establishment can and will do no better.
In the meantime, those in power, or rather anyone in power, will be fixated on pulling the rabbit out of the hat. And now that foreign investment from the Gulf hasn’t materialised, minerals are the next great hope. What will follow once this too proves to be a mirage is anyone’s guess. But I am quite sure, fixing the economy will not be a possible solution.
The writer is a journalist.
Published in Dawn, April 15th, 2025