Salafi Muslims are going into politics instead of trying to change the world through religious education or jihadi violence
Pseudonyms are used in this article to protect the anonymity of the research participants.
I met Sheikh Ahmed at a small mosque in central Morocco in October 2016. He told me: “We used to believe that Islam forbids all modern politics. We believed that politics was a western practice that divides Muslims and distracts them from worship.”
Ahmed is a proponent of Salafism, a form of Islamic “fundamentalism” and one of the most influential religious movements of the past 40 years. He continued: “But from 2011, we began to understand that Islam in fact requires us to enter politics.”
Salafi attacks perpetrated by al-Qaida and the so-called Islamic State (IS) have led to enormous interest in Islamic fundamentalism among western analysts, policymakers and journalists. This commentary has tended to understand Salafism to be a broadly static global ideology, inherently opposed to modern politics and largely detached from what is happening in the neighbourhoods in which its followers live and worship.
During eight years of in-depth research on Salafi groups in north Africa, I found something significant. In response to the “Arab Uprising” protests that shook north Africa and the wider Arab world between 2010 and 2012, many north African Salafis – including Ahmed – began to rethink their ideological convictions. Many decided their goal of changing the world required neither “apolitical” religious education nor violence. Instead, many began to participate in parliamentary politics.
Also known as “Wahhabism”, Salafism emerged in Islamic institutions and universities in Saudi Arabia and the wider Arab Gulf by the 1960s. Despite being widely regarded as a Saudi Arabia-centred ideology, Salafism has since been adopted – and, importantly, adapted – by a large number of pious Muslims in north Africa, the wider Muslim world, and the west.
Salafis share a religious doctrine that calls on Muslims to revive an “authentic” approach to Islam centred on strict monotheism. Salafis have traditionally argued, therefore, that Muslims should reject modern politics. Instead, they must dedicate themselves to applying the beliefs and practices of the first generations of Muslims in all aspects of their lives.
Nevertheless, Salafis have long disagreed over how exactly to apply this doctrine to society and politics. Should they focus on religious education and preaching in an effort to form an “authentic” Muslim community? Or should they criticise their political rulers or revolt?
Jihadi Salafis respond to this dilemma by supporting the use of revolutionary violence. They see it as a means of fighting westernisation and unseating “un-Islamic” rulers. By contrast, mainstream “quietist” Salafis reject both politics and violence as “immoral” practices. Instead, they seek to change the world through religious preaching and by offering strict loyalty to political rulers as a matter of faith.
From the late 1970s until the late 2000s, Salafism gradually spread from the Arab Gulf into North Africa. This took place as Moroccan, Tunisian, Libyan and Egyptian students returned to their countries of origin after studying in Saudi Arabia and the broader Arab Gulf. Back home, many established quietist Salafi movements.
To different extents, North African regimes thought their “apolitical” beliefs and loyalty to governments made them useful allies. Consequently, quietist Salafis were generally allowed to expand their religious activities. By the late 1990s, they had gained significant local followings.
In tandem, North African jihadi Salafis returned from the insurgency in Afghanistan (1978-92) and also built followings in their home countries. Jihadi Salafi militants led violent attacks against both local and western targets in north Africa. Consequently, they were harshly repressed by security forces.
After the Arab Spring: choosing politics
The Salafi rejection of politics was dramatically upended by the Arab Uprising protests between late 2010 and 2012. Dictators in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt were swiftly deposed. While the Moroccan monarchy was not overthrown, to appease the demonstrators it relinquished some control over the political system and introduced limited reforms.
Determined to take advantage of these new political openings, many quietist and former jihadi Salafis across North Africa suddenly turned political. They established political parties, ran for political office, and forged new political alliances. Perhaps most spectacularly, a new Salafi party in Egypt captured a quarter of the vote in the 2011-12 parliamentary elections.
In neighbouring Libya, mounting political instability following the downfall of its former president, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011 saw quietist and former jihadi Salafis win positions within local ministries and establish informal police forces. Quietist and former jihadi Salafis in Morocco and Tunisia also joined, formed alliances with, and established political parties.
This rapid politicisation of North African Salafism challenges long-held assumptions about Islamic fundamentalism. Salafis are not inherently apolitical, and their approach to politics and violence is not set in stone by a global, Saudi Arabia-influenced religious doctrine.
Rather, they are pragmatic and flexible. The large political openings in North Africa brought about by the Arab Uprisings pushed them to rethink their core religious beliefs as they sought to expand their influence.
As such, rather than being an idiosyncratic and uniquely dogmatic movement, Salafis are much like other ideological religious movements. They are savvy political players who can adjust their strategies and “universalist” worldviews according to the current situation, wherever they live.
Dr. Guy Robert Eyre receives funding for his research on North African Salafism from the Gerda Henkel Foundation.