Donald Trump likes tariffs, but they damage the economies of everyone involved
Donald Trump is calling April 2 2025 “Liberation Day”. For the rest of the world it will just be the day when they discover the details of his latest round of tariffs.
Those tariffs have already become the stand out economic feature of Trump’s second term in the White House. And frankly, it’s been hard to keep track.
There have been tariffs imposed and then lifted, tariffs with exemptions, tariffs on metal and tariffs on wood. Now Trump has announced a 25% tariff on all imported cars to take effect on April 2, when he also plans to reveal his “reciprocal tariffs” on other trading partners.
Trump thinks the US has been “ripped off for decades by nearly every country on Earth”. He also counts “tariff” as his favourite word, and a tool which is “"very powerful, both economically and in getting everything else you want”.
Whether or not the president gets everything he wants remains to be seen. But the frequent changes in tariff policies over the past few weeks have definitely created uncertainty in trade with the US, which research shows can be harmful in itself.
And the evidence clearly shows that the reasons for the US trade deficit are more to do with domestic issues such as productivity and fiscal discipline than international trade.
So what are the possible outcomes if Trump continues to pursue this policy?
The worst case
Our analysis shows that in the worst-case scenario, non-reciprocated tariffs on Canada and Mexico could result in a significant fall in GDP for all three countries. Canada would be the worst affected (a dip of 16.5%) followed by Mexico (6.6%). GDP in the US would fall by 0.19%.
Canada is particularly dependent on selling its oil and gas – and the US is heavily reliant on its northern neighbour for its fuel supply. In 2024, total trade between the two nations reached US$762.1 billion (£589 billion).
The impact on Mexico would also be devastating. Over 40% of the country’s GDP is derived from exports – and 80% of those exports go to the US.
High tariffs and subsequent retaliations would quickly reduce the confidence of companies on both sides. Costs passed on to consumers would reduce demand and then profits, forming a vicious cycle of economic recession. Trade protectionism could then rise further, potentially even turning a recession into a depression
Middle ground
We also found that even if the economic effects of tariffs were less severe, no nation involved would manage to achieve GDP growth. And Canada and Mexico would still suffer the most.
In this situation, some kind of stalemate could emerge, where tariffs lead to rising inflation, reducing the political appetite for escalation. Trade friction would likely continue until 2026, when a renegotiation of the trade agreement between the US, Mexico and Canada is due to take place.
Best case
Even under the best-case scenario, with reduced economic impact, GDP for all three countries still falls. Put simply, imposing tariffs creates no winners.
Since the tariff has been seen as a bargaining chip, the best option for Canada and Mexico will be to enter trade negotiations with the US, aiming for a balanced trade policy that is beneficial to all parties.
In the meantime, they should cooperate with other economies affected by US tariffs – such as the EU and China – in the hope that this encourages Trump to make concessions.
All three countries could then revert to their original low-tariff levels before the trade war. This constitutes the optimal scenario within our projected framework – and could be what happens eventually.
US treasury secretary, Scott Bessent, has said that Trump’s second favourite word is “reciprocal”. If that’s true, then it is possible that the Trump administration has the overall intention of cooling down the intensity of this trade war ahead of negotiating a new version of its trade deal with Canada and Mexico – and a new one with China too.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.