Sudan: From mob mentality to civic rationality
The efforts of the Sudanese Army (General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s militia) to reclaim the Republican Palace have proven futile, especially considering that this dilapidated hall lost its symbolic and moral value long ago — ever since it became the headquarters of the Salvation clique, where they conspired against the people and sowed discord among them. Today, the unit composed of conscripts from northern Sudan has been annihilated in Malha (North Darfur), a scene that may not bring joy to the souls of the faithful but is certainly a cause for reflection on the strife ignited by the Islamists across Sudan.
When the war broke out two years ago, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) had the necessary military strength but lacked a clear plan or strategy to seize power. As the war expanded and dragged on, their political legitimacy dwindled because of widespread violations against civilians. The RSF leadership found itself in a defensive position, struggling to justify its legitimacy and its ability to govern by providing security and services to the people. Until recently — before signing the charter and the constitution — the RSF hesitated, lacking both a coherent media strategy and a just governance philosophy that could move them beyond the narrative of victimhood and towards a broader, forward-looking vision.
In the early weeks, RSF soldiers were reportedly disciplined, but many turned to looting once the security forces lost control and chaos spread across the capital. This was precisely what the corrupt Islamists had planned: to create turmoil, allowing them to free their imprisoned comrades. Notably, Ali Osman, the former vice-president and founder of the Shadow Brigades, was seen among the escaping prisoners, a humiliating moment for a man who once projected an aura of power.
The Kezan (a term used for corrupt Islamists of Sudan) possess a media strategy, but it is little more than noise and bluster — designed to provoke an already disillusioned and emotionally vulnerable populace. But they lack the means to seize power outright, knowing they are reviled both regionally and internationally. History has shown them to be nothing more than desperate thieves who not only failed to provide the most basic services but also created a parallel state to enrich themselves. Their hubris led them to ignite a war they falsely claimed they could win in four hours — yet the conflict engulfed the capital, spread to other cities, and resulted in mass displacement, murder and untold atrocities that continue to this day.
Each time they are invited to negotiate to prevent the nation’s disintegration and salvage the army’s dignity, they double down on their intransigence. They deliberately sow discord, employing political and administrative maneuvers aimed at facilitating the voluntary or forced secession of western Sudan — just as they did with the South. Their aspirations remain pathetically small compared to the grandeur of the nation. They continue to delude themselves, thinking they can rule through deception, hypocrisy and brute force. But can they truly subjugate the people of the North and East after so blatantly humiliating the people of Al-Jazeera, allowing militias to ravage their lands under the command of the infamous double agent (Abu Aqla Keikel)?
The Islamists have enlisted tribal and ideological militias under the slogan “One Army, One People,” yet they have avoided reopening recruitment centres or reinstating qualified officers who were forcibly retired. Their fear? Losing control over the army and facing potential resistance from the Free Officers (those who remain). Instead, they have relied on conscripts with no professional military skills — individuals whose minds have been indoctrinated by their religious mentors and who are willing to sacrifice themselves in a war with no higher strategic goal beyond restoring the Islamic Movement to power and reclaiming its political, economic, and military dominance.
These conscripts, emboldened by their newfound role, now look down on the army itself, mocking its stature as they scramble for airtime on Al Jazeera Mubasher, which continues to broadcast this farcical spectacle — seemingly unaware of the damage it does to the morale of the so-called national army. It is, perhaps, a deliberate psychological ploy introduced by these conscripts, a prelude to gradually reintroducing these Islamist factions into the political scene.
The lingering question is what do the Islamists hope to achieve in their desperate bid to reclaim power? They institutionalised administrative corruption, built a framework of intellectual bankruptcy, encouraged diplomatic discord, nurtured cultural and educational decline, normalised political depravity, orchestrated economic destruction, and shattered the nation’s social fabric. No one knows the answer, not even their hidden backers.
Egypt, meanwhile, struggles to protect its own interests and has failed to develop a coherent strategy for Sudan. It neither wants the Sudanese army to win nor to lose, as it benefits from the ongoing security and economic turmoil, which ensures a steady flow of Sudanese resources into its hands without oversight. Russia and Iran are cautious about direct intervention, wary of provoking the United States. Turkey and Qatar, for their part, understand the corruption of the Islamists all too well but remain uncertain about how to engage with Sudan’s new rulers or how to respond to the rural masses now surging forward.
Sudan has no future unless it rids itself of the corrupt Islamists once and for all. But at what human and material cost? Global powers care little for the suffering of the Sudanese people; their primary goal is to break the so-called Arab entity and will not rush to resolve the conflict diplomatically or politically as long as the struggle continues between the pastoral Arabs and the Nile Valley Arabised elites. If the ultimate outcome is the removal of this extremist faction, so be it. But the broader objective is to establish a regional and tribal balance that fosters genuine coexistence among Sudan’s diverse communities.
Beyond the superficial narrative promoted by the government in Port Sudan through its local and international media mouthpieces, Burhan faces numerous challenges should he consolidate power in Khartoum and its surroundings. These challenges are deeply interconnected, creating a complex crisis with no easy resolution.
Politically, Sudan remains burdened by the legacy of a far-right Islamist regime that, for more than four decades — since Nimeiri’s flawed introduction of Sharia — sought to militarise politics, politicise identity and export terrorism globally. This long history of ideological entrenchment has shaped Sudan’s fragile diplomatic standing. The ongoing war has further isolated the country, leading to its exclusion from key organisations like the African Union, while the Arab League remains largely passive. This diplomatic isolation not only weakens Sudan’s ability to negotiate peace but also restricts access to critical economic aid and international mediation efforts.
The economic consequences of this isolation, combined with the devastation of war, are dire. An estimated 65% of the agricultural sector and 75% of the industrial sector have been destroyed, exacerbating the already severe humanitarian crisis. Despite this, the Port Sudan government, through its vice-president, Malik Agar, continues to deny the existence of a deep and widespread famine — a reckless stance that underscores the administration’s detachment from the suffering on the ground.
Compounding these economic hardships are deep-rooted social divisions. Sudan continues to struggle with the legacy of spatial apartheid and the discriminatory “Law of Strange Faces”, which targets people from western Sudan. This marginalisation is not just historical but actively reinforced by Port Sudan’s vengeful policies, as seen in the atrocities committed against black Sudanese in Al-Jazeera state.
These political, diplomatic, economic, and social fractures directly fuel Sudan’s ongoing military instability. Burhan’s reliance on integrating militias with diverse ideological and tribal agendas only heightens the risk of further fragmentation and violence. Without a coherent national strategy to address these interwoven challenges, Sudan faces a prolonged period of instability — one well-documented in Sarah Zuckerman Daly’s 2014 study, The Dark Side of Power Sharing, which warns of the dangers inherent in such fractured military structures.
For Sudan to achieve true coexistence among its people — rather than merely cohabitation between two armies — there must be an acknowledgment that what happened on 15 April 2022 was not a rebellion but rather the collapse of a system that had long been eroding from within. This necessitates shifting focus to the core issue: the imperative of embracing a comprehensive national settlement — one that acknowledges the injustices suffered by all since independence. Only by confronting the legacy of a brutal, racially entrenched centralism can Sudan move forward. True reconciliation must occur not just between allies but between enemies — and it cannot be dictated by the mob mentality that insists on an “inevitable military resolution”, but it must be stipulated by civic rationality, upheld by men and women of will and wisdom.
Dr Waleed A Madibo is a governance and international development specialist, the founder and president of the Sudan Policy Forum and a Fulbright scholar.