SANDF: A force stretched to its limits

The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) plays a critical role in maintaining domestic and regional security.

Despite its strategic importance, it faces serious problems that threaten its operational effectiveness. Underfunding, inadequate resources, maintenance failures and internal discipline issues have weakened the force, raising questions about its ability to fulfil its obligations.

The SANDF has participated in multiple missions that place considerable strain on its resources. Its current regional peacekeeping missions include operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 

The SANDF is deployed for an offensive mandate under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Mission in the DRC (SAMIDRC), which replaced the East African Community regional force after its expulsion from the DRC by President Félix Tshisekedi in 2023 and the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC. 

The South African soldiers in the DRC face significant operational problems, including logistical difficulties and inadequate funding, as the mission attempts to stabilise eastern DRC, where M23 rebels, backed by Rwandan forces, have captured key cities and mineral-rich areas. Thousands of people have been killed and displaced.

A recent communique noted updates on the security situation in eastern DRC and considered the SAMIDRC mandate report from the 6 March Extraordinary Organ Troika Summit. At a SADC summit in Harare a week later, leaders announced the termination of the SAMIDRC mandate and a phased troop withdrawal from the DRC.

The SANDF also recently withdrew from northern Mozambique, where it had been deployed as part of the SADC Mission in Mozambique to combat the extremist insurgency in Cabo Delgado. 

Although the mission made progress and had notable successes, logistical constraints ultimately limited its effectiveness.

In its domestic operations, the SANDF has been tasked with securing South Africa’s borders, particularly the one with Zimbabwe to curb illegal cross-border activities such as smuggling and human trafficking. 

Since December 2023, about 3  300 SANDF soldiers have been used to combat illegal mining carried out by informal miners known as zama zamas, which have had a destabilising effect on local communities, the environment and the economy.

SANDF troops have also been deployed to protect Eskom infrastructure from sabotage and criminal activity since 2023.

In 2024, President Cyril Ramaphosa deployed 880 soldiers to four Eskom power plants at a cost of R146 million over six months. Although this operation aimed to protect South Africa’s energy security, it diverted military resources from their primary defence mandate.

The SANDF continues to provide assistance during natural disasters, such as floods and fires, highlighting its expanding domestic role in the face of national crises. These natural disasters are occurring with increasing frequency and intensity as a result of climate change. Poor resilience planning has not helped.  

Despite increasing demands on the SANDF, funding for the military has been steadily declining. Peacekeeping missions do not have dedicated budgets and instead rely on reallocations from the operational and capital budgets, straining already limited resources.

In the 2023-24 financial year, the department of defence received a budget of R51.1  billion, a net decrease of R500  million from the previous year. The 2025-26 budget is set at R58.52  billion, an increase from R55.94  billion in 2024-25. But, after adjusting for inflation (4.4% in 2024), the real increase is marginal, effectively maintaining the status quo rather than addressing long-term funding deficits.

While political will plays a role in shaping defence policy, financial constraints appear to be the more significant limiting factor in ensuring military effectiveness. 

Inadequate funding, declining capacity and concerns over military readiness have been flagged for many years. 

As highlighted in defence analyses dating back to at least 2015, these problems have persisted despite policy efforts. Therefore, while budgetary limitations play a critical role, the broader condition and efficacy of the SANDF must also be considered when assessing why it struggles to perform.

Given South Africa’s sluggish economic growth and competing budgetary priorities, the country struggles to allocate sufficient resources to national security. International benchmarks suggest that countries allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence spending to maintain adequate security capabilities. South Africa’s defence budget consistently falls below 1% of GDP, highlighting both fiscal limitations and a lack of prioritisation in strengthening national security. 

This underinvestment has broader implications for the country’s ability to meet regional security commitments under SADC, potentially weakening its role in collective defence and crisis response mechanisms.

The SANDF’s operational readiness is severely compromised by outdated and poorly maintained equipment. South Africa’s 26 Gripen fighter jets are among the most advanced on the continent. Of these, however, 13 are in storage and one has been written off, leaving only 12 operational. None of the C-130BZ Hercules transport aircraft are airworthy, severely limiting airlift and combat capabilities. 

Maritime defence capacity is inadequate, with only one operational frigate and a single multi-mission inshore patrol vessel. None of South Africa’s submarines are currently functional, raising concerns about the country’s ability to secure its vast coastline.

Landward defence capability has similarly stagnated, not only because of a lack of investment but also the systemic governance failures in state-owned enterprises (SOE) such as Denel, the country’s arms manufacturing firm. The army’s infantry, armoured and mechanised units operate with aging equipment, exacerbated by Denel’s long-standing mismanagement. 

Denel’s failure to deliver 264 Badger armoured personnel carriers, despite an R8.3  billion contract signed in 2007, exemplifies the broader issue of both SOE and procurement mismanagement. Denel has been plagued by financial instability, leadership crises, and corruption, as evidenced in the Zondo commission’s findings on state capture. 

The air force lacks strategic airlift capability, hampering its ability to reinforce or resupply troops deployed outside South Africa. This poses a significant risk, particularly in peacekeeping missions where mobility and rapid response are crucial.

The deaths of the 14 South African soldiers in the DRC in late January 2025 occurred largely as a result of insufficient air cover for ground troops, and exposed the poor state of the SANDF’s tactical intelligence, particularly in operations where counterinsurgency and asymmetric warfare strategies are required. 

As noted by Moses Khanyile, director of the Centre for Military Studies at Stellenbosch University, the SANDF requires enhanced surveillance, reconnaissance and early warning systems to effectively respond to security threats. Strengthening these capabilities would improve operational readiness and situational awareness, ensuring a more proactive approach to national and regional defence.

A 2015 United Nations report report identified SANDF soldiers as among the worst offenders in cases of misconduct, raising concerns about accountability. But recent reports from battles in Saki and Goma in the DRC suggest that South African forces have demonstrated bravery and commitment to their mandate. The dedication displayed highlights a remnant of professionalism and resilience in the ranks, offering a foundation for future improvements through stronger leadership and accountability measures.

Given the current state of the SANDF, South Africa must critically reassess its military commitments and funding priorities, along with ensuring institutional improvements to improve spending efficacy. The government faces a difficult choice: either properly resource the SANDF to meet its increasing obligations or scale back international deployments to focus on pressing domestic security needs. 

As argued by Khanyile, addressing capacity and funding gaps is essential to ensuring the SANDF remains capable of protecting South Africa’s national interests and contributing effectively to regional stability. 

A strategic dialogue between the minister of defence, the minister of finance and the president could help develop a sustainable funding and modernisation plan, safeguarding the long-term viability of the SANDF while balancing fiscal constraints.

Investment in key areas would strengthen the force’s operational readiness and ensure it continues to fulfil its mandate nationally and in the region.

If the SANDF is to maintain its ability to protect South Africa’s national interests and contribute meaningfully to regional stability, timely financial and structural intervention is crucial. Failure to act decisively will not only compromise South Africa’s security but also threatens to diminish its role as a regional power in peacekeeping and conflict resolution efforts within the SADC framework.

Leleti Maluleke is a peace and security researcher at Good Governance Africa.