Declassified JFK Files: Transcript Reveals Israeli Scientists and US Experts May Have Played Roles in Transfer of Nuclear Intelligence to Israel

The newly declassified JFK file revealed that former CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton testified under oath in an executive session before the Church Committee in 1975 about deep intelligence ties between the United States and Israel.

The testimony, given in a top-secret executive session, was part of the Senate Select Committee’s broader investigation into intelligence operations.

Though much of the session was focused on Cold War espionage and Soviet defections, one line of questioning zeroed in on allegations that U.S. intelligence may have assisted Israel’s covert nuclear program.

Angleton, who served from the agency’s founding until late 1974, confirmed a formal, albeit unwritten, intelligence-sharing agreement between the CIA and Israeli operatives beginning in 1951, one reportedly brokered between Angleton and Reuven Shiloah, Israel’s first Mossad director, noting that the relationship operated on a fiduciary basis and avoided documentation.

Excerpts from the declassified JFK file reviewed by The Gateway Pundit (p.15):

Staff Director William Miller: And under whose authority was the agreement made?

Mr. Angleton: Under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on the other side.

Mr. Miller: And this involved the exchange of resources of both countries?

Mr. Angleton: The term “resources” is not quite correct. Everything except their own people. It was giving up papers and signals, communications Intelligence, and all the other products of intelligence action.

Mr. Miller: So the Director of Central Intelligence was aware of the agreement. Was the President?

Angleton: The President was aware of it. And the Secretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the CIA, and eventually was very much involved.

Mr. Miller: Where is a record of this agreement kept, as an instrument of the U.S.?

Mr. Angleton: The internal papers would be in the Agency. The tetters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to the President or to the Secretary of State, I assume are still in the Agency.

…If you are speaking as to whether there was a representative treaty which was cleared – and people wanted these things cleared – I don’t think there were any clearances obtained from the Hill.

…And it is a custom of intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some understanding. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common understanding. So, these were all understandings that were generated by events.

But the hearing took a dramatic turn when Senator Howard Baker and Committee Counsel Frederick Schwarz began probing Angleton about a sensitive topic: alleged transfers of U.S. nuclear knowledge to Israel.

When pressed on whether the CIA directly or indirectly transferred atomic technology or nuclear-related intelligence to Israel, Angleton firmly denied any such involvement (p.26).

Mr. Schwart: I want to make sure that I have asked the question broadly enough. Did the Agency take any steps to make available to the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic matters.

Mr. Angleton: None whatsoever.

Despite his denial, the transcript revealed that Angleton was confronted with allegations raised by journalist Tad Szulc and author Seymour Hersh—who both suggested that key figures, including Israeli scientists and former U.S. nuclear experts, played roles in a clandestine pipeline of nuclear knowledge to Israel.

One name that emerged prominently was Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, a CIA scientist involved in controversial mind-control experiments (MK-Ultra) and psychological warfare programs. Another was Dr. Wilfred Mann, described as possibly a Soviet mole and a close associate of infamous traitor Kim Philby.

Hersh had even claimed that U.S. plutonium was transferred covertly for use in Israeli nuclear weapons development.

Angleton responded to these claims with caution. He acknowledged that if such transfers occurred, they were not within his knowledge or authorized under CIA operations.

However, he did express concern about the consequences of such allegations on U.S. credibility and Middle East diplomacy, especially if widely believed internationally.

Mr. Schwarz: Do you know a journalist called Tad Szulc?

Mr. Angleton: I do.

Mr. Schwarz: Did you meet with him sometime this year?

Mr. Angleton: In March.

Mr. Schwarz: Where did you meet him?

Mr. Angleton: At the house of Ben Wells.

Mr. Schwarz: And did the three of you then go for dinner someplace?

Mr. Angleton: That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz: At that meeting did you discuss–

Mr. Angleton: We went as Szulc’s guests somewhere to dinner.

Mr. Schwarz: At that meeting did he raise with you the subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the CIA to Israel?

Mr. Angleton: Yes.

Mr. Schwarz: What did he say to you?

Mr. Angleton: They prefaced his remarks by stating that he was not a professional scientist, but he was a Jew, and so was his good friend Hersh. And they had some strange ESP working in which one said to the other, have you heard what I have heard?

And the other one said, I think I may have heard what you have heard. And then this thing went back and forth, and then it finally devolved, one said did it have anything to do with Angleton, and the other one said yes, and it went on to where they discovered that each had had separate sources that I had been instrumental in acquiring plutonium for the Israelis, and as a follow-up, to help the Israelis on their know-how by sending Dr. Mann to Israel clandestinely.

And they both had their stories, and they had a gentleman’s agreement. And the matter was published without notifying the other.

Mr. Schwarz: And what did you say in response?

Mr. Angleton: My response to him was, it was wrong. But he had not identified the scientist. So, I asked him—

Mr. Schwarz: When you say it was wrong—

Mr. Angleton: His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz: So you denied the story that atomic technology had been transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton: I said, it is wrong.

Mr. Schwarz: I just want to make sure what it is. It does constitute a denial.

Mr. Angleton: His story was wrong.

Senator Baker: Let me ask you, Mr. Angleton, do I understand by that that you mean every material aspect of the story was wrong and incorrect?

Mr. Angleton: I didn’t mean quite that. I was more interested in the fact that, one, he knew Tad Szulc—I am sorry that I knew Hersh—and that Hersh told him that his source was the man who gave him the December 22 article, and whether he “had been set up.”

Senator Baker: What December 22?

Mr. Angleton: That is the time they kicked off the entire furor on the past espionage thing.

Senator Baker: Against American citizens?

Mr. Angleton: Yes.

Senator Baker: Did they do that once?

Mr. Angleton: No, because neither disclosed their independent sources to the other.

Senator Baker: The point I am trying to clarify for my own purposes is that the conversation you just related you said was wrong. Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect of that statement was wrong?

Mr. Angleton: Yes. But I didn’t know my motives on a lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly heard from Hersh.

Mr. Schwarz: I just want to make sure, in your conversation with Mr. Szulc, as opposed to your testimony here today on the merits, did you deny to Mr. Szulc that you or the Agency had facilitated the transfer of atomic technology to Israel?

Mr. Angleton: I denied it. But the conversation drifted rapidly, because Szulc was talking about a very great agent that he had in the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact that he had more sources than Hersh had.

James Angleton did suggest that Tad Szulc had a source in India, or at least made references that implied insider knowledge connected to India.

During the testimony, Angleton recounted a peculiar and cryptic conversation with Szulc, in which Szulc said things like:

• “Do you know Sydney?”
• “Do you know who is bicycling in India?”
• “Does the word Sydney mean anything to you?”

Angleton interpreted these remarks as indirect references to Sidney Gottlieb, a former CIA scientist involved in covert programs. He noted that Gottlieb had been transferred to Australia and had traveled in India, which matched what Szulc appeared to be alluding to.

“And Sidney X. And Sidney X is Sidney Gottlieb, who was one of our technical employees who retired, and is now in Australia. … And he was bicycling in India.”

This exchange led Angleton to believe Szulc had a remarkably informed source, possibly within or connected to intelligence operations—someone who knew about CIA personnel movements, such as Gottlieb’s travels.

Although Angleton didn’t confirm with certainty that Szulc had a direct source in India, the conversation strongly implied that Szulc had received accurate and classified-level details that surprised even Angleton.

On page 100 of the file:

Senator Tower: In your capacity as Head of Counterintelligence, did it ever come to your attention—did you ever have any certain knowledge that Israeli agents were actually trying to acquire nuclear secrets in the US, atomic secrets?

Mr. Angleton: Do I have to respond to that?

Mr. Kirbow: Would you like to go off the record a moment, Mr. Chairman?

Senator Tower: We can go off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

You can read James Angleton’s full 1975 testimony to the Church Committee below:

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