Israel’s worrying release of violent West Bank settlers
Hamas released three young Israeli women hostages on Jan. 20. In exchange, Israel released 90 Palestinians, primarily women and young people, the latter held in Israeli prisons without charge for up to six months — a practice called “administrative detention.”
The dual sets of releases mark the first steps in the Israeli ceasefire agreement with Hamas, part of the first of three phases that would end 15 months of war.
The first phase, which will lead to the release of an additional 30 Israeli hostages and approximately 1,700 Palestinians, is meant to be completed in six weeks.
Negotiations for the second phase — involving the return of all hostages, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza and an end to the war — are slated to begin two weeks after the initial hostage and prisoner release. The third phase involves the reconstruction of Gaza.
As former President Joe Biden indicated the same day while the hostages were returning to Israel, the ceasefire and initial hostage and prisoner releases offer hope for an end the hostilities between the Jewish State and its terrorist enemy.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the latest effort to end the war that began on Oct. 7, 2023, when Hamas attacked an Israeli music festival, has received widespread coverage throughout the world.
Yet there was another group of prisoners, whose release was timed with the first phase of the Israeli-Hamas agreement, that has received far less attention.
On Jan. 16, just two days before the first sets of hostage and prisoner releases, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announced that he would be freeing seven settlers who had been held in administration detention for terrorizing, vandalizing and attacking Palestinians on the West Bank. As Katz put it, “in light of the expected release of terrorists from Judaea and Samaria [the West Bank] as part of the hostage release deal, I have decided to release the settlers … to convey a clear message of strengthening and encouraging the settlements.”
Put another way, if Israel could release Palestinian terrorists, he could do the same for Israeli terrorists.
The release followed Katz’s earlier announcement in November, when he proclaimed an end to future administrative detention for West Bank settlers. He did so despite a warning from Ronen Bar, the head of Israel’s intelligence agency known as Shin Bet, that a decision to exempt Israelis “will result in immediate, severe and serious harm to the security of the state.” Not only did Katz ignore Bar’s warning, he also released the Israelis without informing Shin Bet, which, in a statement of its own, noted that Katz had not sought an assessment of the implications of his decision. Of course, Bar had already warned Katz of those implications, which the defense minister had previously ignored.
Katz, who took over as defense minister after serving as Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s foreign minister, hardly has an unblemished political record. In 2005, the Israeli state comptroller reported that Katz, then agriculture minister, illegally used taxpayer funds to pay advisers who were members of the party institutions responsible for ministerial appointments. As a result, Katz was called in for questioning by fraud squad investigators; two years later, police indicted Katz for fraud and breach of trust. In 2009, however, Attorney General Menahem Mazuz dropped the case against Katz, who by then had become transportation minister, on the grounds that the state could not definitely demonstrate that the appointments had been made for political reasons. Instead, all that Mazuz could say was that Katz’s conduct had been “inappropriate.”
Katz has survived — indeed thrived — politically not only because he is a right-wing supporter of the politically powerful settler movement but also because he is a long-time supporter of Netanyahu.
It is noteworthy that Netanyahu did not move to block Katz’s decision to release the West Bank settlers. Netanyahu’s tacit approval was most likely tied to his urgent need to mollify Treasury Minister Bezalel Smotrich. Most likely for the same reason, the prime minister authorized a major military operation in the West Bank city of Jenin only three days after the Gaza ceasefire took effect.
Smotrich has been a vocal opponent of the ceasefire deal. With Itamar Ben Gvir and his Otzma Yehudit party having left the coalition, Netanyahu cannot afford to lose Smotrich and his Religious Zionist party as well. As long as Smotrich remains in government, Netanyahu has a majority of four in the Knesset; without him, the government will collapse.
Surely the prime minister is aware that Katz has essentially given settlers a free pass to run amok, one that a could ignite a major Palestinian flare-up on the West Bank at the very time that the follow-on phase of the ceasefire is being negotiated. Yet Netanyahu runs an additional risk that is perhaps even more serious for Israel’s fortunes.
If the negotiations collapse and Israel and Hamas are back at war, no one will be angrier than President Trump, who is committed to a quick end to the conflict. Trump’s reaction in turn could lead to a break between the two countries that is deeper and perhaps more enduring than any fissure that has taken place over the past several decades. It is a prospect that Netanyahu would be well advised to avoid, even if it means overruling his hitherto compliant and supportive minister of defense and incurring the wrath of his treasury minister.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.