Colluding with the Communists: The Dixie Mission to Mao
As the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) President Xi Jinping has promised to “reunify” Taiwan and the PRC, the United States is attempting to rapidly modernize and shift resources in support of Taiwan to deter PRC aggression. Unbeknownst to many, before the United States held such a tenuous relationship with China, the US military closely worked with Mao Zedong and the founding Communist leaders during World War II, particularly through the shared approach of guerrilla warfare. During that period, the Chinese Communists implemented guerrilla warfare as their primary form of fighting, enabling the Communists to withstand superior weapons and military might by the Japanese and the Nationalist government since 1927. the Chinese Communists implemented guerrilla warfare since their first clash with the Nationalist government in 1927. During WWII, the United States recognized the apparent corruption and relative combat ineffectiveness of the Nationalist government against the Japanese, and various American leaders looked curiously at the Chinese Communists as a vastly untapped resource, a potential catalyst for a change in the war. In a memorandum to the Secretary of War in February 1944, acting Secretary of State Stettinius highlighted the estimated 500,000 Nationalist soldiers dedicated to containing the Communists instead of the Japanese, writing, “If harmony could be restored between these two factions in China, it might be expected that troops from both groups would be available for use against the enemy.” Sent as the United States Army Observer Group (colloquially referred to as the Dixie Mission for its purpose in “rebel territory”) with the mission to assess the feasibility of partnering with the Chinese Communists, the Dixie Mission was later deemed a diplomatic failure and has largely been lost in memory regarding US-Sino relations. Still, this remarkable point in history draws attention to the military relationship between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, and provides contemporary lessons on guerrilla warfare, particularly in the context of a future potential conflict involving Taiwan reunification.
The PRC’s Perspective on Unconventional Warfare
Before examining historical lessons on unconventional warfare through the Dixie Mission’s cooperation between the CCP and the United States, it is important to see the PRC’s perspective today. Examining the PRC’s history, in addition to examining their strategic documents, helps understand the PRC’s view on guerrilla warfare. In addition, this also helps make sense of the potential deployment of PRC forces and their counteractions in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait. For the PRC, guerilla warfare and the “Peoples’ Army” largely contributed to fighting Japan in World War II and driving the Nationalist Kuomintang out of mainland China. Until 1993, the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) strategic guidelines focused on preparing for a large invasion first from the United States and then the Soviet Union. For both threats, the PLA planned an active defense to attrit the invader, with the 1964 and 1977 Military Strategic Guidelines specifically declaring guerrilla warfare as its primary form of operations.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the PLA’s strategic guidelines has been based on a peripheral war involving Taiwan, what most recently has been termed “winning informationized local wars.” The PLA’s modernization under Xi Jinping has published little in the use of guerrilla warfare but has made great strides advancing military capabilities within the Army, Air Force, Navy, Rocket Force, and now the Information Force. Because of an improving economy through the past few decades, the PLA no longer needs to use guerrilla power. Nonetheless, the use of irregular warfare is still deeply embedded in the PLA’s strategy.
While guerrilla warfare is no longer predominately used by the PLA, it plays an instrumental role for both the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) and the People’s Armed Police (PAP). The Maritime Militia for example, has been the lead element for protecting territorial interests in the South China Sea. This allows the PRC to operate in the gray zone with coercion, limited conflict, and defensive layers to escalate force to the Coast Guard and then the Navy, with the additional benefit of expanding their intelligence network to thousands of fishing vessels. The PAP’s 660,000 personnel are charged with the missions of internal security and augmentation to the PLA. The PAP’s role is commonly seen as fighting the “three evil forces” at home and abroad: terrorism, separatism (claimed in Taiwan and Tibet), and extremism (claimed in Xinjiang Province). The PAP has had extensive experience in Xinjiang Province to suppress social unrest. In a conflict with the ROC, the PAP could likely be used in urban centers to conduct stability operations and counterinsurgency with their experience in population control.
Prior to the PLA’s massive military modernization, the US Observer Group watched Mao firsthand shape the CCP’s military strategy. The Dixie Mission remains one of the first efforts of military cooperation between the United States and the PRC, providing valuable insight into the Communist leaders and their perceptions of guerrilla warfare. The US Army Observer Group reveals the work of military and political officials’ role in initial contact with a guerrilla force, highlighting the complex dynamics that can inform preliminary coordination with surrogate forces or guerrillas today. The Dixie Mission’s tasks, organization, challenges, and results each shed light on US-Sino relations today and informs the use of guerrilla warfare within the greater context of large-scale combat operations.
Searching for Untapped Resources: The Mission to Reach the Communists
Foreign Service Officer John Davies initially recommended an observation group to the Chinese Communists in a memo to General Stillwell. Davies argued a strong case in favor of observing the Communists, as the last time the US interacted with them was six years prior in 1938. In that year, Marine officer Captain Evan Carlson was the first official US observer, and reporter Edgar Allen Snow embedded with the Communists, writing Red Star over China, which described his observations and interviews of Mao and the Communist Guerrillas. Within the memo that would eventually reach President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Davies claimed that in Communist China there is: (1) a base of military operations in and near Japan’s largest military concentration and second largest industrial base, (2) perhaps the most abundant supply of intelligence on the Japanese enemy available to us anywhere, (3) the most cohesive, disciplined and aggressively anti-Japanese regime in China, (4) the greatest single challenge in China to the Chiang Kai-shek government, (5) the area which Russia will enter if it attacks Japan, and (6) the foundation for a rapprochement between a new China and the Soviet Union.
With the only intelligence on the Chinese Communists coming from Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist government, General Stilwell was interested in getting his own view and assessing the potential to partner against Japanese forces. Even with Stilwell’s input, Chiang Kai-Shek refused to approve of the US Observation Group. Indeed, Chiang Kai-Shek had a difficult history with the Chinese Communists that cemented his position against them, even being forced by his own generals to cooperate with the Communists against the Japanese in the Xian Incident. The Dixie Mission was accepted after FDR pressured Chiang Kai-Shek, using his considerable leverage with the Lend-Lease program followed by a visit from Vice President Henry Wallace.
Today’s proponents of guerrilla warfare have common cause with the Dixie Mission; that is, guerrilla warfare is often selected in a weakened state containing multiple actors competing for power. This dilemma raises policy questions on the feasibility of cooperating with units that are antagonistic to each other, or even in direct conflict with each other despite the presence of an external enemy. The strength of the guerrilla units is often demonstrated in their relationship with the local communities, which extends the guerrillas’ resiliency through intelligence and sustainment networks. The political undertones of partnership with indigenous forces must be balanced with the actual ability to disrupt the occupying force, and the end states that are desired from each party.
After months of pushback by Chiang Kai-Shek, the United States Army Observer Group to the Chinese Communist set off on July 22, 1944. Colonel David Barrett, a day before departing Chungking for the Communists’ headquarters in Yenan, realized the group had no official mission to execute besides the general concept of observing. In response, Intelligence Officer for the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater, Colonel Dickey, hastily wrote a memorandum requesting the collection of any information related to Communist forces, Japanese forces, weather, economic and naval intelligence. The exceedingly broad directive suggested the rushed manner that CBI headquarters initiated the Dixie Mission, a potentially strategic objective.
Only months after the Dixie Mission started, Special Emissary for the President of the United States, Major General Patrick Hurley, arrived in Yenan with the purpose of bridging the diplomatic divide between the Communists and Nationalists. On September 7, 1944, without any forewarning to the Observer Group, Hurley landed in Yenan to meet the key Communist leaders. While Hurley had little experience or background in Chinese affairs, he had been selected by the President for his political acumen and particular skill in negotiations. As he was oft to remind those around him of the strong deal he made once between the state of Mexico and the Sinclair Oil Company. Over the course of the next year, Hurley mediated between the Chinese Communists and Nationalists in an effort to officially unite forces against Japan.
Unbeknownst to the special emissary of the Dixie Mission, the OSS was working with John Davies to collaborate with the Chinese Communists against the Japanese. In the winter of 1944, three days of meetings – led by OSS representative Lieutenant Colonel Wilis Bird – were held with Zhou Enlai and the Chief of Staff for the Communist Army, Ye Jianying. During the talks, they discussed the use of an American Airborne Division to work with Communist Forces. Additionally, plans were conceived for the OSS to advise and assist Communist forces in guerrilla warfare, intelligence and sabotage, including the 650,000 in the Communist army and 2.5 million from the People’s Militia. While the Observer Group had been sent to conduct an initial assessment, there were representatives within the Dixie Mission that were disjointedly at different levels in terms of their willingness to cooperate with the Chinese Communists.
The Dixie Mission’s beginnings serve as a warning to future observation groups – understand the political ramifications and clearly define the purpose for the mission. While the US maintains “strategic ambiguity” in its relationship with Taiwan, leaders at the highest levels need to know their limitations, purpose, and their red lines. The US’s position is highly volatile due to the political nature between the PRC and the ROC, and the military needs to ensure it clearly knows its mission and boundaries in security cooperation to reduce risk of strategic miscalculation.
Organization of the Observer Group
The Dixie Mission lasted from 1944–1947, consisting of two contingents, with the first being a group of nine personnel commanded by Colonel David Barrett, and the second arriving shortly after on August 7, 1944. The contingent included personnel from the State Department, CBI G2, OSS, Air and Ground Forces Resources and Technical Staff, (an OSS and Army Air Force initiative), Air Ground Aid Service, Navy and assorted Army representatives (refer to figure two). While Barrett headed the observation group, each sub-group had their own stakeholders for reporting and interests, with an overly broad mission that loosely unified the group. Partitions within the Dixie Mission could be seen as political and military, covering intelligence, operations and recovery.
John Service and Raymond Ludden represented the State Department with occasional visits by John Davies, to assess whether there was a potential to unify the government between Chiang Kai-Shek and Mao’s Communists. Major General Hurley would also make it his mission to create a treaty amenable to both parties to concentrate them against the Japanese occupation. In a large shift that would affect the Dixie Mission, General Stilwell was removed from command in October 1944, and Ambassador to China, Clarence Gauss, resigned and was immediately replaced by Hurley.
Militarily, Colonel Barrett sought to assess the effectiveness of the Communist forces, personally traveling to observe the Japanese Resistance Political Military University, while others like Colonel Peterkin (OSS), Captain Colling, Ray Ludden, and Major Casberg were sent on surveys across Northern China to assess guerrilla operations, civilian support, and assist in down pilot recovery missions. Within these, the OSS increasingly saw the opportunity to work with Mao’s extensive intelligence network.
Several of the Dixie members taught classes to the Communist forces. In his memoir, Spirit of Yenan, John Colling reflects on teaching demolition and sabotage techniques in Yenan: “I was sent to Yenan in part because of my expertise in demolition and guerilla warfare. There were four demonstrations in total and attendance at each averaged about 1,000.” Likewise, OSS members looked for ways to coordinate intelligence, establishing a microfilm lab and teaching the Chinese Communists to use it.
The Dixie Mission served as a partner feasibility assessment that would have international implications for years to come. It represents a unique moment in time before Mao’s rise to power when the United States may have been able to shape a shared partnership with the Chinese Communist Party. Strategically, partnership with the Chinese Communists would have partially isolated Russia from neighboring allies post-WWII and set a different trajectory in Sino-US relations. While it was unknown how beneficial the Communists would be to the war effort, the relative shortcomings of the Nationalists’ government compelled many in the China Theater to look for alternative ways to get additional support. The selection of indigenous partners to support US objectives can have strategic consequences in the near and long-term. The dynamics between the United State military and groups it chooses to partner with has had far-reaching strategic implications for decades. During the Cold War, the United States was more willing to support certain groups or leaders who would oppose the Soviet Union, despite their own crimes against humanity. Training the Contras in Nicaragua and providing assistance to Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War both became points of contention that have been domestically condemned, and have raised suspicion on the intentions of US military assistance internationally. In today’s information age, it is more important than ever for the United States to select partners that embody the same values and share the same objectives.
Organizational and Mission Challenges
The first obstacle for the Dixie Mission was sanctioning a mission through the Nationalists government to cooperate with the Nationalists’ domestic enemies for the past decade – the Communists. Since the Chinese revolution – which overthrew the imperial government – China was shaped by feuding warlords, and then extensively by the political aims of unification by both the Nationalists and Communists. Following the Japanese invasion in 1937, both Chinese groups attempted to temporarily reconcile differences to fight a shared enemy, but their political convictions and Chiang Kai-Shek’s resolve (and possible attempt to hold his power) proved the efforts futile. The United States ultimately had the leverage to push the Observer Group forward, but it arguably meant a significant loss of face for Chiang Kai-Shek as his leadership and military prowess were inherently questioned.
The second issue faced by the Dixie Mission was a disjointed effort between the political and military portions of the Observer Group. Politically, Major General Hurley was completely invested in brokering a negotiation (see figure three) between Communists and Nationalists to unify a combined front, which had been attempted and failed twice previously. Militarily, the OSS, with no communication to Hurley, already began discussing the potential of guerrilla warfare with the Communists and to prepare for large-scale combat operations after the European Theater closed.
Additionally, during the time of negotiations, Mao discreetly asked the naval representative of the Dixie Mission, Lieutenant Herbert Hitch, to send a letter directly to Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King. The letter entailed a request for military support, stating that the Communists, upon US request, would secure a 25-mile perimeter on the Shandong Peninsula with over 250,000 soldiers. Unfortunately, once Chiang Kai-Shek and the Nationalist government heard the observer group moving forward with military plans without an explicit deal, negotiations crumbled. Writing to Hurley, Stilwell said, “The 18th Group Army (Reds) will be used. There must be no understanding on this point. They can be brought to bear where there will be no conflict with Central Government troops, but they must be accepted as part of the team during the crisis.” In Stilwell’s perspective, the Communists were valuable enough with or without the Nationalists’ approval.
The Effects from the Dixie Mission
The United States Observer Group to Yenan served as a means to explore if the Chinese Communists would work in cooperation with the Nationalists and the US to dispel the Japanese forces. The group was recalled on August 16 1945, and many members of the group would later be labeled as pro-communist based on their reports, and their careers sequentially shelved. But the Dixie Mission, as the only official medium between the United States and the Chinese Communists at the time, did provide valuable insight into the methods used by the Communists, and contributed in several ways to the war effort by training, sabotage, and rescues.
The Observer Group managed to take battlefield tours, visiting guerrilla bases near enemy lines, weapons factories, and observing their interactions with the local populace and the Japanese. In his book, Yenan!: Colonel Wilbur Peterkin and the American military mission to the Chinese Communists, 1944–1945, US Air Force Historian William Head chronicles Peterkin’s experiences with the Dixie Mission, particularly during his visits to other Communist areas outside of Yenan. During one expedition, Peterkin witnessed how guerrilla fighters had created underground passages below a village: “During the days following, Peterkin inspected secret tunnels used by the Communist guerrillas and peasants…The guerrillas and peasants scattered the soil over nearby fields so as to cloak their tunnel digging efforts. Some tunnels led to secret rooms built under peasant houses…The tunnels frequently provided the main secret route of guerrilla passage from one village to another.” In another visit, Peterkin toured a weapons factory, “within twenty-five miles of the Japanese lines, a munitions plant that turned out rifles and pistols made from railroad steel using hand-powered lathes.” The Dixie Mission provided rare first-hand experience to examine the Communists’ support and sustainment for guerrilla warfare.
Likewise, the Dixie Mission gave the US observers an overview of their intelligence network. At Yenan, observers interacted with Japanese Communist Okano Susumu, who oversaw the Japanese war prisoners, defectors, and their interrogations. The Communists refined interrogation techniques and were very successful in causing Japanese soldiers to defect and share intelligence. From defectors, they created psychological warfare groups designed to encourage Japanese to surrender. Colonel Barret noted about 150 Japanese prisoners in Yenan, who would be interviewed by the Dixie Mission. Barret and John Colling, serving in the Dixie Mission for the OSS, both noted the depth and scope of intelligence that the Communists utilized with informants and clear communication in Tokyo. Barret noted how the Communists received Tokyo newspaper Asahi 10 days after publishing, and Colling noted, “the League also operated an intelligence network that ran from behind Japanese lines in China to Tokyo, which assisted my top secret ‘Apple Project’ in finding out the actual results of the B-29 bomber raids on Japanese cities.” The OSS and Air Ground Aid Group worked extensively to tap into the Communists’ intelligence network and were at least successful in utilizing it for recovery operations saving approximately 300 Americans airmen from crashed landings.
The Dixie Mission not only conducted assessments of the Communist guerrillas, but utilized the expertise from several of its members to train and share US tactics, techniques, and procedures in terms of weapons, training, and planning. Colonel Barrett had directed the Observer Group’s expert in demolitions, John Colling, to give a demonstration and instruct the Communist soldiers in the use of explosives. Colling recalled teaching methods for disrupting railways, “I was sent to Yenan in part because of my expertise in demolition and guerilla warfare… My repertoire was quite diverse; I destroyed wide gauge railroad tracks by using a new explosive called Composition C.” Likewise, he witnessed how the Communists would make mines out of rock that Japanese metal detectors could not read, using command wire to detonate under a mule cart track all with minimal resources in the local economy. This subject matter exchange was one example that revealed techniques and capabilities to both units and fostered a shared determination against the Japanese forces in China.
Less known about the Dixie Mission is some of the observers’ participation in kinetic operations while with Communist guerrillas. As Colonel Peterkin moved to a “Japanese Resistance Base” near enemy lines, he targeted and called for fire on Japanese supply lines. As historian Head writes, “Peterkin was pleased to hear that his earlier request to the 14th Air Force to bomb Anyang had been fulfilled. A Japanese armored train had been destroyed.” Similarly, as John Colling visited forward bases near Japanese borders, he recorded and participated in a raid against a blockhouse, a Japanese fortified defensive position. After several days of calling for the blockhouse’s surrender by defected soldiers who joined the Japanese Emancipation League (JEL), Colling and the guerrilla unit of 40 soldiers built tunnels, emplaced explosives, and destroyed the blockhouse. While kinetic operations were infrequent for observers, they did join at times and assist.
Over the course of two years, the United States Army Observer Group managed to assess a wide survey of capabilities from the Chinese Communists and their guerrilla forces. From kinetic operations, search and rescues, expanded intelligence, training techniques, or additional weather stations, the Dixie Mission provided a new source of information on the growing Communist power in China. While Major General Hurley and the mission never successfully negotiated a cooperative partnership between Nationalists and the Communists against Japan, the mission maintained a continual touchpoint with Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and the rising leaders of the Communist government following the war. For guerrilla warfare, the Observer Group revealed tactics and techniques unique to the Communists and learned firsthand from their expert on the matter, Mao Zedong.
Contemporary Applications
The Dixie Mission not only represents a unique point in time where the United States built diplomatic relations with Mao Zedong prior to the founding of the PRC, but also sheds light on the differing aspects of choosing partners and their leadership for strategic purposes. Throughout the 20th century, the United States has sided with certain factions or leaders and faced the consequences of both good and bad assessments. The Dixie Mission reflects the importance of partner assessments, political rivalry, population support, and the use of intelligence.
Partner Assessments
Operationally, the Dixie Mission represents a common dilemma for partner assessments today and in the future. As an external actor, it is difficult to support resistance or military groups in one country when they have opposing viewpoints or end states. Major General Hurley worked tirelessly to negotiate an agreement between the Communists and Nationalists, but ultimately the years of bloodshed between both groups and an unwillingness to compromise prevented a unified effort against the Japanese. Also, it reveals the truth that US involvement with a resistance force provides that force with increased legitimacy as a military and political actor to the international community. While there were many positives that came from the Dixie Mission, it lacked a unified mission and message which ultimately caused US relations to both the Nationalists and Communists to suffer. Partner feasibility assessments need to examine cultural group dynamics, desired goals, and a potential partner’s ability to cooperate with other indigenous forces. Partner selection today is too important to leave for last-minute groups of opportunity but deserves a deeper assessment over time of goals and objectives, with a clear end state.
Political Interests and Inter-service Competition
Guerrilla warfare will succeed or be heavily impeded based on political backing or division. Like in special operations, a principle of guerrilla warfare is working in politically-sensitive environments that can have operational to strategic ramifications. As such, the political cost of guerrilla warfare and the potential consequences are often too high to support. For the US Army Observer Group, McCarthyism and the hunt against anyone who appeared to support communism had a detrimental effect on the mission. In his preface, John Colling noted, “[W]e returned with complimentary reports, which were subsequently silenced by the politics of McCarthyism, and rendered unnecessary by the dropping of the atomic bomb. Most Dixie Mission members were dismissed from further meaningful government duty.” The Observer Group primarily served to assess if military cooperation was possible, but political negotiations and interest were inherently ingrained as the Chinese Communists remained a potential alternative with ideological differences to Chiang Kai-Shek’s government.
Units or agencies that conduct initial contact and partner feasibility assessments today need a clear mission, operational authorities, and political support to develop a comprehensive assessment. Colonel Barrett, the commander of the group, received an overly broad mission the day before he left for Yenan. Once with the Communists, many members of the mission came from different services with different agendas, which at times conflicted and hurt their collective mission. Without a clear mission from military and political leaders, the Dixie Mission eventually damaged its negotiations with the Communists because of differing agendas.
Operational authorities are also essential – currently statutory code 127d and 127e enable irregular warfare in combatting terrorism and special operations in conditions short of traditional armed conflict. Establishing authorities to conduct irregular warfare during traditional armed conflict needs to occur prior to a crisis or conflict to ensure special operations forces (SOF) can respond rapidly. Using intelligence to identify potential resistance groups prior to conflict also allows for a faster response and can expedite political decision-making when necessary.
Population Support
The US assessment of the communist guerrillas highlighted a fundamental quality for successful guerrilla warfare – public support. One Chinese historian reflected on the Communists’ balance of fighting and garnering public support: “Guerrillas could not realistically engage large bodies of Japanese regular troops. The main achievement of the Communist armies in the war was to win the support of peasants and the respect of the Chinese people.” Others both experienced and read reports on the significant differences between how Nationalist and Communist soldiers treated the local people. The heavy repression from the Japanese forces enabled the Communist guerrillas to gain local support as they positively made efforts to help in small towns and villages, subsequently growing their intelligence net, resiliency and overall support. As Peterkin toured across Communist country, he also saw how villages would aid the guerrillas in concealment and caches, building a three-mile-long tunnel system in one area with multiple secret and booby-trapped entrances connecting different houses. In his book, On Guerrilla Warfare, Mao affirmed:
What is the relationship of guerrilla warfare to the people? Without a political goal, guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained…. The moment that this war of resistance dissociates itself from the masses of the people is the precise moment that it dissociates itself from hope of ultimate victory over the Japanese.
The Chinese Communists treated public support as a fundamental quality required to survive and see eventual success against Japanese occupation. Because of public support, the Communists maintained certain advantages from guerrilla warfare, namely political support of the population and the ability to conceal or ambush from urban and rural areas because of local cooperation.
With over 20 years of experience in counter-insurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has clearly seen the critical relationship that exists between an insurgent or guerrilla force and the population. “Winning the hearts and minds” of the populace requires a level of competence and legitimacy and includes the ability to meet core grievances and the needs of the public. C.M. Woodhouse, a British Special Operations Executive agent who supported the Greek resistance during World War II wrote, “There has never been a successful guerrilla war conducted in an area where the populace is hostile to the guerrillas, and conversely it is virtually impossible to stamp out a guerrilla war in an area where the populace continues to support the guerrillas.” In order to gain public support, the public first needs sufficient will to resist occupying powers. Positing a conflict or occupation of Taiwan by the PRC, the ROC has invested extensively in civil-military integration and cooperation, enabling the public to understand the military’s role and overall political goals. Civil-military integration and the use of guerrilla warfare could be well set up as the ROC prepares for an asymmetric battle according to its National Defense Strategy. However, it is still to be determined if the populace of Taiwan has the desire and will to resist if necessary.
Human Intelligence
Lastly, the Communists’ methods of interrogations, detainment, and use of Japanese defectors along with psychological warfare should be further studied for modern relevance. Japanese soldiers during WWII were known for their radical adherence to duty and honor, by and large preferring suicide to surrender. For the purposes of intelligence, Japanese preference for death over capture significantly hindered collection from Japanese prisoners of war or defectors. Primary sources from the time noted a distinct difference between how Nationalists treated Japanese prisoners of war, versus the Communists’ care of prisoners. In Stilwell and the American Experience, Tuchman noted, “No one had ever seen the prisoners claimed by the Kuomintang except for a token group which was always the same, like the captured helmets.” In contrast, John Colling described how the Communists shifted from Chinese traditions of captive abuse to humane treatment.
In The Spirit of Yenan, John Colling recalls the process of receiving Japanese prisoners of war, and how the Communists used it to their advantage. For example, Japanese forces instated a regulation that any soldier who was absent for three days would be executed. The Communists in return, would treat the Japanese prisoners well, giving them clothes, food, cigarettes, and a “guest house” with a mix of re-education classes and a liberal amount of free time. After three days, prisoners were allowed to leave, but also knew they would go back to harsher conditions and perhaps be executed if they returned to their unit. This was all done through the Japanese Emancipation League (JEL), so prisoners were received and treated by former Japanese soldiers. The JEL heavily emphasized re-education, and reportedly found that the Communists were able to capture approximately 2500 Japanese soldiers, and about 300 joined the JEL in anti-war propaganda. While Japanese soldiers of the time were often ideologically driven to fight and serve their country, the Chinese Communists found effective ways to reduce unit cohesion and increase their own human intelligence. Treatment of detainees matters and can either help or hinder intelligence gathering activities. Additionally, this historical review of CCP treatment of prisoners reveals a deeper focus on psychological operations, which, combined with information operations, can be highly effective.
Conclusion
The Dixie Mission reveals the unique relationship that the United States had with the Chinese Communist Party prior to the PRC and portrays the challenges that the US government continues to face in assessing and selecting potential partners to conduct guerrilla warfare. One diplomatic report on the situation in China shares an honest assessment of the complexity in identifying partners within a divided state: “although our intentions have been good and our actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group, but the Central Government have been diplomatically correct…. chaos in China will be inevitable, and the probable outbreak of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated.” The support of guerrilla warfare often happens at the tactical level, but always has operational to strategic consequences militarily and for the associated implications to the US government. Initial contact with resistance groups requires clear political goals, overarching military objectives, and support to ensure a successful transition to extend military reach through guerrilla warfare.
Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official position of the Naval Postgraduate School, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.
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