Lebanon’s new president faces uphill struggle to steer country away from brink of collapse

Lebanon’s parliament elected a new president on January 9 after a two-year political deadlock and 13 failed attempts. Joseph Aoun met the threshold for victory in the second round of voting after his rival, a Hezbollah-backed candidate called Suleiman Frangieh, withdrew from the race.

In his inaugural speech to parliament, President Aoun outlined a series of pledges to deal with the overlapping crises that have brought Lebanon to the point of collapse. However, delivering on these promises will be immensely challenging.

Aoun’s presidential victory is remarkable. He did not publicly campaign for the job, and none of the political parties sponsored him as their favoured presidential candidate. So, how did Aoun emerge to win the presidency?

Rather than an established scion of the political class, Aoun is a career soldier, serving as the commander of Lebanon’s army since 2017. Lebanon’s army, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), is a rare example of an institution that is widely seen as a unifying symbol in Lebanon.

Aoun effectively stopped the army from being dragged into the recent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, despite the deaths of over 40 LAF soldiers, and he played a decisive role in overseeing a 60-day ceasefire deal brokered by the US and France in November.

The main backers of Aoun’s presidential bid were a loose network of regional and international players, including the US, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These states all view Aoun as their best hope of maintaining the brittle ceasefire, while also overseeing the restoration of Lebanon’s national government.

They have used their leverage by making the delivery of economic aid to Lebanon contingent on the main political factions electing Aoun.

The election of Aoun provides further evidence of the weakening power of Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah has suffered several political and economic reversals over recent years.

In the 2022 general election, Hezbollah and its allies lost their parliamentary majority. And then, in 2024, Israel appears to have weakened Hezbollah’s military machine, including killing its leader Hassan Nasrallah and several senior figures.

Read more: Lebanese election sees significant gains for independent non-sectarian politicians

The recent ousting of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria has also deprived Hezbollah of a powerful ally, while the group’s main backer, Iran, is in no position to maintain its level of funding. Iran’s capacity to support Hezbollah has reduced significantly due to international sanctions spearheaded by the US to prevent the regime in Tehran from developing nuclear weapons.

Lebanon’s former president, Michel Aoun (not related to Joseph Aoun) was a longtime ally of Hezbollah. The group had hoped it could install another ally into the presidential palace by supporting the candidacy of Frangieh. But Frangieh withdrew from the race and, alongside a number of other lawmakers, announced his backing for Aoun.

In his first speech as president, Aoun stated: “My mandate will emphasise the state’s right to monopolise arms.” Although Aoun did not name Hezbollah directly, his words were understood to mean that he would seek to disarm the group. Hezbollah parliamentarians sat silent while most MPs applauded Aoun’s statement.

Off to a good start

Aoun has charged his presidency with several lofty ambitions. But these ambitions will prove difficult to deliver. The power of the presidency has strict limitations owing to its largely symbolic figurehead status.

The position of president is primarily to service Lebanon’s power-sharing system. This system provides guarantees of representation in parliament to 18 sect communities. To ensure that no group can monopolise political power, the role of president is reserved for Maronite Christians, while the prime minister must be from the Sunni Muslim community and the speaker of the house is Shia.

President Aoun has pledged to reform the power-sharing government. Survey evidence indicates that Lebanon’s government has the lowest level of trust in the Middle East. The Lebanese power-sharing system is prone to dysfunctional political institutions, policy deadlock and periodic rounds of collapse. Power-sharing politicians are known for corruption and vote buying.

Aoun is off to a good start. A few days after his appointment, he convened parliament to elect a new prime minister, Nawaf Salam, the current head of the International Court of Justice. Salam’s confirmation is a surprise because, like Aoun, he is not seen as patron of any of the major political parties in the country.

The fact that the usual horse-trading between the main parties to agree on a new prime minster did not occur further underscores the weakening of Hezbollah, which was unable to get its preferred candidate, Najib Mikati, back into power. In response to Salam’s appointment, Hezbollah lawmakers accused their political opponents of trying to exclude them and fragmenting the country. Salam has a long history of calling for reform of the state and tackling endemic corruption.

Aoun and Salam now face many challenges in delivering on the hope that many Lebanese feel following their appointments. They will need to form a government as a matter of urgency to create political stability and approve a budget. Lebanon confronts a dire economic situation that the World Bank has identified as among the “most severe crisis episodes seen globally since the mid-19th century”.

A further urgent priority is supervising an extension to the current ceasefire deal with Israel, which comes to an end on January 25. The current agreement requires Israeli troops to withdraw to their side of the border.

With the backing of the army, large sections of the Lebanese population, and powerful international players, Aoun and Salam form a pairing that give realistic hope for a period of sustained stability and reconstruction. But finding a way to build consensus politics in Lebanon will not be easy, especially if the new president and prime minister set a course that brings them into confrontation with Hezbollah.

The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.