How to counter insurgencies
IT is easy to say that the state must develop comprehensive and distinct counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies; however, what does comprehensive mean? This critical aspect is often missed in policy and public discussions. As insurgents in Balochistan have escalated their attacks, marking a significant increase in frequency and intensity over the past several months, it becomes essential to analyse the characteristics of the insurgency.
Another question often raised during policy discussions is how to compare the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). How are they different, and why does the BLA qualify as an insurgent group while the TTP does not?
The operational strategy and capabilities of Baloch insurgent groups have evolved significantly. The BLA, in particular, has transitioned from conducting low-intensity, small-scale attacks several years ago to executing more sophisticated, high-profile operations today. Similarly, the TTP has adopted operational strategies similar to the BLA’s, albeit on a different scale. Both banned groups draw inspiration from the Afghan Taliban’s strategy, which was effectively employed in Afghanistan.
The Taliban did not invent new strategies; they mainly adopted classic guerrilla warfare tactics, maintaining a light footprint and avoiding large-scale conventional battles except in situations with overwhelming local superiority. This approach allowed them to sustain a prolonged conflict against more powerful adversaries. Both the BLA and TTP have incorporated elements of this strategy, adapting it to their local contexts to prolong their campaigns.
Public support for the state is critical for a successful counterinsurgency strategy.
Bard E. O’Neill, one of the leading scholars of modern warfare, insurgency, and terrorism, provides valuable insights into these complex subjects. His work helps answer critical questions, such as what constitutes a comprehensive strategy in addressing insurgency and terrorism. Among his many contributions, O’Neill’s book Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare stands out as particularly important for understanding these issues in local and global contexts.
O’Neill emphasises that the primary distinction between insurgency and terrorism lies in the political goals and public sympathy that violent actors seek to cultivate. Insurgencies are often defined by their broader political objectives and the level of public support they command. In contrast, terrorist organisations typically lack widespread appeal in their political messaging and resort to terrorist tactics to generate fear and attention.
Insurgency and terrorism can be distinguished based on their goals, methods, and scope of operations. Insurgents aim to overthrow existing governments, achieve autonomy, or enact significant political change. For example, the TTP has attempted to enhance its insurgent credentials by reducing attacks on civilians and focusing on broader political aims.
On the other hand, terrorist operations tend to be more decentralised and clandestine, focusing primarily on high-profile attacks to instil fear and undermine the authority of the state. O’Neill acknowledges that there is often significant overlap between insurgency and terrorism. Insurgent groups may employ terrorist tactics as part of a broader strategy, while some terrorist groups may evolve into insurgencies if they gain sufficient popular support or territorial control.
The key distinction lies in the scope of ambitions and the nature of operations. Insurgencies are typically long-term movements involving large-scale organisations, with military and political wings working in tandem. They tend to operate within a specific region or country, aiming to challenge the state’s authority and legitimacy directly. In contrast, terrorist groups usually conduct isolated attacks designed to draw attention to their cause, disrupt societal order, and demoralise opponents.
In this context, the TTP is an insurgency in the making. O’Neill categorises insurgency into seven forms, the worst being the anarchist type, which seeks to destroy the current order without replacing it. Such insurgencies tend to proceed slowly and have limited capacity for dialogue. In contrast, secessionist insurgencies aim to create a new independent state. Traditionalist insurgencies seek to restore a previous social, political, or religious order.
Both the BLA and the TTP overlap these categories. Other forms of insurgency include egalitarian, pluralist, reformist, and preservationist, none of which characterise the BLA or the TTP.
O’Neill outlines a typical three-phase approach used by insurgent movements. The first phase is the Latent and Incipient Phase, during which insurgents build support, recruit members, and establish networks. The BLA has completed this phase, while the TTP is struggling to regain the confidence of people in tribal districts and religious schools in Pakistan. To overcome this weakness, the TTP is mainly recruiting people from Afghanistan and Pakistani refugees in Afghanistan who migrated during military operations in North Waziristan.
The second phase is the Guerrilla Warfare Phase, characterised by small-scale hit-and-run attacks aimed at weakening government forces. The final phase involves insurgents engaging in more conventional military actions to confront the government.
However, insurgent groups with secessionist tendencies require a political face, which the TTP lacks, and the BLA is still seeking. O’Neill also emphasises the importance of Counterinsurgency (COIN) principles, which provide key insights into comprehensive counterinsurgency strategies. The first principle is that the state must restore its image and be perceived as legitimate by the population. Population support and public perception of the state are critical components of a successful counterinsurgency strategy.
The second component is accurate and timely intelligence to disrupt insurgent networks, which is only possible with the population’s support. Securing the population and preventing insurgents from gaining support is crucial. This means the state must end policies based on discrimination.
In Balochistan, resolving the issue of missing persons can limit the BLA’s appeal. Winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the population is essential to denying insurgents the base of support they need. Addressing socioeconomic grievances is also an integral part of COIN.
Usually, states with fragile political and social structures do not learn from history. They keep repeating similar mistakes and try to fill the gap of intellect through intel.
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, January 12th, 2025